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ABSTRACT
There are substantial bodies of theoretical literature regarding learning by individuals,
organizations, and regions. There appears to be no theory that applies at all levels, or explains
how learning at one level relates to learning at other levels. This study reviews the theoretical
literature on individual, organizational, and regional learning, applies textual analysis to chart the
gap between these bodies of literature, and posits an explanation that fills this gap. The
fundamental theory proposed here is that community yields learning, or that community makes
people smarter. A conceptual framework is provided for explicating and evaluating the proposed
theory, and it is illustrated via a thought experiment. Community is presented as a phenomenon
or process, rather than a place or thing, and learning as a gain in capabilities, which are equated
to real freedoms: specifically, liberty, prosperity, and wellness. This study details how
community functions result in increased capabilities, and provides suggestions on how this
proposition might be applied in practice and investigated through research.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Overview and Background to the Problem
This dissertation will suggest and explicate a multilevel theory of learning. My intention
is to provide an explanation of learning at the individual, organizational, and regional levels, and
how learning at each level of social aggregation relates to learning at other levels. Rather than
suggesting an entirely new theory, I identify a gap between bodies of literature and propose a
synthesis of a wide range of theories related to learning. And, I provide a conceptual
framework—which builds on and extends existing concepts—that can be used to apply and test
the theory. Finally, I illustrate use of the proposed theory and conceptual framework by applying
them to broadband high-speed internet services and higher education.

Statement of the Problem
Individuals learn. Organizations learn. Even regions learn. These assertions are well
established by substantial bodies of empirical, practical, and theoretical literature, which are
reviewed below. While there is some literature that relates learning at different levels of social
aggregation—Coleman (1988) and Upton and Egan (2010) for examples—there is no theory that
clearly links all three levels; and there is no theory that applies at all levels. The literature review,
below, will substantiate these assertions.
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There are numerous theories of learning, a multitude of theories related to learning, and
even more literature on the application of the theoretical literature. All behavioral sciences,
major areas of philosophy, and several academic disciplines that combine other disciplines
(communication and information sciences, management science, political science, policy
science, and economic geography and regional science) contribute to the development of a
comprehensive, multilevel theory of learning. Similarly, such a theory could contribute to
criticism, explanations, improvements, and predictions in many domains of human endeavor.
Thus the core problem of this dissertation is to propose a theory that is broadly inclusive and
widely applicable.
The problem may be best understood in a specific context: How individuals,
organizations, and regions acquire and use high-speed internet access, or broadband, and how
that interacts—or doesn’t—with higher education. In order to use broadband, individuals must
have some understanding of internet applications and content (i.e., the worldwide web), a
computer or similar device, skills necessary to make use of that device, and broadband. More
importantly, individuals must have a purpose for using the technology, even if that purpose is
mere curiosity or to pass the time. Organizations face similar knowledge requirements to make
use of broadband, but with even greater emphasis on purpose. Hypothetically, an organization
can increase efficiency and efficacy via broadband—becoming more productive and profitable—
but only if members of the organization know how to use the technology for the organization’s
purpose. Of course, the knowledge and technology must be available in the region—particularly
broadband, which is physical infrastructure—for individuals and organizations. But, why deploy
the infrastructure unless people know how and why to use it?
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Higher education presents similar practical problems in need of a theoretical explanation.
As a subject, it is useful for illustrating different aspects of this theory. Individuals learn—at
least in part—via higher education. That learning is applied via organizations, and contributes to
a region’s knowledge base. At the same time, colleges and universities must learn as
organizations to accomplish their purposes, and so must the individuals who comprise them. If
regions are to build and capitalize on institutions of higher education, they must learn, too.
Broadband is increasingly important to such efforts, and higher education can impact the value
of broadband as a purveyor of knowledge. There is an interaction between infrastructure and
institutions that has implications for learning across levels.
Broadband and higher education seem to require learning at the regional, organizational,
and individual levels. And, both are nominally useful for learning at and across levels. They are
prime examples of interdependence of learning at various levels of social aggregation. How and
in what ways such things are interdependent is just the type of thing I hope to provide a way of
explaining. The intersection of these two topics—broadband and higher education—provides a
specific context for detailing the problem and for illustrating a possible solution.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to propose a theory not from empirical observation but from
analysis of existing, validated theories. I propose to identify a gap between theories about
learning at different levels of social aggregation and then extend and integrate those theories to
suggest an explanation that links them together. My purpose is also to illustrate my concepts and
conjectures about how learning occurs across levels by applying them to broadband and higher
education.
3

Research Questions and Hypotheses
What is the relationship between learning at the individual, organizational, and regional
levels? As will be shown from the literature review, there is currently no theory to explain how
they relate. The goal of my dissertation will be to explain this relationship, and to provide a
multilevel model of learning that is useful for measuring and predicting, for describing and
explaining, and for critiquing and improving learning in such context. I address learning by
individuals, organizations, and regions in a way that is consonant with and synthesized from
accepted theory: The problem is not with existing theories, but with the gaps between them. So,
my goal is to provide a potential explanation that bridges those gaps, and can be used to generate
hypotheses about how learning occurs across levels of social aggregation.
Hypothetically, there is a relationship between learning at various levels of social
aggregation. Further, we can surmise that this relationship is positive, that learning at the
individual level complements and promotes organizational learning, which has a similar
relationship to regional learning, and vice versa. What is the effect of learning at one level on
learning at other levels, and what is the mechanism of this effect? How might we explain and
predict this effect, let alone improve learning across levels? These are the questions I intend to
address in my dissertation. I present a tentative explanation, and provide a specific consideration
of how that explanation might be applied to acquiring and using broadband.

Conceptual Framework
Part of the problem is that we have no conceptual framework for examining the
relationship between learning at different levels of society, and for assessing whether and to what
extent learning at one level contributes to learning at other levels. This means we have an
4

incomplete understanding of learning, so there is a scholarly problem. If theory at one level is
inconsistent with, even contradicts, theory regarding another level, then there are possible
problems with these explanations. Practically, the problem is that current understanding of
learning at different levels may be incomplete and fragmented, and an impediment to
performance improvement. I propose to provide a conceptual framework that is theoretically and
practically useful for understanding learning across levels of society.
That said, the conceptual foundations of this study are human agency and social
construction. Human agency is the concept that humans act in their own interests. It is prevalent
in economic (Coase, 1960; Arrow & Hurwicz, 1977), psychological (Simon, 1991; Bandura,
2001, 2006), and sociological (Thibault & Kelley, 1952; Roloff, 1981; Latour, 2005) theories.
Social construction is the concept that concepts, institutions, and knowledge are created, and
reality is defined, via human interaction (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Blumer, 1969; Vygotsky,
1978; Habermas, 1984; Giddens, 1986; Bruner, 1990). This primarily a sociological theory but
been applied to psychology (Bandura, 2001) and economics (Cooke & Leydesdorff, 2006) has
implications for all forms of knowledge, including science: As Kuhn (1996) famously noted,
what passes as scientific knowledge is socially constructed.
As a theoretical dissertation, theory and theorizing are also conceptually important. My
conceptual approach to theory is that of post-positivism and postmodernism, particularly drawing
on Kuhn (1996), Popper (2003), Lyotard (1984), Lakatos (1976, 1978). Generally, this
perspective theory is simply a conjecture about the nature of reality. The fundamental criteria for
theory is that it be falsifiable because, as Popper (2003/1963) pointed out, it is impossible to
prove something true. Kuhn (1996) holds that the primary role of science is to advance and/or
support normal science via accretion of evidence. The build up of evidence and elaboration
5

happens within the confines of narrow scientific worldviews. Lakatos (1976, 1978) occupies
something of a middle ground between Popper and Kuhn, holding that theories should provide
more explanatory power than their predecessors. Lakatos noted that various scholarly disciplines
have a core set of ideas that are inviolate, and a periphery that is constantly evolving. He
essentially concludes that theory must be judged by its consistence with accepted knowledge, its
heuristic value, and the novelty of its predictions. Feyerabend (1993) encouraged—to put it
mildly—skepticism toward scientific claims, maintaining that it science has no grounds for
priority over other claims about the world. All of this can be seen in the context of what Lyotard
(1984) termed the postmodern condition. To Lyotard, science is but a general metanarratives
about what is real and true, and the postmodern condition is seeing metanarratives for what they
are: stories told to validate the teller.
Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) define theory as, “a set of statements about the relationship(s)
between two or more concepts or constructs” (p. 28). Theory is a conceptual tool for thinking
and acting. “It may be decisive though not authoritative,” as Lindblom and Cohen (1979, p. 79)
note. I do not seek to make authoritative statements about relationships between concepts or
constructs. Instead, I simply hope to point out potential consilience between various research
programs (to use Lakatos’s term). I come with a Feyerabendian appreciation for the limits of
science, and a Lakatosian recognition that evidence enhances but does not make theory. Purely
conceptual work is important for advancing scholarship and promoting emancipation.

Rationale for the Study
This is a theoretical dissertation, the data for which are prior theories. A theoretical
dissertation answers its research question by identifying and filling the gaps in existing literature
6

(Calabrese, 2009). Also referred to as a desk, library, or literature-based dissertation, a
theoretical dissertation requires one to:
EVALUATE the literature as it stands and/or SYNTHESIZE (bring
together) more than one body of literature to see what one can add to the
other or where there might be similar or different sorts of claims being
made. … ¶ … The idea is to look for gaps, weaknesses, problems or biases
in the existing literature—to undertake a CRITICAL ANALYSIS—in
order to lay the ground for future research. (University of Leicester, n.d.,
para 3-5, emphasis in the original).
A theoretical dissertation might extend or integrate existing theories, or introduce new theories
(Institute for the Psychological Sciences, 2012). And, it should discuss the practical implications
of the theory, as well as implications for future research (London School of Economics and
Political Science, 2011).
The criterion for including existing theories has to be their relevance to learning and their
intersubjective validity: How well accepted are they across academic disciplines? Valid theory
should provide a consistent, complete, and falsifiable explanation of its topic (Popper,
1963/2003; Lakatos, 1976, 1978; Moore, 2001). And, of course, practical utility provides another
criterion (Lakatos, 1976, 1978; Feyerabend, 1993). These criteria also apply to the output of this
dissertation. This will be an attempt to synthesize a consistent, complete, and falsifiable
multilevel theory of learning that has explanatory power and usefulness. These criteria are also
the rationale for the study.

Significance of the Study
This dissertation will address gaps between theoretical literature regarding learning by
individual persons, organizations, and geographic regions. In their review of literature on
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organizational learning Bapuji and Crossan (2004) conclude that there is a need for better
understanding of levels of learning beyond single organizations. The literature review, below,
maps out these gaps. In his study of how place-based communities learn, Morse (2004) suggests
that, “the relevance of group and individual learning should not be ignored, and indeed, a rich
model of organizational, interorganizational, or community learning ought to consider the
linkages between levels” (p. 58). I propose to provide such a model (actually three models, from
a single general, proposed theory), identify opportunities for empirical research and practical
application, and illustrate how the models apply, including guidelines for empirical research,
focusing on how broadband is acquired and used. Basically, the significance of this study is that,
by addressing a gap between existing bodies of literature, it generates opportunities for research
and for improving learning practices.

Definitions of Terms
In this proposal, level refers to extent of social aggregation. Individual means a single
person. Organization refers to a group of individuals brought together for some purpose. A
region is a large number of individuals (and organizations) in a geographic area. And, community
is the phenomenon of persons sharing a sense of belonging, commitment, and influence.
Capability is ability given capacity. Knowledge is informed true belief. Learning is the action,
phenomenon, or process of gaining capabilities and knowledge. A theory is simply an
explanation or rationale for why something occurs or how different things are related. All of
these terms will be discussed in detail.

8

Delimitations of the Study
This is to be a theoretical dissertation. And, it is concerned with relations between levels
of social aggregation. It will not involve analysis of primary data. The analysis is limited to
theoretical literature regarding learning by individuals, organizations, and regions, and
specifically to identifying commonalities and gaps among/between these bodies of literature.
Discussion of the theory will be limited to the adoption and use of broadband, and to the
transformation of higher education.

Limitations of the Study and Assumptions
The primary limitation of this study is that, while it will provide a conceptual framework
and suggest an explanation, I do not test the conjecture other than conceptually. The proposed
theory will be consonant with diverse existing theories, and will provide potential means for
filling the gap between bodies of literature, but it will not involve primary data gathering and
analysis.

Summary and Dissertation Outline
I propose to synthesize an explanation and rationale for how learning occurs, and is
related, across levels of social aggregation. First, I review essential literature of individual,
organizational, and regional learning, including relevant literature from economics, philosophy,
psychology, sociology, and other disciplines, based on the criterion of relevance. Second, I
summarize methods for analyzing texts, and delve into theory building and model building
methods. Then I’ll provide an analysis of the literature to identify differences and gaps as well as
commonalities. The proposed theory and conceptual framework will comprise the bulk of the
9

third section, including general models derived from the theory. Lastly, I illustrate the theory by
applying it to broadband and higher education. This illustration will also provide guidance on
how to operationalize variables, develop metrics, and apply the proposed theory for practical and
scholarly purposes.

10

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Learning by individuals
The major early theories of learning were wholly behavioral and do not allow for
intentions or mind. Mind is defined as the faculty of living things that allows them (us) to sense,
respond to, and remember the world; the organ of consciousness, emotions, and imagination
(mind, n.d.). Behaviorist theorists, most notably Thorndike (1910), Pavlov (1927/2003), and
Skinner (1950), equate learning to conditioning. Changes in behavior come from negative or
positive reinforcements of responses to stimulus. Cognitivist theories of learning see the mind as
an information-processing mechanism. For cognitivists, such as Ebbinghaus (1913), Piaget
(1973), and Bruner (1966, 1990), the mind changes via the acquisition of information and
processing it into knowledge, which leads to changes in behavior. Frames or models for
organizing knowledge—schemata (Kant, 1781/2000; Piaget, 1973, 1983; Hirsch, 1987)—are
applied to data generated by the senses, allowing for recognition, decision-making and sensemaking, and the connection and transfer of knowledge from one setting to another (for example,
knowing that “night is dark” is automatically associated with other concepts about darkness and
night).
Cognitive science describes mental processes in terms of automaticity (effortless
cognition) (Bargh and Ferguson, 2000), accessibility (salience, priming, effects of experience)
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(Baldwin, et al., 1996), and assimilation/accommodation (incorporation of new information into
existing/new schemas via accretion, tuning, and restructuring) (Piaget, 1983). These processes
operate through frames of reference, models, theories, or worldviews—schemata (Kant,
1781/2000; Neisser, 1967; Rumelhart, 1980; Piaget, 1983; Hirsch, 1987) that focus learning but
can also interfere with it via confirmation bias (cognitive dissonance and group-think)
(Nickerson, 1998). All of these basically define the structure of knowledge, how schema relate to
each other, are created, recalled, used, and changed. Increasingly, schemata are seen as
embodied—integrated with behavior—rather than just something in our heads (Rumelhart, 1980;
Isanski & West, 2010).
The cognitivist approach is built on an input-output model that is explicated by general
systems theory (Bertalanffy, 1950, 1968). It is also closely related to the general models of
communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949), economics (Leontief, 1986; Miller & Blair, 2009),
and various biological and social phenomena, as well as the most widely applied design of
computers, known as the von Neumann model (Godfrey & Hendry, 1993; Barney, 2011).
Multiply input-output models and connect them as a network, and you have the basis of the
connectionism (Marcus, 2001). The networks are essentially sets of rules and strategies, which
are analogous to neurons, for dealing with uncertainty (Marcus, 2001). There is no central
processor, as in the cognitivist model; intelligence is distributed throughout the network’s simple
components (Marcus, 2001). Connectionism sees learning as changes, driven by data, in the
patterns of activation of those components; changes that result in improved outcomes (Marcus,
2001).
Constructivism is based on the sociological recognition that institutions—at very least—
are built via social interaction (Berger & Luckman, 1966). The psychological implication is that
12

individuals construct knowledge as they learn (Bruner, 1990), informed by interacting with
others (Vygotsky, 1978). Schemata are constructs or theories developed via variation and
selection/testing (Piaget, 1973); and development depends on the learner’s existing knowledge
and social setting (Vygotsky, 1978). The practical implication for education is that powerful
learning occurs as we build things, and even more so when we build them together (Papert,
1980), allowing collaborative creation and selection of schema. Wittrock (1992) sees learning as
“the process of generating relations both among concepts and between experience or prior
learning and new information” (p. 532). His approach is similar to constructivism but he
downplays structural elements such as schemata and emphasizes the generative functions.
Each theory of learning has its critics. Chomsky (1967) identified fundamental
weaknesses in behaviorism when he pointed out its fundamental weakness for explaining how
we learn language. Pinker and Mehler (1988) almost do the same for connectionism. Hacking
(1999) points out the limitations of constructivism. But each has its strengths. Latour (2003)
could be speaking of any theoretical approach as he calls for preserving the aspects of
constructivism that are useful for improving learning.
Bandura (1977, 1986, 1997, 2001, 2006) provides theoretical framework that
accommodates the stronger points of other learning theories. Individuals are agents who
regulate—to some extent—their own behaviors. Behavior is determined by personal and social
factors, which are affected by behavior. One’s perceived self-efficacy and expected outcomes
influence learning, as it occurs via experience and vicariously via behavioral models, and are
influenced by it. Fundamentally, Bandura’s (2001) theory is based on a simple idea; or, more
accurately, an axiom:
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A functional consciousness involves purposive accessing and deliberative
processing of information for selecting, constructing, regulating, and
evaluating courses of action. This is achieved through intentional
mobilization and productive use of semantic and pragmatic representations
of activities, goals, and other future events. (p. 3)
Bandura carefully defines terms and variables, and his theoretical approach—social
cognition and sociocognitive learning theory—is flexible enough to accommodate tests of
conflicting hypotheses and allow theoretical enhancements.

Drive and related theory
In drive theory the fundamental issue is drive. While the field has largely moved beyond
Freud’s (1961/1930) drive theory, Freud nonetheless provides a basis with his concepts of eros
and thantos as being opposing drives that are activated by biology and circumstances, motivating
behavior to satiate, and to repress when it is not beneficial or practical to fulfill them. Hull
(1951) and Spence (1958) theorized that responses to stimuli are a function of basic drives
mediated by learned behaviors. Maslow (1970) suggests a more detailed and nuanced drive
theory, based on a hierarchy of needs in which higher-level needs for belonging, esteem, and
self-actualization are addressed after more basic physiological and safety needs are fulfilled.
Lawrence and Nohria (2002) update Freud’s drive theory, based on findings in cognitive
science. They argue that behind our motivations and needs are four fundamental, biologicallybased drives: to acquire, to bond, to defend, and to learn. The drives are the basis for human
behavior, decision-making, emotion, and reason. There are tensions between these drives, which
are resolved via innate human skills (communicating, cooperating, gathering, hunting, etc.). The
basic biological drives to acquire, bond, defend, and learn are the rule-base for human cognition,
forming emotions, guiding reason, and giving rise to complex dynamic behaviors and systems
14

via innate skills. The innate skills provide the basis for more complex and specialized
capabilities. Learning is the drive to improve skills and better acquire, bond, and defend.
Drive can include internal/intrinsic and external/extrinsic motivations (Deci & Ryan,
1985), instrumental motivation to achieve means to some end, and integrative motivation to
belong (Carreira, 2005). Some external factors may motivate, while others can dampen
motivation if not present (Herzberg, 1959). Motivation is related to intentions and self-concept,
particularly vis-à-vis other persons, the object of need, what is required to fulfill the motive, and
perceptions of societal norms (Rotter, 1954; Heider, 1958; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Bandura,
1997).
Ryan and Deci (2000; Pink, 2009) identify needs for autonomy, competence, and
relatedness as fundamental human motivators. These needs emerge as intrinsic motivations.
When actions meet needs, motivation to act is internalized. Internalized motivation drives
intention. So, when actions meet needs, one is to act on one’s own. Extrinsic motivations such as
punishments and rewards disconnect actions from these fundamental needs, undermining
internalization (Kohn, 1993; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Pink, 2009). Other scholars, particularly those
studying second-language acquisition, have made a further distinction between behavior as a
means that is instrumental and integrative motivations (Carreira, 2005). According to Carreira
(2005), behavior motivated by desire to belong is more efficacious than behavior motivated by
desire to achieve, and both motivations are more powerful than extrinsic motivation but less so
than fully intrinsic motivation.
Reflection is consideration of one’s self, of one’s actions and their outcomes. It seems to
be essential to learning. Schön (2008) discusses how practitioners reflect as they act, and how
they reflect afterward. The critical difference between short-term reasoning and careful analysis
15

is further explicated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979; Kahneman, 2011). Some cognitive
processes occur rapidly and transparently. These processes are inherently conservative and much
more sensitive to risk of loss than to prospect of gain. Slower cognitive processes, in contrast,
allow the self to be disengaged in order to better balance potential benefits and risks via
calculation. Schön (2008) says that practitioners maintain a repertoire of intellectual tools for
applying as they reflect. They use these tools to choose a course of action. Bandura (2001)
emphasizes self-reflection as essential to self-regulation and foresight, guided by intention. More
fundamentally, reflexivity—cause is shaped by effect, the self authors the self, the actor is driven
by the action, agents create institutions that define agents—can be seen as essential to action and
cognition, as well as critical for learning (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Maturana & Varela, 1980;
Giddens, 1986; Bandura, 2001). Society serves as a mirror by which the individual comes to
know herself or himself.
The human-capabilities approach to development (Sen, 1988, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000;
Clark, 2005) sees the ultimate result of development as freedom and equates capabilities with
freedom. The capabilities approach distinguishes between actual state-of-being (“functioning,” in
Sen’s terms) and possible states of being, emphasizing ability to choose functionings from
numerous possibilities, and between “negative” freedom from constraint on capabilities and
“positive” freedom that enables capabilities. Sen, Nussbaum, and Clark do not specifically link
capabilities to drives, but they do note that capabilities generally involve fulfilling one’s needs.
Their focus is not so much on what is chosen as on the nature and number of possibilities from
which one can choose; the opportunity costs of each possibility, and the results of each choice.
Conceptually, drives—whether autonomy, competency, and relatedness, or to acquire, belong,
and defend—fit with the capabilities approach.
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Frankl (1984) maintains that, “Man’s search for meaning is the primary motivation …
meaning [that] is unique and specific in that it must and can be fulfilled by him alone” (p. 105).
It is also our primary responsibility, according to Frankl, to respond to life with a unique answer.
The same can be said for all entities—corporations, associations, institutions, etc.—and
especially for leaders. The drive for meaning dovetails theoretically with theories of motivation
and drive theory. These drives represent the why of learning—to acquire, bond, defend, and
learn; to be autonomous, competent, and related; for instrumental, integrative, and intrinsic
purposes, and perhaps extrinsic ones as well.
In summary, the authors of the literature review above are all talking about basically the
same (or at least closely interrelated) elements—about capabilities, why capabilities are
important, and what causes capabilities to increase. According to this literature, freedom
involves how we connect to others. Positive freedoms support drive fulfillment, and negative
freedoms suppress it. The literature reviewed above says, in sum, that freedom doesn’t just allow
drive fulfillment. Freedom is a fundamental objective of human drives.
Paradoxically, negative freedoms motivate action, while positive freedoms can make us
lazy. Fear of losing can itself be a negative freedom. Promise of rewards can reduce interest in
positive freedoms. We tend to respond stronger to risk of loss than to opportunity for gain
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The works referenced in this section, taken together, explain this
paradox. Essentially, the mind continually seeks to improve its abilities in order to make the
most of its limited capacity.
The question becomes what, in conjunction with drives and motivations, determines
increases in capabilities? What factors maximize learning at all levels? What maximizes it at any
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level? Are the factors for learning at any level different from the factors at other levels? How do
we learn, and how do we improve our ability to learn?
Regardless of our drives, how and whether one acts can be predicted by intention to act,
mitigated by perceived external cultural, economic, physical, social, etc., constraints (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1985, 1991). It is important to recognize that characteristics of objects in the
environment, and the environment itself, variably afford, or are latently conducive to, certain
action possibilities that are independent of one’s abilities (Gibson, 1977; Norman, 1999), but
recognizing that such affordances increase agency. If one believes the outcomes of an action will
be beneficial and desirable, and her or his significant others value the action, he or she will have
a strong intention to act, and is highly likely to do so. With such beliefs, the individual will
investigate what is involved in acting, and this information will inform intention.

Agency in socioeconomic context
Agents make use of various assets—facilities, information, materials, relationships, tools,
etc.—as they act. A simple fact of reality, which forms the basis of economics, is that assets are
relatively scarce; There are more agents and uses than there are available assets. Fundamental
economic theory (Smith, 1776/1904) holds that assets naturally accrue to the most-valued uses
via the market. Consumers express their preferences via purchases. Those who efficiently
produce what consumers demand, acquire more assets. Market efficiency—connecting demand
with supply with minimal added costs—depends on free flow of information. Productive
efficiency comes from structuring the production process, dividing tasks among workers.
Agents do not act in a vacuum; they interact with other agents. They associate with others
and with places, and they exchange information and resources, based on self-interest. This
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exchange is the basis of groups (Thibault & Kelley, 1952), of societal change and constancy
(Roloff, 1981), and of networks that enable or resist change (Latour, 2005). Identity inherently
involves self-awareness and self-concept, which shape interaction. Agents’ identification with a
group, and acting in the groups’ interests, defines personal and group identities, based on the
inherent human tendency to categorize, to differentiate, and desire to be part of the ingroup
(Tajfel, 2010). Action to establish and maintain relations is based on judgments about the
outcomes of interactions, and on the alternatives to or dependence on the relationship (Homans,
1958; Befu, 1977).
Identity, interaction, and intention all rest on an infrastructure of beliefs. They are
learned, but they are also constructed. They are built on beliefs about autonomy, competency,
and relatedness—beliefs about what these things are, about criteria for each, and beliefs of how
well others and self meet these criteria. Identity is built via interaction, which informs intention,
which leads to action. All of this—all knowing—occurs in cultural and natural context. It is
situated in (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Lave & Wenger, 1991), and is dependent on the
physical aspects of the body (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991; Isanski & West, 2010; Wilson
& Foglia, 2011).
A fundamental issue for agents is information and uncertainty—information is, for
present purposes, that which reduces uncertainty. As with other assets, information is unevenly
distributed, and agents have limited cognitive capacity (Simon, 1991). Asymmetrical information
can lead to sub-optimal choices, cheating and exploitation, and costs and risks being foisted on
those who do not receive concomitant benefits (Coase, 1960; Arrow & Hurwicz, 1977). Agents
often work on behalf of others—principals, in economic terms—but tend to place their own
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interests above those of the principals. Agents may also act collectively as means to more
effectively pursue their common interests.
Rational decision-making requires agents to identify alternatives, determine the
consequence of choices, and compare the consequences; the best, most rational choice is the
alternative with the best consequences (Simon, 1976). People in close proximity—crowds—
often behave as one (Blumler, 1951), yet it can be difficult for those with common interests to
act together (Olsen, 1965). Smelser (1965) identifies the components of collective behavior as
values, norms, motivation, organization, and situational facilities—pretty standard fare for social
sciences—but he goes on to note:
The major determinants are structural conduciveness, strain,
crystallization of a generalized belief, precipitating factors, mobilization
for action, and social control. ¶ We conceive the operation of these
determinants as a value-added process. Each determinant is a necessary
condition for the next to operate as a determinant in an episode of
collective behavior. As the necessary conditions accumulate, the
explanation of the episode becomes more determinate. Together the
necessary conditions constitute the sufficient condition for the episode. It
should be stressed, moreover, that we view the accumulation of necessary
conditions as an analytic, not at temporal process. (Smelser, 1965, pg. 2425)
Decisions to act collectively are based on how benefits and costs are distributed, and they
accrue to those involved in collective action (Olson, 1965). The greater the costs are, the larger
the group is, and the less the subjective value of action is, Olson (1965) posits, the less likely it is
that group members will act collectively. Under such conditions Smelser’s analytical, valueadded process cannot get started or progress. Inevitably, those with the most assets must lead the
collective decision, and those with the least participate and benefit without contributing (i.e. they
are “free riders”).
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Communities, markets, and organizations arise from a need to minimize the free-rider
problem. They are means to reduce the transaction costs of searching, contracting, and
coordinating (Williamson, 1981), to maximize social sense-making via environmental scanning,
interpretation, and guides for action (Weick, 1995), and to decision-making process of analysis,
design, and execution (Simon, 1976). Communities emerge wherever agents find a sense of
belonging, influence, needs fulfillment, and shared emotional commitment (McMillan & Chavez,
1986).
Decision-making—as well as community-building, organizing, and sense-making—is a
social undertaking because information is accessed via social ties, particularly weak ties
(Granovetter, 1973, 1983). Agents are embedded in networks that determine access to
information and knowledge and what they see as beneficial, desirable, possible, and practical
(Granovetter, 1985; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March, 1991; Burt, 2004; Chesbrough, 2006;
Christensen, 1997/2006). Giddens (1986) theorizes that agency and social structures, i.e.,
institutions, are codeterminant: individual actions are constrained by, but also shape, institutional
arrangements. Actions have symbolic meaning that must be interpreted, as agents interact,
according to Blumer (1969), which constructs the agents’ identity even as it guides their
behavior.
As they interact, agents also gain collective competence (Weick & Roberts, 1993/1996;
Bandura, 2001), increase productivity (Arrow, 1962) and absorptive (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990)
capacities, and innovate (Morgan, 1997; Cooke, 2002; Cooke & Leysdesdorff, 2005). The
fundamental issue is that technological advancement, incremental and radical changes in the
ways assets are combined and used, is the bedrock of economic growth; it also creates new
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information and knowledge, making others’ information and knowledge less complete and
valuable, creating competitive advantage.
Theories of individual learning initially attempted to explain acquisition of knowledge in
isolation. More mature theories recognize that knowledge is intrinsically social. Essentially,
learning is an increase in agency—ability to act in one’s own interests—that involves the
construction and application of embodied models of the world (schemata) to one’s self, to others,
and to things. As suggested by Bandura’s (1986) triadic reciprocity, one’s capabilities, or level of
knowledge, depends on personal characteristics—identity and intentions, particularly—and
social context, one’s communities, networks, organizations, and so forth. The former can be seen
as the sum of one’s beliefs. The latter are the means to drive fulfillment, particularly for
acquiring information related to drives. More than that, social structure constrains individual
action even as it extends individual capabilities. The social and the personal shape each other
even as they determine behavior.

Organizational Learning
Nevis, Dibella, and Gould (1995), among others, imply that all organizations are learning
systems:
We define organizational learning as the capacity or processes within an
organization to maintain or improve performance based on experience.
Learning is a systems-level phenomenon because it stays within the
organization, even if individuals change. One of our assumptions is that
organizations learn as they produce. Learning is as much a task as the
production and delivery of goods and services. (p. 2)
This position is built on basic economic theory. It extends from Arrow’s (1962) insights
into learning by doing. It implicitly accepts Hayek’s (1945) points about the uses of knowledge,
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and incorporates observations about the nature and role of institutions (Williamson, 1981, 2000;
Ostrom, 1990). It also fits well with theories related to individual learning from psychology and
sociology, discussed in relation to individual learning, above.
Senge (2006) makes the distinction between adaptive learning, which allows an
organization to operate, and generative learning, which “enhances our capacity to create” (p. 14)
and enables innovation. Cook and Brown (1999) posit that this results from a “generative dance”
between knowing and knowledge, between tacit and explicit knowledge. Christensen
(1997/2006) notes that innovation can vary in scope—from internal processes to external
marketplace—and from sustaining current market structure to disrupting it. Organizational
effectiveness can be understood, according to Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983), in terms of focus
and structure. They see focus as varying from internal to external, and structure ranging from
control to flexibility. Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) present this as the basis for various
organizational models, and for understanding core goals or values. Or, at least it is a basis for
thinking about organizations’ people, productivity, acquisitions, and stability.
There is something of a bifurcation between attempts to explain how organizations learn
and attempts to improve organizational learning (Argyris, 1999; Easterby-Smith & Araujo,
1999). Easterby-Smith and Araujo (1999) make a further distinction between the social and
technical views of both organizational learning and learning organizations. The technical, which
has dominated to date, focuses on organizational performance, particularly as measured in
economic or financial terms. The social is more concerned with how meaning is constructed.
Where the former eschews politics as a foil, the latter accepts it as an integral aspect of
organizations.
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Huber (1993/1996) argues that learning does not require a change in behavior: “An
organization learns if, through its processing of information, the range of its potential behaviors
is changed” (p. 126). Noting that this applies to any entity, including a society, that can acquire,
distribute, interpret, and remember information, he maintains that an entity learns if even a single
unit (member) acquires knowledge and recognizes it as potentially useful. The more units
recognize this usefulness, the more varied interpretations of the knowledge, and the more
uniform comprehensions of the interpretations are, the more learning occurs.
Huber (1993/1996) reviews literature on acquisition of knowledge by various means:
congenital, experiential, and vicarious, by grafting, by intentional searching, and by unintentional
noticing. He concludes that only acquisition by experience and search have been thoroughly
considered, but without synthesis or conceptual work. There are many diverse factors that
contribute to change in the range of potential organizational behaviors, Huber concludes, but
relatively few have been studied, and there has been little substantiation of theory. The research
is highly fragmented with much specialization and little collaboration or integration, according to
Huber’s analysis, and is not applied to improving organizational learning.
The technical approach, exemplified by Huber (Easterby-Smith and Araujo, 1999) is
behaviorist: If an organization is successful, if it maintains in the face of change or changes to
overcome threats, it has learned. But the approach does not involve actually ascertaining the state
of an organization’s knowledge, either prior to or after learning has apparently occurred; it offers
no practical insights.
A somewhat more “social” perspective on organizational learning is offered by Weick
and Roberts (1993/1996). In collective mind—which they define as “heedful interrelating” —
there is careful coordination of action and knowledge. Multiple actors act jointly to contribute to
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a social system, and subordinate their personal actions to the system and its outcomes. Actions of
individuals are interdependent and integrated into a seamless system, the dynamics of which are
“felt” or sensed rather than categorically and explicitly described or measured. Knowledge is
acquired from the system via dialog and narrative, based on common artifacts and shared
experience. Then, by dialog and narrative, it is fed back into the system by each individual
participant. Organizational learning perpetuates and reinforces the system, even as it shapes and
reinforces participants’ identities.
From this perspective learning by rather than in organizations is primarily a cultural
rather than cognitive phenomenon: It is about shared meanings rather than collective behaviors
(Cook and Yanow, 1993/1996); behaviors are simply means to create meaning. The implication
for assessment is that only those directly engaged in the action—at least in the “systems that
cannot fail” like those discussed by Weick and Roberts (1993/1996)—can tacitly assess the
situation.
Weick and Roberts (1993/1996) somewhat resolve the social/technical divide by
demonstrating the parallel between cognitive operations at the individual level and cultural
operations at the organizational level: they operate via differential connections and patterns of
nodal activation. Where these connective patterns result in habits of individuals, routines are
manifest organizational behaviors. Routines are matched as appropriate to situations encountered
by the organization, shaped more by past experience than future expectations, and judged in
terms of the relation between actual and desired outcomes. All of this occurs within an ecology
of learners within which patience is a virtue, because it allows learning effects to emerge (Levitt
and March, 1988/1996).
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The technical approach to learning organizations, most evident in work on intellectual
capital, focuses on measuring and valuing knowledge. Stewart (1997) defines it as “intellectual
material—knowledge, information, intellectual property, experience—that can be put to use to
create wealth” (p. x), or “Intellectual capital is packaged useful knowledge” (p. 67). It is related
to and made up of human, structural, customer, organizational, and other non-financial capital,
including leadership and culture and values (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Stewart, 1997).
Adherents to the intellectual capital approach provide complex sets of metrics that make up the
seemingly simple calculation: Human Capital + Structural Capital + Relational Capital =
Intellectual Capital (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Roos, et al., 1998), but this includes such
intangibles as “Customer IT literacy,” “Innovation,” and “Motivation.”
The proliferation of variables and metrics for intellectual capital (Bontis, 2001) suggest
conceptual fragmentation and a weak theoretical framework. After constructing and applying a
knowledge-measurement methodology, King and Zeithaml (2003) conclude that the results of
such methods have limited general value because knowledge resources vary greatly across
industries and organizations. Lee, Lee, and Kang (2005) focus on the efficiency of knowledgecirculation processes in an organization—creation, accumulation, sharing, utilization, and
internalization of knowledge—and claim that organizations are able to become more knowledgeintensive as the amount of resources required for these functions decreases. Knowledge
circulation can be seen as collective cognition, or simply division of labor. While the concept of
knowledge circulation is useful for analyzing organizational learning, it does not deal with the
reality that what qualifies as knowledge is contingent on circumstances. Nor does the concept
accommodate the possibility that knowledge can emerge spontaneously without a cause or
source.
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Krogh, Roos, and Slocum (1994) consider difficulties related to organizational
knowledge—and, similarly, for regional knowledge: Knowledge is enacted by multiple knowers.
It has context and scope that can be either very general or very specific. And knowledge is
captured, communicated, and evaluated via language. Spender and Grant (1996) point out that
knowledge is given meaning across various levels—industry, firm, department—and that
quantitative methods may not be able to address this variability and richness.
Senge (2006) exemplifies the social approach to learning organizations. Learning is
“expanding the ability to produce the results we truly want in life” (p. 142). This occurs via
generative rather than just adaptive learning, not just surviving but also enhancing our creative
abilities. “The core learning dilemma that confronts organizations [is that] we learn best from
experience,” notes Senge, “but we never directly experience the consequences of many of our
most important decisions” (p. 23). More succinctly, “every organization is a product of how its
members think and interact” (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, & Ross, 1994, p. 48). But organizations
are complex dynamic systems in which “doing the obvious thing does not produce the obvious,
desired results” (p. 71). Feedback can be reinforcing/amplifying or balancing/stabilizing; small
amounts of the latter can lead to big changes, and small amounts of the former can hamper big
changes. Both types of feedback consist of some source(s) of information, represented by one or
more variables, which interact to inform behavior. The fundamental factors that can be derived
from Senge (2000, 2006)—although he doesn’t put them so simply—are connections and vision.
Connections and vision represent the interactions and thoughts that amplify—or attenuate—each
other.
Other notable social approaches to organizational learning include Choo (1998), and
Davenport and Prusak (1998), who are somewhat more “technical” than Senge. Choo builds on
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Senge’s ideas as well of those of others, but is more detailed and structured, and proffers a
holistic model of learning organizations. His model includes modes of knowing—sense making,
knowledge creating, and decision-making—which organizations (and individuals, groups, etc.)
employ as appropriate to the circumstances, converting explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge,
and back again. Choo identifies cognitive, affective, and situational dimensions that vary with
mode and with knowledge conversion. In place of Senge’s shared vision, Choo looks for “shared
mind”: ability to learn together, evident in the organization’s culture and the ways in which it’s
members reach—or don’t reach—consensus.
Davenport and Prusak (1998) begin with a working definition of knowledge—a
taxonomy, really. Information is “data that makes a difference” (p. 3), Davenport and Prusak
(1998) tell us, and “knowledge derives from minds at work” processing information (p. 5).
Davenport and Prusak parallel Choo’s modes with a process that generates, codifies and
coordinates, and transfers knowledge. In Davenport and Prusak’s model, each step in the process
involves different roles and skills, which are rather more observable than Choo’s affective,
cognitive, and situational variables. Davenport and Prusak repackage Senge’s disciplines as
critical activities for organizational learning, each of which contributes to the efficacy of
processing data into information into knowledge.
Collins (2001) presents an empirically-derived model that also essentially extends
Senge’s (2006) concepts of mastery and feedback into a process for organizational
transformation. Unlike Choo’s (1998) knowing cycle, Davenport and Prusak’s knowledge
process, or intellectual capital’s foci and timeframes of knowledge (Stewart, 1997; Edvinsson &
Malone, 1997), Collins’ “Good to Great” model is developmental. Collins sees the process
occurring over a relatively long time. Organizations gain capabilities by engaging the “right”
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people, getting them to think together, and to act collectively. The Good-to-Great development
process is driven by iterations of a “council” asking questions, dialoging and debating, making
decisions, and analyzing the results of those decisions. This iterative process is practically a
hybrid of Shewart’s plan-do-check-act cycle (Deming, 1986), Kolb’s (1984) experiential
learning model, and van der Spek and Spijkervet’s (1997) knowledge activities, as well as
Boisot’s (1995) information space, and Choo’s (1998) modes. It is notable that Deming and Kolb
both also promoted active involvement of those closest to the work.
A somewhat different approach, which focuses on organizations’ attractiveness to highly
capable individuals, is Gratton’s (2007) Hot Spot model. She characterizes attractiveness as a
function of cooperative mindset, boundary spanning, igniting purpose, and productive capacity
within the organization, each of which is developed through iterative processes similar to Argryis
and Schön’s (1978), Senge’s (2006), and Collin’s (2001). Her parallel to Boisot’s (1995)
information space and Stewart’s knowledge forms/states is a matrix of a relationship’s depth
(strength) to its boundary spanning. Different combinations of span and strength allow different
strategies for creating hotspots. Novel combinations of people, exploitation of shared expertise,
and exploration via synthesis are social, intellectual, and emotional drivers of human capital.
This is a variation of March’s (1991) concept of exploiting versus exploring technologies, as
well as Stewart’s (1997) model for dealing with various types of knowledge.

Community in Organizational Learning
The concept of community plays a central role in organizational learning, particularly
highly social approaches, such as those of Gozdz (1995), Penuel and Roschelle (1999), Wenger,
McDermott, and Snyder (200 2), Voosen and Conneely (2005), and Wenger, Trayner, and de
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Laat (2011). In this literature, community is something that exists within organizations—“a
group of individuals with some common interests and greater density of communication within
than across its boundaries” (Markus, 1990, p. 194), rather than a geographically situated
phenomenon (Hillery, 1955, 1958; Fischer, et al., 1977; Fischer 1982). And, the focus is
practical, so theory is implicit rather than explicit; the theoretical essence is that community is
the means of learning.
The contributors to Gozdz (1995) offer a wide range of perspectives on community in
organizations, but the overall message is, “Community in organizations is essential for optimal
performance and learning capability. Without it we cannot create aligned organizations that
coherently work toward shared goals and objectives” (p. 415). The need for community arises
from the nature of knowledge, according to Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder (2002), “that it is
not an object that can be stored, owned, and moved like a piece of equipment or a document. ...
Companies must manage their knowledge in ways that do not merely reduce it to an object” (p.
11).
From cognitive science, Penuel and Roschelle (1999) conclude that practical knowledge
develops in communities by solving a variety of problems, particularly in novel situations, based
on prior learning, enabled by collaboration, and guided by reflection. Voosen and Conneely
(2005) present learning communities as facilitated and supported teams of learners focused on
creating new, tacit knowledge to solve ill-formed problems. Senge and Scharmer (2006) see
learning community as “a diverse group of people working together to nurture and sustain a
knowledge-creating system” (p. 197, emphasis in original) that involves three complementary
domains of action: research, capacity-building, and practice. This requires guiding ideas,
infrastructure, and common work.
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Learning communities are especially prevalent in academic settings. Hord (1997) notes
that the term was common in educational lexicon, although it had no clear definition—the
community could be educators, administrators, students, parents, external stakeholders, or some
combination of these. The concept was refined into community of inquiry, focusing on students
and teachers learning together, especially in the context of online and blended learning
environments. Garrison, Anderson, and Archer (2000) suggest that an educational experience is
defined by cognitive, social, and teaching presence, so the question becomes how to maximize
those things online. The authors see practical inquiry, which they see as a process of shared
perception, deliberation, conception, and action, as the basis for building communities of inquiry.
Friedman (2006) discusses how scholarship might be extended via communities of inquiry
within communities of practice that include both researchers and practitioners. But Rourke and
Kanuka (2009) find problems with construct validity, means for measuring learning, and, more
fundamentally, learning outcomes from communities of inquiry. In particular, they question the
concept of cognitive presence, finding that it does not emerge in online communities of inquiry.
Interestingly, the model of practical inquiry suggested by Garrison, Anderson, and Archer (2000)
is very similar to cyclic loops of learning, discussed below. But the extent of these activities and
the extent to which they are shared do not seem to be important factors in the communities of
inquiry research.
Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011) view “community and network as two aspects of
social structures in which learning takes place” (p. 9). Networks are defined by connections and
flows, according to Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat, communities are defined by shared identity
and collective intentions. Connections, flows, shared identity, and collective are all learning
resources. Noise, spontaneity, and unpredictability are inherent characteristics of communities
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and networks, any, and, or all of which can feed or undermine learning. Too strong a collective
identity means too little noise and variation, maintain Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011), and
too much noise impedes collective identity and interests from emerging:
[C]ommunity creates a social space in which participants can discover and
further a learning partnership related to a common domain ... [but
community] can become hostage to its history, its established ways of
doing things, and the attendant identification with the group. (p. 10)
The learning value of network derives from access to a rich web of
information sources offering multiple perspectives and dialogues,
responses to queries, and help from others ... Expanding connectivity
increases the chance of useful access, but it also increases the level of
“noise.” (p. 11)
Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011) say knowledge is collected and sense-making
occurs via narratives, collective and individual, as accounts of community/network activities,
aspirational narratives that frame community/network success, and the tensions between
accounts and aspirations. Value develops through cycles from immediate intrinsic value, through
potential value as knowledge capital and applied value as changes in practice to realized value of
performance improvement. This parallels the four levels of Kirkpatrick’s (Kirkpatrick &
Kirkpatrick, 2006) model of learning, to which Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011) add a fifth
level of reframing value to redefine success. Each level has different quantitative indicators of
increasing impacts through time and space, and different evaluative/reflective questions and
value-creation stories.

Cycles in Organizational Learning
The defining metaphor of organizational learning theory is undoubtedly the loop. An
early version of the loop is the Shewart cycle, the plan-do-check/study-act cycle promoted by
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Deming (1986; Gabor, 1990) and widely used as the basis for continuous improvement.
Deming’s guidance is to apply the cycle iteratively to critical issues, one after another, in a
disciplined, data-driven manner. Argyris and Schön (1978) begin with a simple model of how
outcomes are linked back to actions via beliefs and feelings, then they add ability to improve
action, and finally they note how the linkages might be improved to better align enacted and
espoused theories. Thus they add a second loop of learning to learn. Argyris and Schön (1978),
the plan-do-check/study-act (Deming, 1986; Gabor,1990), and the Lean Startup (Ries, 2011) are
similarly structured, but operate at different scales, allowing for loops to be embedded in each
other. According to Lindsley, Brass, and Thomas (1995), spiraling loops of perceived efficacy
and performance link individuals, groups, and organizations, but have different characteristics at
different levels: higher level spirals of efficacy and performance seem to be harder to start and
stop, downward spirals are more evident than upward spirals, and higher level spirals may
interfere with or mask lower levels spirals.
There are numerous larger-scale process models of organizational learning. Crossan,
Lane, and White (1999) see intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing as
comprising organizational learning, and connecting action and improvement at individual, group,
and organizational levels. Choo’s (1998), Davenport and Prusak’s (1998), Collins’ (2001), and
Gratton’s models all share features with Crossan, Lane, and White. At more general level are
Simon’s (1976) model of decision-making, Weick’s (1995) sense-making, and Williamson’s
(1981) transaction costs, and Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat’s (2011) value-creation cycles.
Focused, smaller-scale processes, such as action learning (Revans, 1998; Kramer, 2008),
appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005), and Peters’ (2009) DATA-DATA model,
are also similar. The common features are a series of general actions each of which involves
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information and feeds into the next action, culminating in increased capabilities and reduced
uncertainty. Each action or phase in each cycle involves a different set of rules, roles, and
resources—different knowledge bases—applied to the evolving issue. And, the process is
applied iteratively.
A central theoretical question is whether these models are positive statements about what
is or normative statements about what should be. Are they suggestions about how organizations
should be structured in order to learn? Or, are organizations that learn necessarily based on such
cycles? A related issue is the structure of the “loops”: Does each loop consist of distinct phases?
How do the phases interrelate; are they invariably linear and sequential? If the phases vary, how
and why do they do so? The literature reviewed above tells us that there is at least a
contemplative state and an experiential state—seeing and doing—that translate into active and
reflective phases. It also tells us that such simplistic dualities are unrealistic. Action and
reflection are generalities that are never realized in the extreme; we—collectively and
individually—are always operating with both. Sometimes we are highly active,
unselfconsciously attending to and through others. Other times we are deeply reflective, totally
engrossed in self, not really doing anything. But, most of the time we are acting and reflecting,
interacting and conversing, in a state between the two extremes of self- and other-orientation.
This fusion is practically and simply captured in Toyota’s 14th quality principle: “Become a
learning organization through relentless reflection (hansei) and continuous improvement
(kaizen)” (Liker, 2004, 40).
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Regional Learning
The literature reviewed up to this point has not explicitly addressed a fundamental issue:
location. People congregate in places, and places become associated with particular activities and
products. The concept of geographic regions as containers of knowledge is as old as the social
sciences, going back to classic economics’ attempt to explain why some locations are rich and
others poor: Smith’s seminal Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(1776/1904), and Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage (1817). Marshall advanced the
concept with his consideration of industrial districts, emphasizing the importance of proximity
and environmental factors (Asheim, 2003).
The fundamental question became why some economic activities tend to agglomerate, or
congregate in and around a particular location, rather than spread out in space. The general
answer is that agglomeration somehow provides an advantage. “The original rationale for
industrial districts rests on the creation of … economies that are external to the firm but internal
to the area, for groups of small firms … [that] … provides a competitive alternative to the
internal economies of scale of large firms” (Asheim, 2003, p. 415). Agglomeration allows for
knowledge spillovers from firms and institutions to those around them, but it can also lead to
technological lock-in and path dependency in which the economic fate of a region is tied to the
lifecycle of its industry, from boom to bust (Audretsch, 1998).
While Marshall is considered the father of neoclassical economics, the field largely
ignored his interest in agglomeration (Asheim, 2003). Neoclassical economics did not account
for how and why industrial districts blossomed, prospered, and declined. Regions were eclipsed
during the mid-twentieth century as nations launched large-scale science programs, but economic
restructuring and failure to produce market winners undermined this approach by the end of the
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century (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Cooke, 2002). Schumpeter (1976/1942) provided the basis
for a solution to the theoretical and programmatic shortcomings of neoclassical economics with
insights into how entrepreneurs foster “creative destruction” by bringing innovative products into
the marketplace (Cooke, 2002). Innovation requires resources beyond those readily available to
the entrepreneur, thus they face transaction costs finding resources (including knowledge),
executing contracts, and coordinating work (Williamson, 1981).
Propinquity reduces transaction costs, allowing firms to be smaller and more specialized.
Thus, “much of the competitive advantage lies outside a given company or even outside its
industry, residing instead in the location of its business units” (Porter, 2003, p. 254, emphasis in
original). The rise and fall of regions may be understood by replacing the term “competitive
advantage” in this quote with the word “knowledge.” The unique availability of a full range of
specialized knowledge makes regions economically important.
Marshall emphasizes in particular the mutual knowledge and trust that
reduces transaction costs in the local production system; the industrial
atmosphere which facilitates the generation and transfer of skills and
qualifications of workforce required by local industry; and the effect of
both these aspects in promoting (incremental) innovations and innovation
diffusion among small firms in industrial districts. (Asheim, 2003, pp.
415-416)
Many commentators maintain that improvements in communication should reduce the
rationale for agglomeration (Cairncross, 2001). Others point out that this has not happened
because collective assets and capabilities, transfer of tacit knowledge, and the very acts of
creating knowledge and innovating require propinquity (Calhoun, 1998; Brown and Duguid,
2002; Boschma, 2005; Cooke and Leysdesdorff, 2005).
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Interest in agglomeration reemerged in the late twentieth-century. This interest was
fueled by research documenting the role that the production of information and knowledge plays
in our society (Machlup, 1962; Porat, 1977). Interest in agglomeration was informed by new
appreciation of the roles of institutions and knowledge in economic theory (Williamson, 2000;
Cortright, 2001). An emphasis on innovation by business thought leaders (Drucker, 1985,
2002/1985) made agglomeration a practical matter. Those who resurrected agglomeration
emphasize the integration of the social and economic. These scholars point to complementary
public and private roles, and to balance between competition and cooperation, as important in
agglomeration. There is division of labor (specialization) among numerous small firms, broad
and rapid dissemination of information, and a highly skilled workforce. Agglomerating involves
increasing importance of continual, radical innovations, and collective cognizance of a
globalizing economy. It requires learning, most of all (Asheim, 2003). Piore and Sabel (1984)
see the integration of community life with productive activities as the means by which networks
of firms maintain collective assets and continually innovate. As Asheim (2003) puts it:
In a learning economy, the competitive advantage of firms and regions is
based on innovation, interactive learning processes. … [O]ne problematic
aspect of the learning economy has been its focus on ‘catching up’
learning based on incremental innovations, and not radical innovations
requiring the creation of new knowledge. (pp. 426-427)
The concept of “learning regions” was proposed to explain how agglomeration fosters
continual and radical innovations, and to illuminate modern issues related to globalization,
knowledge-intensive enterprises, and technological change (Florida, 1995). Amin (2008) and
other scholars (Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1992; Burrows, Gilbert & Pollert, 1992) contrast these
socioeconomic phenomena with large-scale, standardized production that they refer to as
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Fordism, in reference to industrial approaches popularized by automotive magnate Henry Ford.
In a global, post-Fordist, innovation-oriented economy, regions matter more than ever because
“regions themselves are becoming focal points of knowledge-creation and learning … [that]
function as collectors and repositories of knowledge and ideas, providing an underlying
environment or infrastructure that facilitates the flow of knowledge, ideas, and learning”
(Florida, 1995, p. 528). Florida goes on to say:
Learning regions provide the crucial inputs for knowledge-intensive
economic organization to flourish: a manufacturing infrastructure of
interconnected vendors and suppliers; a human infrastructure that can
produce knowledge workers, facilitates the development of a team
orientation, and which is organized around life-long learning; a physical
and communication infrastructure which facilitates and supports constant
sharing of information, electronic exchange of data and information, justin-time delivery of goods and services, and integration into the global
economy; and capital allocation and industrial governance systems attend
to the needs of knowledge-intensive organizations. (p. 534)
The challenges for firms, Florida (1995) maintains, are to “adopt new organizational and
management systems that harness knowledge and intelligence,” to maintain “a balance between
cutting edge innovation and high-quality and efficient production,” “to spur individual genius
and creativity … and the collective mobilization of knowledge,” and “to build integrated and
dense global webs of innovation and production” (p. 534). All of which implies a shift away
from “the increasingly dysfunctional Fordist model” to sustainable advantage based on
“continuous improvement of technology, continuous development of human resources, the use of
clean production technology, elimination of waste, and a commitment to continuous
environmental improvement” (p. 535). The implication is that firms cannot do these things on
their own but require an intellectual, physical, and social environment that enables them to do
them collectively: a learning region.
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The learning-region paradigm emphasizes the networks or associational characteristics of
a region in which firms are embedded, subsuming individual entrepreneurs and workers to
consider how they function together rather than operate independently (Granovetter, 1985;
Saxenian, 1994; Morgan, 1997). Various forms of proximity—cognitive, organizational, social,
institutional, and geographical—provide stability and enable interactive learning (Boschma,
2005), but excessive stability and static interactions resulting from “institutional thickness” can
impede innovation (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Hauser, Tappeiner & Walde, 2007). Dynamic social
networks with abundant weak ties within regions allow for knowledge spillovers and new
opportunities for interactive learning. Broader extra-local networks bring new capabilities, ideas,
and technologies into regions (MacKinnon, Cumbers, and Chapman, 2002). Both types of ties
reduce transaction costs for knowledge as well as other resources, contributing to innovation by
making it easy to connect disparate chunks of information into usable and useful knowledge.
Embeddedness must be balanced by autonomy. If it is not, regions can get locked into a
particular technology, following it from boom to bust. “It is the type of network relationships
between organizations (firms, institutions) rather than their spatial clustering alone that
determines the ability of regions to adapt” (Boschma and Lambooy, 1999, p. 393). Dynamism in
social networks—lots of weak ties and shifting relationships—allows clusters (or the
communities or regions in which they operate) to diversify, reinvent and revitalize themselves,
and avoid technologically-determined path-dependency. Stronger, more stable ties provide
governance, particularly to and through institutions, and reduce uncertainty, making it more
practical for actors to take risks (Morgan, 1997).
Some regional-learning literature, particularly prior to Florida’s explication of the
concept, extends resource-based theories of organizations to explain why firms cluster together
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by industry (see, for example, Porter, 1990). Breznitz and Taylor (2010) contrast such factororiented theoretical perspectives with others that focus on social structure of regions, such as the
dynamics of the “triple helix” of academia, government, and industry (Etzkotwitz and
Leydesdorff, 1997; Etzkowitz, 2008) and an interactive model of innovation (Morgan, 1997).
Cooke (2002) suggests that regional learning is essentially collaborative economic action by a
localized socioeconomic system in response to natural socioeconomic disequilibrium. This
requires social connections that are dynamic yet resilient: “knowledge is in the network,” Cooke
(2002) maintains, “because each move in the interactive innovation process requires learning
from other than those involved in the preceding move” (pp. 2 – 3, emphasis in the original).
Breznitz and Taylor (2010) conclude that social structure is as important for innovation as
economic factors, and more important to growing and retaining producers of technological
innovations.
The triple-helix theory (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1997; Etzkotwitz, 2008) posits that a
general type of social-network structure must exist for regional learning, and evolves in a
particular way to sustain innovation. Generally, Etzkotwitz (2008) maintains, triple-helix
regional learning emerges as the distinction between business and science is blurred, and as
government facilitates this blurring with resources and regulatory relief. Civil society and
voluntary associations provide the space for the helices to connect and overlap. “A triple helix
regime typically begins as university, industry, and government enter into a reciprocal
relationship with each other in which each attempts to enhance the performance of the other”
(Etzkotwitz, 2008, p. 8). As industries become more knowledge-intensive, government and
university play more important roles as enablers. The triple helix evolves as each strand—
academia, government, or industry—takes on new roles similar to the roles of the others in
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support of the others’ core competencies, as each strives to make the others successful.
Performance of each helix improves as individuals and information circulate through it, and
individuals and information circulating between the helices fuels innovation.
Innovation is an interactive learning process, says Morgan (1997), with powerful
feedback loops incorporating common and tacit knowledge, “that is shaped by a variety of
institutional routines and social conventions” (Morgan, 1997, p. 493). Agglomeration, or clusters
of complementary specialized entities in proximity and cooperating with each other, is a
hallmark of learning regions. But the clusters are byproducts of the innovation process, of social
propagation of knowledge from individuals to community, and of mobility within the region
between firms (Cooke, 2002). These are made possible in turn by norms of reciprocity and
trust—social capital—that facilitate network development, support interactive learning and
innovation, and thereby provide competitive advantage. Cook maintains that “[C]lustering
[exists] for learning, knowledge transfer, collaboration, and the exploitation of spillovers” (p. 3).
The “innovation as interactive learning” theory further explicates and supports the “evolving
triple helix as source of sustained radical innovation” theory: The triple helix provides the
institutional infrastructure for interactive learning, and interactive learning provides the means by
which the triple helix evolves.
Moulaert and Sekia (2003) examine various “territorial innovation models” of regional
learning. They find that each includes agglomeration, endogenous development, and systems of
innovation. Each model also includes evolution and learning, network organization, and
governance. But Moulaert and Sekia feel that these models suffer from theoretical ambiguity as a
consequence of excessive focus on business culture and technological innovation. They suggest
an “integrated area development” model that includes non-market components of the economy
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and community life “to broaden the discussion on territorial innovation in all its dimensions, as a
lead theme for the progress of humanity at the local level” (p. 299).
MacKinnon, Cumbers, and Chapman (2002) fault regional-learning scholars for not fully
considering the importance of extra-local ties in fostering innovation. Doloreux and Parto (2005)
… contend that the interactions between actors in regional innovation
systems have not been sufficiently explored, while the institutional context
of these interactions has been largely overlooked. As a result, the validity
of recommendations for innovation policy making based on the current
analyses of regional innovation systems is somewhat questionable. (p.
134)
But, by reviewing the literature we can see that Doloreux and Parto’s contentions are not
justified, as I now show.
Brown and Duguid (2002) maintain that the only means of constructing regional
advantage is to capitalize on local knowledge that is simultaneously “leaky” and “sticky.” Such
knowledge inevitably leaks out of particular organizations but sticks in a particular region
because it inheres to an embedded boundary, spanning local social networks. Also consider what
may be called “optimal proximity,” presented by Boschma (2005): a loosely coupled system,
balancing local “buzz” with extra-local linkages, combining community and market relations,
and providing institutional checks and balances, to create a common knowledge base with
diverse but complementary capabilities. This involves cognitive, organizational, social, and
institutional capabilities across and within geographical limits. Brown and Duguid (2002) and
Boschma (2005) make essentially the same point: Sustained innovation capacity comes from
leveraging unique local human assets for acquiring relevant global human assets and constantly
recombining them. These perspectives are essentially elaborations on Marshall (Asheim, 2003),
Piore and Sabel (1984), and others.
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In the same ways that interactive learning enables firms to generate marketable
innovations, case studies have shown that interactive learning by policy makers (Hassink, 2005)
and boundary spanning by civic organizations (Safford, 2009) can be important for regions to
recover from path dependency and revitalize. Cooke and Leysdesdorff (2005) maintain that
regions provide “constructed advantage”—as opposed to comparative and competitive
advantages—by intentionally aligning and integrating the regional economy, governance,
knowledge infrastructure, and community and culture. Constructed advantage involves
combining symbolic/creative, synthetic/technical, and analytic/scientific forms, linking the
subsystems for knowledge creation, exploration, and exploitation, enabled by the triple helix.
Gertler and Wolfe (2004) look at regional foresight exercises as interactive learning by
individuals, organizations, and regions that allow them to adapt and innovate. Such broad-based
collective learning can overcome the barriers to learning intrinsic to capitalism. Cross-sector
interactive learning allows for the creation of the entirely new organizations necessary for the
creative forgetting and unlearning by organizations and social systems. It leads to deep regional
economic restructuring (Johnson, 1992; Hudson, 1999; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999).
A new kind of organisation is spearheading the phenomenon: knowledgebased communities, i.e. networks of individuals striving, first and
foremost, to produce and circulate new knowledge and working for
different, even rival, organisations. One sign that a knowledge-based
economy is developing can be seen when such individuals penetrate
conventional organisations to which their continuing attachment to an
“external” knowledge-based community represents a valuable asset. As
these communities develop their activities, they become agents of change
for the economy as a whole. (David & Foray, 2002, p. 9)
A knowledge-intensive community is a community where a large
proportion of members is involved in the production and reproduction of
knowledge and, hence, the creation of a public (or semi-public) space
where knowledge is circulated and where codification and dissemination
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costs have been radically reduced through the use of new information and
communication technologies. (David & Foray, 2002, p. 14)
Core Concepts
This section builds on and extends the concepts and definitions embedded in the literature
review, above. My focus here is on terms that are central to theories of learning, particularly
those that I anticipate using in my proposed theory, and especially those that I use somewhat
differently than is typical. My goal here is to clarify and validate my definitions of the terms as a
basis for the results section of my dissertation.
Learning. The key term in this proposed dissertation is learning. Schunk (2008) begins
his comprehensive survey of theories of individual learning by defining learning as “an enduring
change in behavior, or in the capacity to behave in a given fashion, which results from practice
or other forms of experience” (p. 2). Note that the essence of learning for Schunk is a change,
where the standard definition of learning is simply “the act or process of acquiring knowledge or
skill” (learning, n.d.). Theory is implicit in both. For Schunk the essential theory is that “practice
or other forms of experience” results in “an enduring change in behavior, or in the capacity to
behave in a given fashion” (p. 2). The standard definition theorizes that “knowledge or skill” is
acquired via an “act or process.” Together these definitions make learning both an act—or series
of activities (a process)—and the result of that act; it is both a change in behavioral capacity and
acquisition of knowledge or skill, which are presumable demonstrable.
Acting and behaving are both important to learning; what’s the difference? To act is “to
do something, to exert energy or force” (act, n.d.), generally to benefit or perpetuate the actor,
whereas behavior is a pattern of interactions in the social context of mores, norms, and values.
As noted in the philosophy of action (Wilson & Shpall, 2012), action implies agency,
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consciousness, intention, and mind. Action has meaning to the actor(s), others attribute meaning
to the actions/actors, and actors shape their actions to affect meaning (Weber, 1922/1978); Thus,
action becomes behavior. Action or behavior without agency is simply an effect of gravity,
thermodynamics, or other laws of nature. These definitions do not venture to say that learning is
an improvement, though—only a change. Next, I argue that learning is necessarily a beneficial
change, or increase in capabilities.
Capability and knowledge. Undergirding the definition of learning are two essential
terms: capability and knowledge. The dictionary definition of capability refers to “ability or
capacity” (capable, n.d.), but I use the term to mean the combination of the two: ability given
capacity, where capacity is the quantity that can be accommodated or carried, and ability refers
to the quality of accomplishments from using capacity. Capability is both the know-how and the
resources to act (Sen, 1988, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000; Clark, 2005). Knowledge is informed true
belief; something that one accepts as real or true, based on reasoning from sense data, that is
actually real or true. This definition is derived from Plato (Meno, The Republic, and Theaetetus),
who refers to knowledge as justified true belief. Using the term “informed” rather than
“justified” avoids the problems of justification (Gettier, 1963; Chisholm, 1982), and provides
practical criteria for knowing by substituting information for justification. Shannon and Weaver
(1949) define information as a probabilistic measure of uncertainty, or simply something that
reduces uncertainty. So, essentially, knowledge is content of the mind derived from the senses,
even if indirectly via reason, that is coherent, consistent, and correspondent. One can increase the
quantity or scope of one’s informed true beliefs, or one’s existing beliefs can become better
informed and more true. Either way, an increase in knowledge improves one’s capabilities to act.
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Belief. For the purpose of this dissertation, belief is simply defined as contents of mind,
which is consonant with the standard definition (belief, n.d.). Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) say that,
“beliefs refer to a person’s subjective probability judgments concerning some discriminable
aspect of his world; they deal with a person’s understanding of himself and his environment” (p.
131). For every belief there is an object that the belief is about, a relationship, a second object or
characteristic or outcome, and a probability associated with that relationship. Belief that a thing
exists—belief in—is simply a fundamental form of belief about. Beliefs can arise from direct
observation, which Fisbein and Ajzen (1975) refer to as descriptive beliefs, or can be inferred
from past experience, from logic, and socially promulgated associations. Experience creates a
“residue” of beliefs according to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), which is critical to inference:
It is thus possible to view beliefs as representing a continuum from
descriptive to inferential. At the descriptive end of the continuum, a
person’s beliefs are directly tied to the stimulus situation, and a the
inferential end, beliefs are formed on the basis of these stimuli as well as
residues of the person’s past experiences; the continuum may be seen as
involving minimal to maximal use of such experiential residues. (p. 133)
So, belief can be defined formally in terms of the relationship between to objects or qualities, the
subjective probability assigned to the relationship, and the extent to which the belief draws on
prior experience—it is new content of the mind or built upon existing content.
Knowledge has verisimilitude (Popper, 1963/2003) when it is coherent, consistent, and
correspondent. These are the criteria for true knowledge. Coherent knowledge is clear, sensible,
and has well-integrated components (i.e., propositions) that do not contradict each other (Young,
2008). Consistent knowledge—based on Habermas (1979, 1984) and the pragmatists, Dewey
(1910/1991,1929/1984; Hickman & Alexander, 1999), James (1907/1975), and Peirce (Peirce,
Hartshorne, & Weiss, 1935)—is invariably expressed and experienced, particularly via narrative
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and practice. Correspondent knowledge accurately represents some aspect of reality (David,
2009). While these definitions can be seen as competing philosophical views of truth, they can
also be seen as complementary criteria for true knowledge, i.e., true knowledge must meet all
three criteria to have maximum verisimilitude, to be considered “most true.”
Ryle (1946, 1949) makes the distinction between knowing-that and knowing-how. There
is a huge difference between “acknowledging principles in thought and intelligently applying
them in action” (1946, p. 8). Principles may explain and guide action but one does not need to
know the principles to act, and “Knowing a rule is not knowing how” (1946, p. 7). Knowing-that
involves putative facts or truths, while knowing-how often occurs without conscious theorizing.
In fact, action and experience precede and inform as well as validate fact and theory, Ryle
insists. It is not the declaration that makes the action possible, rather the other way around. Of
course, the action may be observed rather than experienced directly, particularly when actions
are particularly dangerous, but that is a weaker form of knowing-how. Ryle built on previous
philosophers, particularly Russell (1911), who argued that true knowledge involved firsthand
experience (knowledge by acquaintance), and that knowledge by description (know-of) was a
lesser form of knowing.
Ryle’s ideas can be seen in Bandura’s social cognitive theory, particularly learning by
observing versus learning by doing (Bandura, 1986), and in the distinction between moral
competence and moral performance (Bandura, 2001). Ryle is also reflected in How People Learn
(Bransford, Brown & Cocking, 2000), which reports that experts’ knowledge can’t be reduced to
a set of facts or rules; they can retrieve specialized knowledge with little effort, but may be
incapable of teaching others. Essentially, there is an ineffable, non-codifiable knowledge of
procedures that comes with experience. This knowledge enables statements about what is real or
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true, but those statements can only be tested, validated, and verified by application, which may
require expertise from repeated application (i.e., just because something doesn’t work the first
time you try it, doesn’t mean it’s wrong, it just means you’re doing it wrong and you have to try
it again and do it right).
Polanyi (1958, 1966) extends Ryle’s distinction to explicit and tacit knowledge,
distinguishing between knowledge that can be codified and easily transferred and knowledge that
can be shared only through interaction. All knowledge, Polanyi notes, is based on personal
judgment and is consequently subjective. Both Polanyi and Ryle reject the Cartesian dualism
between mind and body. Polanyi, particularly, explores how we can indwell an object, attend
through it—rather than to it—to something else, essentially integrating mind and body. For
Polanyi, knowing and doing are integrated into being (similar to, but distinct from Heidegger’s
approach (Capobianco, 2010)). Interestingly, Polanyi’s work seems to have had more impact on
organizational learning, where there is interest in generating and monetizing knowledge, than on
education (as recent examples: Pfeffer and Sutton, 2000; Lam, 2000; Bennet and Bennet, 2008;
Busch, 2008; Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009).
Just as Ryles and Polanyi rejected Cartesian mind-body dualism, so did Heidegger
(Capobianco, 2010) and Habermas (1979, 1984) reject the object-subject distinction. For
Heidegger, this dualism disappears in being. Habermas (1979, 1984) made the point that each
action or utterance is embedded in the intersubjective, the world of ideas, language, and values
that has been constructed and is reconstructed by human interaction. Habermas maintains that
statements can only be valid if they are consistent with the objective “it,” the subjective “I,” and
the intersubjective “we.” Habermas suggests that the rational is established via communication,
that language serves as the means for connecting doing to knowing, for translating implicit
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know-how into explicit know-that and using know-that to inform know-how. To be considered
fully rational, any action/thought/expression must be seen as normatively (intersubjective),
objectively, and subjectively valid to all involved: It must be true (“it”), right (“we”), and sincere
(“I”). Valid knowledge—and consequent actions and expressions—corresponds with what is
objectively considered real, consists of intersubjectively defined social mores, and coheres with
one’s subjective believes and experiences.
All of this must be placed in the context of current understanding of reality. Most
fundamentally, as already noted, human knowledge and understanding are limited (Plato, The
Republic; Descartes, 1641/1998; Simon, 1976, 1991). In the last century we have come to
understand that this is not just a limit of the human mind; it is a fundamental aspect of reality.
Einstein’s theory of relativity (1920), Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (1930), Gödel’s
incompleteness theorem (1931/2000), and Arrow’s impossibility theorem (1970) show that
reality is inherently contingent and uncertain. The result is described by Shannon’s theory of
communication (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) in which information is inevitably reduced by
entropy and noise. The fundamental uncertainty of nature is evident in chaotic and complex
phenomena for which absolutely accurate prediction is impossible, there is self-similarity or
recursion across scale, and small causes can have large effects (Waldrop, 1992; Kelly, 1995;
Prigogine, 1997). Individual units can self-organize into unique wholes and new properties can
emerge seemingly without cause (Goldstein, 1999; Corning, 2002), particularly among living,
self-referential systems (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Luhmann, 1990).
Taken to the social scale, fundamental realities mean that objectivity and rationality must
be looked on with skepticism. Heidegger (1927/1996) rejects objectivity. Kuhn (1962/1996) lays
bare the process by which scientific paradigms are constructed and supplanted. Lyotard
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(1979/1984) points out the impossibility of generalization and the limits of universal
“metanarratives.” Habermas (1984) and Giddens (1986) discuss how rationality and social
structure are continually redefined as people communicate with each other. We may be certain
that causality exists, but the exact levels of cause and effect, and the relations between them, are
complex, contingent, and fundamentally uncertain.
In summary, knowledge is informed, true belief, which is manifested as capabilities.
Learning is both the outcome and process of gaining capabilities and knowledge. Knowledge can
take several complementary forms—know how, know that, etc.—and can be explicit, implicit, or
tacit. The criteria for knowledge are coherence, consistence, and correspondence, which
comprise trueness or verisimilitude. Validity must be subjective, objective, and intersubjective.
The processing of information into knowledge can vary in cognitive efficiency, efficacy, and
equity. The outputs of learning can be understood in terms of cognitive metrics, knowledge
criteria, forms of knowledge, and validity. All of these thinks are inherently limited and
uncertain, and are arbitrarily defined by human interaction. The basic question for the
dissertation is about the process and activities that result in learning, and how they relate to
individual, organizational, regional, and broader social factors.
Multilevel. Given that the purpose of this dissertation is to provide an explanation and
model of learning that spans multiple levels of social aggregation, I really should provide a clear
definition of multilevel, including what it means for a model or theory to be multilevel. The
literature reviewed here makes it apparent that social theories don’t just accommodate multiple
levels of social aggregation; the theories seek to identify the levels, explain why they are distinct
from, and help us understand how they relate to, each other. A distinction must be made between
classes-collectives-sets and elements-individuals-members, Dubin (1969) tells us, to avoid the
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mistakes of assuming the individual mirrors the class or assuming that the collective is simply
the sum of its members. “Multilevel models enable the analyst to view people in the context of
their social and organizational hierarchies,” say Heck and Thomas (2009):
Because of the presence of these successive grouping, people within
particular organizations may share certain properties including workrelated beliefs, attitudes, and goals. Similarly, properties of groups may
also be influenced by the people in them. (p. 1)
Rousseau (1985) provides basic concepts and issues, beginning with the idea that
multilevel implies hierarchical relationships in which higher-level entities are composed of,
larger, and more complex than lower-level entities. Higher-level entities are “interdependent,
goal directed” collectives, in Morgeson and Hofmann’s (1999) formulation, that emerge from
and influence individual action.
The implication is that variation occurs within subjects, at lower levels, as well as
between subjects of a given level, and a fundamental question for multilevel theories is how
variation within a unit relates to variation between units (Heck & Thomas, 2009). Thus, in
multilevel models the focus is on correlation between variance of constructs as much as their
values. Generally:
Multilevel theories, thus, begin to bridge the micro-macro divide,
integrating the micro domain’s focus on individuals and groups with the
macro domain’s focus on individuals and group with the macro domain’s
focus on organizations, environment, and strategy. The result is a deeper,
richer portrait of organizational life—one that acknowledges the
influences of the organizational context on individuals’ actions and
perceptions and the influence of individuals’ action and perceptions on the
organizational context (Klein, Tosi, & Cannella, 1999, pg. 243, emphasis
in original).
This dissertation seeks to take this understanding to another level—literally and
figuratively—by considering how regional context influences organizations and individuals, and
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vice-versa. In this dissertation, I will refer to individuals and their activities, characteristics, etc.,
as micro, to groups and organizations as meso, and to regions as macro.
Community. The other term that will be important is community. The standard definition
of the term (community, 2003) involves, “A group of people living in the same locality and
under the same government” and “The district or locality in which such a group lives,” but also
“A group of people having common interests” and “A group viewed as forming a distinct
segment of society” (community, 2003). Tönnies’ (1887/2001) made the seminal distinction
between community ties (Gemeinschaft), which cause individuals to place others above self,
exemplified by family, from the ties of society (Gesellschaft), which are based on self-interest. In
1955, Hillery noted ninety-four definitions of the term in sociological literature, and his 1958
seminal consideration of the topic focused on “a social group inhabiting a common territory and
having one or more additional common ties” (p. 237).
Arensberg and Kimball (1965) see community as “a master institution or master social
system; a key to society; and a model, indeed perhaps the most important model of culture… a
main link, perhaps a major determinant, in the connections between culture and society” (p. ix).
Sanders (1975) turns this linkage around, saying that community “is part of and acted upon by
complex environmental factors” (p. 44). This “setting” includes a community’s ecology,
demography, culture, personality, time, and society at large. For a community to prosper,
Sanders (1975) suggests that it must:
1. Recruit new members either through birth, in-migration, or
annexation, and maintain existing members;
2. Train the new members to play the appropriate roles as they take their
places and achieve status in the community;
3. Exert some form of control over individuals who deviate too far from
the norm. (p. 192)
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These processes are carried forward, Sanders suggests, by two general functions:
allocation and communication. The allocation of resources, roles, power and prestige to members
of the community provides incentives and disincentives for becoming, staying, or bringing in a
member of the community, and for filling certain roles or behaving in certain ways.
Communication is the means by which members or potential members of a community come to
know how the community performs allocation—how much of what resources are assigned to
which components of the community. Communication allows the community to carry out its
processes—recruitment, socialization, and control—by bringing individuals within its
boundaries, enhancing their ability to deal with diversity and to prosper, and inform members
about those processes.
Social psychologists such as McMillan and Chavez (1986) approach community from an
individuals’ perspective. They define community phenomenologically, in terms of the
individual’s sense of belonging, influence, needs fulfillment, and shared emotional commitment,
which apply—like Arensberg & Kimball’s and Sander’s definitions—to interest-based
communities as well as place-based ones. McMillan and Chavez (1986) provide detailed
definitions of each aspect of community:
[M]embership has five attributes: boundaries, emotional safety, a sense of
belonging and identification, personal investment, and a common symbol
system. These attributes work together and contribute to a sense of who is
a part of the community and who is not. (p. 11)
Influence is a bidirectional concept. In one direction, there is the notion
that for a member to be attracted to a group, he or she must have some
influence over what the group does. … On the other hand, cohesiveness is
contingent on a group’s ability to influence its members. (p. 11)
[F]or any group to maintain a positive sense of togetherness, the
individual-group association must be rewarding for its members. … The
extent to which individual values are shared among community members
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will determine the ability of a community to organize and prioritize its
needs-fulfillment activities. … ¶ … A strong community is able to fit
people together so that people meet others’ needs while they meet their
own. (p. 12-13)
A shared emotional connection is based, in part, on a shared history. It is
not necessary that group members have participated in the history in order
to share it, but they must identify with it. The interactions of members in
shared events and specific attributes of the events may facilitate or inhibit
the strength of the community. (p. 13)
In summary, strong communities are those that offer members positive
ways to interact, important events to share and ways to resolve them
positively, opportunities to honor members, opportunities to invest in the
community, and opportunities to experience spiritual bond among
members. (p. 14)
So, community as a concept is strongly associated with, but does not necessarily involve,
place. It does, however, link individuals and groups together, and to broader society. Place, as
well as interests, is basically means for making that linkage. Community is phenomenon—not a
thing—that is evident in interactions between humans (and other living things). The phenomenon
is sensed so strongly that it is perceived as a thing. Indeed, this can be seen as a central element
of the definition: Community is perceived affective ties among actors.
Conceptually, community is a nexus of human needs-fulfillment activities that is clearly
identified and valued as such by participants. Community is evident in the extent to which
participants would forego personal benefits in order to establish or sustain this nexus. Morse
(2005) introduces the concept of community learning, but implies that community is a thing
when he says that, “[c]ommunity learning is collaborative learning that occurs at the community
level about community level concerns” (p. 4, emphasis in the original). Morse (2005) provides
six postulates about learning as a community-level process:
Postulate I: The community process creates new, collective knowledge in the form of
shared meanings or collective ideas. (p. 13)
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Postulate II: Structured processes of dialogue and deliberation facilitate the community
process. (p. 15)
Postulate III: The community process creates, maintains, or strengthens the relationships
which constitute the social structure of community. (p. 19)	
  
Postulate IV: A model of community as the structure of interinstitutional relations
focuses the attention of researchers and community participants on the linkages across
community institutions and social fields. (p. 20)
Postulate V: Community learning occurs as knowledge created through the community
process is fed-forward to the level of the community structure or field. A community has
learned when this collective knowledge is institutionalized across the community
structure, or rather, is embedded across the web of community institutions. (p. 23-24)
Postulate VI: A “learning community” has a well-developed community structure that
has institutionalized the practice of community learning, thus facilitating a sustained
community process. Such communities are said to be taking advantage of the “collective
intelligence.” They have created ongoing “forums for interaction”, or space for the
community process at the level of the community structure or field. (p. 27)
Morse (2005), like other scholars who focus on community, implies that the term
community refers to a thing. As things,
Communities are collections of actors whose membership in the collective
provides social and cultural resources that shape their actions.
Membership can result from a number of factors, including propinquity,
interest in a common goal, or common identity. (Marquis, Lounsbury, &
Greenwood, 2011, p. xvi)
According to Marquis, Lounsbury, and Greenwood (2011), community is a form of organization
for social production of goods and, “a key source of institutional logics that provide meaning and
shape behaviour of actors in an institutional field” (p. xvi). For practical purposes, community is
“a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common
perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings” (MacQueen, et al.,
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2001, para. 3), recognizing that people emphasize and experience elements of this differently,
based on their backgrounds.
An important implication of these definitions is that community exists at and varies
across all levels: Individuals each have unique, personal communities. Organizations are not
communities, but do have communities embedded within them, and have communities that span
their boundaries. And, organizations are members of communities when all members of the
organizations involved share a sense of their organizations’ belonging. Regions are not
communities but do have communities of individuals and organizations within and across them.
For the purposes of my dissertation, community is not a thing; it is a set of actors that is
defined by their interactions, manifesting at all levels in similar but different manners. That said,
community manifests as a thing, as a group given substance by members’ behavior, based on
shared sense of belonging and commitment. In this dissertation, I use the term community to
mean both the phenomenon of shared sense of community and the grouping described by
MacQueen, et al. (2001), and make an explicit distinction when I use the term to mean one or the
other.
These concepts and definitions provide the footers upon which I hope to lay the
foundations for a multilevel theory of learning. These concepts are considered in more detail in
chapters four and five. The question is how to explain, to model, and to predict learning, and
how we can critique and improve learning. The literature regarding learning reviewed in this
dissertation shows commonalities between theories of learning at various levels, but also critical
differences. What is conspicuous in its absence is a conceptual framework for linking the levels;
a theory that explains how they relate that is consistent with established theory at each level.
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How might a theory that applies to multiple levels and to relationships between levels be
constructed? In the next chapter I review literature on methods for analyzing concepts presented
in texts, which I use to identify commonalities and differences in learning across/between levels,
literature on methods for generating scientific theory, and literature on multilevel models. Then,
in chapter four, I present the results of my application of these methods to the question of how
learning occurs at various levels of socioeconomic aggregation.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
As discussed at the outset, my goal for this dissertation is to synthesize a theory of
learning at all levels of socioeconomic aggregation. The theory should help us understand
interactions across, between, and within levels in order to predict and improve learning at all
levels. There are three general tasks that I propose to carry out in order to suggest such a theory.
The first task is to identify a theoretical gap: a discrepancy in explanations of how learning—the
process of increasing capabilities or knowledge—occurs. Essentially, for this task, I must
analyze ideas related to learning. My concern is not with particular theories, or even academic
disciplines, but with the space between them, and with connecting them together. For this task I
employ textual analysis (Fairclough, 2003; Flick, 2009). The “data,” so to speak, for this analysis
are the ideas and theories from various academic disciplines, included in the review of literature
in chapter 2.
The second task for this dissertation is to suggest an explanation of learning that is
consonant with the ideas from various academic disciplines. This will be an exercise in theory
and model building. Such an exercise can only be considered productive if it results in a
conceptual framework that includes constructs and variables for description, measurement, and
testing. Therefore, I provide a conceptual framework that accommodates both qualitative and
quantitative inquiry into the nature of learning, and that can be used by various academic
disciplines. In order to accomplish this, my conceptual framework must be different enough to
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extend existing concepts without being so different that it conflicts with existing ideas.
Essentially, my challenge is to establish a “Switzerland” that is not within any one discipline or
paradigm, but is a place for the academics (and practitioners) to meet and work together. The
“Results” section of this dissertation will accomplish this second task.
The third and final task, which is essentially an extension of the second, is to describe
how the models I suggest might be used, how they might be applied in practice, how they might
be tested, and, generally, the means by which they might help us understand, predict, improve,
and explain learning across levels of social aggregation. To accomplish this I provide a mental
simulation or thought experiment of the use of my conceptual framework, models, and putative
theory. I use narrative form for this purpose, telling a story about practitioners and scientists
working together to address learning across levels. This will be done in the final chapter of this
dissertation.

Textual Analysis, Narrative Inquiry, and Critical Discourse Analysis
The initial method of this inquiry is a form of objective hermeneutics akin to narrative
inquiry (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000). It takes theories of learning as parts and products of the
process of mimesis—the representation of reality—and considers what unifies and differentiates
them. My method is to act as a medium for a dialogue within and between these bodies of
literature, extending the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer (1960/2004) as discussed by
McDowell (1994; Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2009). This dissertation is part and product of my
Bildung, which McDowell (1994) defines as the development of one’s second nature, as well as
an interpretation of the mimetic processes implicit in bodies of theoretical literature regarding
how individuals, organizations, and regions learn.
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Building on Schütz (1962), as discussed in Flick (2009), my task is third-degree
construction: constructs from the theoretical ideas that are derived from actual experience and
everyday life. Flick (2009) presents mimesis as the process of constructing versions of the world
from experience, and interpreting those versions to guide action. This is second-degree
construction, where social construction of reality (Berger & Luckman, 1966) is first-degree. My
task here is to look across academic disciplines to understand commonalities and differences in
their constructions of learning. In pursuing this task I borrow from, build on, and respond to
Fairclough’s (2003) point that:
There is a need to develop approaches to text analysis through a
transdisciplinary dialogue with perspectives on language and discourse
within social theory and research in order to develop our capacity to
analyse texts as elements in social processes. A ‘transdisciplinary’
approach to theory or analytical method is a matter of working with
categories and ‘logic’. (p. 6, emphasis in the original)
Critical discourse analysis is a form of social research, which Fairclough (2003) tells us:
… begins from questions such as these: how do existing societies provide
people with possibilities and resources for rich and fulfilling lives, how on
the other hand do they deny people these possibilities and resources? What
is it about existing societies that produces poverty, privation, misery, and
insecurity in people’s lives? What possibilities are there for social change
which would reduce these problems and enhance the quality of the lives of
human beings? The aim of critical social research is better understanding
of how societies work and produce both beneficial and detrimental effects,
and how the detrimental effects can be mitigated if not eliminated. (pp.
202-203)
A somewhat unique feature of this dissertation is that I am interested in how the
behavioral and social sciences answer these questions and achieve the aims of understanding and
improvement. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 tells us that learning is essential to
individuals, organizations, and regions. Learning appears to be a topic for the full range of
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behavioral sciences—indeed, for all science, if advancing knowledge is considered to be
learning. Given the breadth of this endeavor, I focus on the central ideas from theoretical
literature related to learning at the individual, organizational, and regional levels, rather than on
the particular language of specific texts.
The initial portion of the results of this dissertation will be an analysis—my
interpretation—of the fundamental concepts from each of these bodies of literature. I then apply
the methods of theory and model building, discussed below, to suggest an explanation of
learning that applies at all levels of social aggregation, and of how learning at various levels is
related. The purpose of this form of discussion is to instantiate (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010) my
proposed theory, to validate it, and to further the reader’s understanding of what I am suggesting.
Theory and model building are the methods I use to suggest a theory to fill the gaps in the
literature reviewed above.

Theory Building
The goal of my dissertation is to propose “a set of statements about the relationship(s)
between two or more concepts or constructs” (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, p. 28), which is how
Jaccard and Jacoby define the term “theory.” In particular, I attempt to advance our
understanding of how concepts and constructs at different levels of social aggregation (which is,
itself, a construct) relate to each other. I begin with the supposition that a multilevel learning
theory must conform to and draw on accepted theory from multiple fields. Indeed, by its very
nature such a theory transcends disciplinary boundaries. So, this is a transdisciplinary endeavor.
A multilevel learning theory should also have implications for practice at various
levels—individual teaching, organizational development, regional planning, etc. Therefore, this
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dissertation is rightfully an applied, practical endeavor, as well as a theoretical one. Because this
is bound to be an applied, transdisciplinary theory, it is important to make the theory’s logic
abundantly clear and to place it in context meaningful to practitioners (Lynham, 2002; Swanson,
2007). An applied approach, as discussed by Swanson (2007), is methodologically useful
because it inevitably draws on and synthesizes from various theories. Ouliaris (2011) maintains
that the process of theory building causes critical thinking about phenomena, which guides
practice.
With a flexible approach that integrates practice into theory, “Knowledge generation is
often best construed as a rhetorical process wherein the nature of knowledge is inextricably tied
to assumptions and vocabularies used to communicate ideas and approaches to study” (Gioia &
Pitre, 1990, 587). In other words, epistemology matters in practice. Different practices have
different paradigms. Gioia and Pitre maintain that paradigms behind theories aren’t totally
incommensurable; there are fuzzy boundaries between them. Applied theory building is a
“search for comprehensiveness,” for “more complete view or organizational phenomena” (Gioia
& Pitre, 1990, 587-588) rather than for truth. But the assumptions, purposes/goals, and
rhetoric/vocabulary of paradigms are different, precluding true synthesis (Gioia & Pitre, 1990).
Paradigms exist within naturalistic, interpretivist, and critical approaches to social science, and
there is similar fuzziness—and even interdependence—between these approaches (Braybrooke,
1987; Lynham, 2002). Effective practice, if not sound science, requires one to rise above
paradigmatic dogma.
Science has two separate but not incompatible purposes for theory, according to Dubin
(1969): predicting outcomes and understanding interactions—both of which are essential for
practice. Others would add emancipation, or at least improvement (Braybrooke, 1987; Gioia &
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Pitre, 1990; Lynham, 2002; Swanson, 2007), further tying theory to practice. Regardless of how
science is applied, its fundamental objective, Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) maintain, is to achieve
consensus regarding methods and results—to achieve intersubjectivity, in Habermas’s (1979,
1984) terms. Weick (1989), quoting Sutherland (1975), defines theory as “an ordered set of
assertions about a generic behavior or structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad
range of specific instances” (p. 517). Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) define theory as “a set of
statements about the relationship(s) between two or more concepts or constructs” (p. 28). Gioia
and Pitre’s (1990) definition is even simpler: “any coherent description or explanation of
observed or experienced phenomenon” (p. 587).
Generally, theories may be constructed deductively, reasoning from general rules to make
predictions, or inductively, by generalizing from observations to explain them (Babbie, 2010).
The two approaches are also characterized as theory-to-research and research-to-theory
(Lynham, 2002). Traditional positivistic scientific method is based on deduction, but Babbie
(2010) describes science as a cycle that includes induction, too. The combination drives the cycle
from theory to hypotheses to observation to generalizations and back to theory. Dubin (1969)
refers to this as the Theory-Research Cycle, in which he identifies four steps of theory building
prior to stating and testing propositions: specify units, identify laws of interaction, defining
boundaries, and positing possible system states. Ouliaris (2011) maintains that the process of
theory building causes critical thinking about phenomena, which guides practice. Applied
theorizing requires the addition of practice to the cycle of research and development (Lynham,
2002), which is held together by theory (Swanson, 2007). Lynham argues that the theory-toresearch approach is better suited to behavioral and social theory than research-to-theory.
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“Good theory” requires considering different phenomena at different scales, drawing on
the diversity of human experience, and always putting questions into historical perspective
(Mills, 1959). “These temporal and contextual factors set the boundaries of generalizability, and
as such constitute the range of theory,” according to Whetten (1989, p. 492), putting the
questions of how and what into the context of what, when, where, and, most importantly, why. A
substantial theoretical contribution, Whetten (1989) says, should provide theoretical
improvements—not just critiques—for multiple aspects of a theory, based on compelling
evidence.
To economically answer questions that clarify facts, Mills (1959) maintains, do as much
as possible by reasoning, repeating the following four steps: identify relevant information,
determine relationships between pieces of information, eliminate the irrelevant, and restate the
questions. This is, in Weick’s (1989) terms, “imagination disciplined by the processes of
artificial selection” (p. 528), and demands “a more informed and deliberate use of a simulated
evolutionary system” (p. 529). An evolutionary approach helps theorists deal with the reality that
“most theory construction depends on conjectures, preserved in well-crafted sentences, that are
tested in substitute environments by people who have a stake in the outcome of the test and may
be tempted to bias that outcome” (p. 529).
The critical ability for theorizing, Mills (1959) says, is “to shift from one perspective to
another, and in the process to build up an adequate view of a total society and its components”
(p. 232) and “by considering extremes – by thinking of the opposite of that with which you are
directly concerned” (p. 235). Weick (1989) maintains that, “A theorizing process characterized
by a greater number of diverse conjectures produces better theory than a process characterized by
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a smaller number of homogeneous conjectures” and “heterogeneous thought trials are more
likely than homogeneous thought trials to solve theoretical problems” (p. 522).
The greater the number of diverse criteria applied to a conjecture, the
higher the probability that those conjectures which are selected will result
in good theory. Furthermore, selection criteria must be applied
consistently or theorists will be left with an assortment of conjectures that
are just as fragmentary as those they started with. (p. 523)
The three steps of theory building, identified by Weick (1989), are problem statements,
thought trials, and selection criteria. Weick sees this as an intellectual parallel to biological
evolution, as sense making rather than problem solving, that does not have discrete well-defined
structure: “theory building involves simultaneous parallel processing, not sequential thinking”
(Weick, 1989, p. 519). Varian (2009) describes theory building in similar but more practical
terms: Look for problems in ordinary experiences that are scientifically interesting, and create
the simplest models of agents making choices to explain them. Someone has already done it,
Varian warns, and has done it better. Regardless, he promotes simplifying and generalizing by
repeated trial-and-error approach. “This back-and-forth iteration in building a model is like
sculpting: you are chipping away a little bit here, and a little bit there, hoping to find what's
really inside that stubborn block of marble” (Varian, 2009, p. 6).
Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) refer to this process as instantiation, “specifying concrete
instances of abstract concepts in order to help clarify their meaning” (p. 76). They note that
instantiation bridges the conceptual to the empirical, increasing validity, including
intersubjective aspects of empirical methods and results. Researchers maximize shared meaning
and reduce surplus (non-shared) meaning as, “each investigator makes his or her conceptual
definition explicit … [so] … specific points of agreement and disagreement can be identified”
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(Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010, p. 78), which they call consensual validation (as well as
intersubjectivity). They place instantiation between generating ideas for theorizing and
conducting thought experiments, and suggest numerous heuristics and practical strategies for
generating ideas and specifying concepts. “But the meaning and worth of a construct ultimately
depends on the broader nomological network in which it is embedded” (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010,
p. 79).
“When theorists apply selection criteria to their conjectures,” Weick (1989) maintains,
“they ask whether the conjecture is interesting, obvious, connected, believable, beautiful, or real,
in the context of the problems they are trying to solve” (p. 524). Varian (2009) agrees,
particularly, that concepts should be interesting. But, as Fiorina (1975) points out, “interesting”
depends on current knowledge. The theorist’s judgment of plausibility, based on selection
criteria, is parallel to and can substitute for empirical testing, according to Weick (1989).
Varian’s (2009) advice is to simplify and generalize, and get to the fundamental idea of the
model. This requires additional knowledge: “The more we know, the more restrictions we can
place on our models, and the less likely will our models be serious misrepresentations of the
empirical world” (Fiorina, 1975, p. 146).
Babbie (2010) says theory building involves establishing a purpose and unit of analysis,
identifying variables, including time, and operationalizing them, and conjecturing about the
relationship between those variables. And, Lynham (2002) maintains that the process consists of
verifying and refining, as well as generating, theory. All four of the research paradigms
identified by Gioia and Pitre (1990) seem to have a similar process for theory building, and the
cyclic-loop structure: The techniques vary by paradigm, but theory building invariably follows
from opening work, data collection, and analysis. And, theory building—particularly for
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traditional science—is embedded in a process along with operationalization and observation
(Babbie, 2010).
In Dubin’s (1969) view, theories are built of theoretical units (as distinct from, and as
determinants of, units of analysis or units of measure)—from most specific to most general:
enumerative, associative, relational, statistical, and summative units. The units are either
qualitative attributes or quantitative variables that persist over time and are linked by laws of
interaction. The general interactions are, from weakest to strongest, categoric (simple
association), sequential (related in time), or determinant (one depends on the other) interactions.
Causality involves all of these interactions. Research is “used to measure the values associated
with ‘things’” (Dubin, 1969, p. 6) for testing hypotheses about interactions between units,
allowing predictions and understanding.
“Concepts are the building blocks for all thinking,” according to Jaccard and Jacoby
(2010, p. 11), “It is our concepts that enable us to achieve some basic understanding of the
world.” As “generalized abstractions” that “encompass universes of possibilities” (p. 11),
constructs are hypothetical yet functional, learned and socially shared, and selectively
constructed. Constructs are concepts that encompass clusters of other concepts, note Jaccard and
Jacoby, and variables are particularly measurable constructs that represent abstract concepts.
Their general process is to systematically refine concepts, first to constructs, then to variables.
Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) suggest identifying outcome variables first, then direct causes, then
indirect causes including mediating and moderating variables, and finally reciprocal and spurious
relationships, temporal dynamics, and unanalyzed relationships.
Theory building can be seen as a learning process (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 2006), by its
structure as well as results (e.g., new knowledge). Just as learning resolves seemingly conflicting
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and contradictory sensation, so theories are built via a “generative dance” (Cook & Brown, 1999)
between conflicting approaches and incommensurable paradigms. Gioia and Pitre’s (1990)
caution about differing assumptions, purposes/goals, and rhetoric/vocabulary is well taken. But
the concepts of this dissertation are intrinsically transdisciplinary, and this dissertation must be
applied if it is to be sensible. So it is necessary to synthesize from very different concepts if I am
to develop a cohesive and comprehensive theory.
The solution is to use paradigmatic differences as a driving force for theory building, as
advocated by Mills (1959), Weick (1989), and others. Juxtaposing and jumping between
paradigms can be an effective way to generate and select theoretical conjectures, as long as this
is done methodically. Another solution is to embrace the fuzziness between
approaches/paradigm, and build on their interdependencies by grounding theory in real world
context. Such grounding is more than possible, it is essential to applied disciplines because
theory connects research, practice, and development in a dynamic cycle that is, again, essentially
the same as the loops that are central to organizational learning theory (Swanson, 2007). And, it
may be best to start with assumptions, purposes/goals, and rhetoric/vocabulary that are common
to all.
While Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) emphasize the importance of theory having consensual
validity and relating to other theories, they also promote use of both process- and variableoriented approaches. “In our experience, science in practice rarely fits neatly into simple
dichotomies,” say Jaccard and Jacoby, “Rather, scientists blend approaches in different ways and
to different degrees for different problems” (2010, p. 259). They continue:
[W]e believe that one should strive to create a diverse set of tools for one’s
theoretical toolbox and then use them in ways that help get the job done.
… In the end, the ultimate goal is to describe, predict, understand, and
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explain behavior in ways that help us make sense of our world and that
allow us to derive benefits. Both confirmatory and emergent approaches
are complementary, not conflicting means to these ends. (p. 259)
Fiorina (1975) makes the point that theories, particularly formal models, are inherently
limited by simplifying assumptions and could never totally capture reality; there are assumptions
built into any theoretical approach. Therefore, Fiorina says, the ultimate criteria for theories have
to be the logical rigor of the theorizing and the usefulness theory. The challenge with complex
behavioral and social systems, according to Ashby (1970), is to eliminate information: “when
faced with the excessively large quantities so readily offered by complex systems, we have to
learn how to be skillful in shedding it” (p. 100). Lave and March (1993), say:
A model is a simplified representation of the real world. A model is
created by speculating about processes that could have produced observed
facts. Models are evaluated in terms of their ability to predict correctly
other new facts. (p. 19)
Jaccard and Jacoby (2010), who use “model” and “theory” interchangeably, classify
models variously as process-oriented or variable-oriented, as causal or mathematical, and as
confirmatory or grounded/emergent. Grounded/emergent theories and process-oriented
approaches are similar, although—according to Jaccard and Jacoby’s (2010) description—
grounded theories don’t use models. Causal and mathematical models are both variable-oriented
approaches. Causal models address mediating, moderating, reciprocal, and other effects.
Mathematical models define variables as functions of other variables. Jaccard and Jacoby say
these approaches are mostly used in isolation, but argue that causal and mathematical models—
confirmatory approaches—could be used together, and even with emergent approaches, to good
effect. The authors in Blalock (1985) show how mathematical approaches can be applied to
causal models. Others provide philosophical (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2008) and practical
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(Onwuegbuzie, Johnson, & Collins, 2009) guidance and reviews of studies (Small, 2011) that
combine process-oriented and variable-oriented approaches to model building.
Fiorina (1975) sees models as expressions of theories, consisting of “primitives”
assembled into defined concepts under certain assumptions. Ouliaris (2011) says a model is, “a
simplified description of reality, designed to yield hypotheses about economic behavior that can
be tested. An important feature of an economic model is that it is necessarily subjective in design
because there are no objective measures of economic outcomes” (p. 46). Ouliaris (2011)
continues:
Theoretical models seek to derive verifiable implications about economic
behavior under the assumption that agents maximize specific objectives
subject to constraints that are well defined in the model (for example, an
agent’s budget). They provide qualitative answers to specific questions—
such as the implications of asymmetric information (when one side to a
transaction knows more than the other) or how best to handle market
failures. (p. 47)
Formal models are equally useful in political science, Firorina (1975) tells us: They force the
theorist to be more precise, they make assumptions clear (and reasonable), they are easy to
validate, and models allow the theorist to dive deep into a theoretical construct. Fiorina admits to
the limits of formal models but argues that such models should be judged on their predictive
power.
Models can be deductive theoretical models or inductive empirical models that test the
theoretical models with data gathered via research (Ouliaris, 2011). Lave and March (1993)
identify four general types of social science models—models of adaptation (learning), choice,
diffusion, and exchange—and all are built in four steps: (1) observe some facts, (2) look at the
facts as the result of some process, (3) deduce other results, and (4) ask whether these results
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obtain. Their rule of thumb for model building derives directly from these steps: (1) think
“process,” (2) develop interesting implications, and (3) look for generality. Fiorina (1975)
suggests “retroduction”—which is similar to Ashby’s (1970) eliminating information, Weick’s
(1989) artificial selection, Varian’s (2009) chipping away, and Jaccard and Jacoby’s (2010)
instantiation—as a basic approach to model building:
Given some empirical finding(s), X, one poses the question, “How might
the world be structured such that X holds, occurs, or is true?” The answers
to this question are models, all of which have in common that they assume
or imply X. To be worthy of consideration a model must have at least this
one tie (X) to the empirical world. (Fiorina, 1975, p. 145)
Generally, models consist of inputs (independent variables), intervening factors, outputs
(dependent variables), coefficients that specify the relationship between factors, and an error
term for the portion of the relationship that cannot be explained (specified) (Ouliaris, 2011).
And, the models must be tested or validated empirically to identify and correct systematic errors.
Predictive power and ability to isolate the effects of specific factors tend to be mutually
exclusive, Ouliaris tells us, and “the model’s predictions must be tempered by the randomness of
the underlying data it seeks to explain and by the validity of the theories used to derive its
equations” (2011, p. 49).

Multilevel Models
“Multilevel models enable the analyst to view people in the context of their social and
organizational hierarchies,” say Heck and Thomas (2009, p. 1), who provide a thorough
consideration of the topic. Multilevel models include a representation of each level and describe
relations between and within levels. This allows researchers to consider how variation within a
level relates to variation between levels. For this dissertation multilevel modeling means
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representing how persons, organizations, and regions learn, and describing how learning at one
level affects learning at another level.
A major issue for multilevel modeling is the aggregation and disaggregation of data, and
how those data are interpreted:
[I]t is important to develop a scheme to place the explanatory variables
hypothesized to affect individual and other types of organizational process
in their proper hierarchical locations … This helps to clarify the
organizational, or contextual, level to which they rightly belong. (Heck &
Thomas, 2009, p. 20)
For this dissertation, I provide a conceptual framework that clearly delineates levels. There are a
variety of methods for drawing samples, aggregating data, and analyzing results, the
appropriateness of which depends on the type of multilevel model one is using (Klein &
Kozlowski, 2000). Researchers must make decisions about constructs and measurements,
models, sampling, and analysis, Klein and Kozlowski (2000) note. Multilevel models contain
hierarchical data structures, which benefit from techniques that can “represent a number of
different statistical concepts including random coefficients, sources of variation in multilevel
analyses, missing data, growth trajectories, finite mixtures, and latent classes” (Heck & Thomas,
2009, p. 99). These points are well taken, but such details are beyond the scope of this
dissertation. My models will be more general, but I note these admonitions because any
multilevel theory should accommodate them to make empirical analysis practical.
Rousseau (1985) notes that the level on which the model focuses is distinct from the
levels of measurement and analysis, and it is necessary to avoid attributing what’s measured to
another level. Such “misspecification arises from failure to establish specific-level construct
validity, which is the extent to which the operationalization the research employs is a valid
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measure of a construct at the focal level” (Rousseau, 1985, p. 5, emphasis in original). While
aggregation can minimize random error at the level of measurement, according to Rousseau, it
cannot help systematic error, and aggregation methods may create spurious relationships in the
data. Generally, Rousseau suggests, it is best if the focal unit is consistent with the level of
measurement and the level of analysis, and indivisible data for the focal unit is preferable to data
aggregated from subunits.
Rousseau (1985) also reminds us to avoid the ecological fallacy of attributing
characteristics of one level to its constituents, and the cross-level fallacy of assigning traits at one
level to aggregate entities at the next level. Isomorphism, in which a single construct is evident at
multiple levels, is an important topic for social science, Rousseau says, “Isomorphism implies
that constructs mean the same thing at different levels” (p. 8). It can be difficult for isomorphism
to provide non-obvious explanations, Klein, Tosi, and Cannella (1999) note, and clearly define
constructs at different levels: constructs’ functionality is the same even though their structure
may vary across levels. It is necessary to have a cross-level theory of composition that “specifies
functional relationships underlying constructs from different levels” (Klein, Tosi & Cannella,
1999, p. 9, emphasis in original). For example, some researchers have defined constructs at the
intrasubjective, intersubjective, and collective levels, while others have examined how constructs
change levels (Klein, Tosi & Cannella, 1999).
Rousseau (1985) also tells us to avoid contextual fallacies by considering the effects of
environment and setting. Specifically, researchers should mind effects that “act as unit-level
moderators of relationships at the individual level” (p. 9) and those that “result from appraisal or
evaluation of one’s relative standing in a group” (p. 10). In other word, peoples’ behaviors can
be impacted by their situations and their feelings about those situations. Individuals, especially
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executives and other leaders, or groups can also affect context and unit constructs (Klein, Tosi &
Cannella, 1999).
Rousseau (1985) boils all of this down to three types of models: composition models
address how nondependent variables on different levels relate to each other; cross-level models
deal with dependent and independent variables at different levels; and, multilevel models are of
dependent and independent variables at one level generalized to other levels. Models of
composition help ensure that aggregated data represent variables, there is no bias from methods
or raters, and the data’s form is valid for a construct’s attributes. Cross-level models can deal
with how context impacts variables, relations between multiple variables at the same level, and
deviance from in-level norms. Klein and Kozlowski (2000) add that a direct effects cross-level
model can only explain between-unit variation. Direct effects can be moderated cross-level by a
third variable note Klein and Kozlowski, and within-unit variation can affect variation between
subunits (one’s position relative to others may have greater impact than absolute characteristics).
Fully multilevel theories require composition theories to specify how a particular
construct exists separately at multiple levels. Klein and Kozlowski (2000) suggest distinguishing
between the global, objective characteristics of a group, the characteristics or experiences that
are common to all members of the group, and the characteristics that “capture the array, pattern,
or variability of individual characteristics within a team” (p. 217). Model builders “must specify
the levels or types of organizational units meaningful to us from the perspective of theory
development and empirical generalization” (Rousseau, 1985, p. 25). In doing so, it is necessary
to be cognizant of assumptions that functions of sub-units depend on their role in higher-level
units, and/or that units are derived solely and totally from subunits. There must be between-unit
variation just to operationalize the model’s constructs (Klein & Kozwolski, 2000).
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Rousseau (1985) provides the following guidelines for multilevel theorizing. Specify the
appropriate level(s) for theories, at which levels constructs obtain. Establish construct validity at
all appropriate levels. Make sure the number of higher-level units is as large as possible relative
to subunits, and make sure subunits are accurately assigned to the correct units. When evaluating
independent and dependent variables on the same level, gather data from different subjects. Use
global variables whenever possible rather than or along with aggregate data. Evaluate the extent
of subjects’ agreement on aggregated measures, but remember that within-unit disagreement may
be worth studying (Klein, Tosi & Cannella, 1999) as well as an important consideration in
aggregating data (Klein & Kozwolski, 2000). “Maintain all data at the lowest measurement level
possible” (Rousseau, 1985, p. 31). Conduct analysis at the level of the focal unit. When relating
subunit variables to global unit variables, assign the global value to each subunit and conduct
correlations at the subunit level, which “allows effects of unit characteristics on lower level
responses to be assessed at the levels where those effects are hypothesized to occur” (Rousseau,
1985, p. 31).
Logic Models. Multilevel models as discussed above are fundamentally variable-oriented,
causal and mathematical approaches. In contrast, process-oriented approaches are less inclined to
modeling (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010). Case-study logic models are a clear exception. Case-studies
examine how and why a particular set of events and outcomes, or program, occurred (Yin, 2008).
The case study method described by Yin is deceptively simple: First, define and design the case;
second, prepare then collect and analyze data; and, third, analyze results and draw conclusions.
Generally, Yin is a proponent of using case studies to “test” rival explanations. Once the subject
and research question(s) are established, the researcher identifies various explanation, or
program theories, for the events/outcomes. Yin (2008) discusses embedded case studies, with
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multiple units of analysis, as a way to document projects—or other “process units” such as
locations, meetings, or roles—within a program.
Yin (2008) suggests logic models as means for analyzing case study data. Logic models
are widely used in practice, for designing and evaluating programs for business, education,
healthcare, etc. (Conrad, et al., 1999: Cooksy, Gill & Kelly, 2000; W. K. Kellogg Foundation,
2004; Yang, Shen, Cao & Warfield, 2004; Renger & Hurly, 2006; Yin, 2008). “A logic model is
a graphic representation of a program that describes the program’s essential components and
expected accomplishments and conveys a logical relationship between these components and
their outcomes” (Conrad, et al., 1999, p. 18).
Logic models represent the program theory against which empirical results can be
compared for evaluation and research purposes (Yin, 2008). They provide a framework for
multi-method pattern matching and triangulation (Cooksy, Gill, and Kelly, 2000). The W. K.
Kellogg Foundation (2003) focuses on logic models’ use for design and implementation of
programs. How logic models are used depends on whether the model focuses on theory,
outcomes, or activities, the W. K. Kellogg Foundation (2003) tells us, because each has a
different underlying rationale. Theory is about why a program will work. Outcomes are the
expected results. Activities are what the program will do. It is important to make planned
activities, expected outcomes, and theories clear during planning in order to maximize the value
of evaluations.
The W. K. Kellogg Foundation (2004) breaks the logic model into two parts, planned
work and intended results, and subdivides those into (1) resources/inputs, (2) activities, which
are components of planned work, (3) outputs, (4) outcomes, and (5) impact, which are
components of intended results, based on clearly stated assumptions. Conrad, et al. (1999) see a
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program as consisting of “(1) the context; (2) the theory and assumptions that underlie the
program’s intervention, (3) the intervention, and (4) the outcomes” (p. 18). Yang, Shen, Cao &
Warfield (2004) present a model that, “has four major components: (a) issues and opportunities;
(b) strategies; (c) outcomes; and (d) impacts” (p. 497), for each of three strategy clusters. Yin
(2008) sticks with Wholey’s (1979) logic model structure of intervention, immediate outcome,
intermediate outcome, and ultimate outcomes. Renger and Hurley (2006) are more vague about
the components, but emphasize the importance of fully identifying all antecedent conditions (as
opposed to more simplistic descriptions of context).
As Yin (2008) describes them, logic models have much in common with causal models:
The logic model deliberately stipulates a complex chain of events over an
extended period of time. The events are staged in repeated cause-effectcause-effect patterns, whereby a dependent variable (event) at an earlier
stage becomes an independent variable (causal event) for the next stage.
(p. 149)
Note the fundamentally different nature of “variables” in logic models: They are events
rather than measurable constructs. Yin suggests using quantitative as well as qualitative data for
these variables. The ATM (antecedent, targeting, and measurement) approach discussed by
Renger and Hurley (2006) is very much a causal model, but incorporates a wide range of
qualitative factors and scant mathematics. An outcome could be a profound change in the
program.
Logic models can be used to analyze individual, organization, and program level
activities/events, Yin (2008) says, and can capture transformations in units of analysis at each
level. Cooksy, Gill, and Kelly (2000) demonstrate how logic models can capture multiple levels
simply by combining multiple cases. The logic model, which is built of micro units, provides a
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basis for comparing meso units. Taken together the logic models for multiple organizations—
assuming they are in the same geographic area—also imply something about the macro level.
Yang, Shen, Cao, and Warfield (2004) look at a comprehensive program for increasing
philanthropy and volunteerism on three levels. The top level is the overall initiative. The second
level consists of three clusters: “(a) supporting emerging leaders and donors, (b) creating and
sharing knowledge around philanthropy and volunteerism, and (c) building tools for sector
sustainability and effectiveness” (Yang, Shen, Cao & Warfield, 2004, p. 495). Under each cluster
at the lowest, are multiple projects. Their logic model incorporates each cluster’s objectives for
all projects related to issues and opportunities, strategies, outcomes, and impacts. “No multilevel
evaluation alignment would be feasible unless there are common principles to tie together the
evaluations at different levels,” note Yang, Shen, Cao, and Warfield (2004, p. 497).
The Colorado Trust’s framework for its Change Through Advocacy program (Beer &
Reed, 2009) exemplifies the application of a logic model and is a causal multilevel advocacy
evaluation model. It begins with increasing in organizations’ capacities, goes through alliance
building, to shared agendas and political will, and culminates with substantive impacts. This
hypothetical model is used to guide change as an evaluation that, “ensures continuous learning
within the advocates’ organizations—incorporating informed, evidence-based decision making
into grantees’ day-to-day operations” (Beer & Reed, 2009, p. 152).
W. K. Kellogg (2004) is a detailed guide to creating a logic model as tool for planning
and implementation. Its process begins with theory building, then specifying outcomes, and,
finally, detailing activities. Yang (2004) presents this process as an evaluation tool by embedding
it in a larger process: establish a logic model, then pose evaluation questions and subquestions,
and then collect and analyze data, which lead to program improvements. The ATM approach’s
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(Renger & Hurley, 2006) first step is identifying antecedent conditions. These will be so
numerous that it will be necessary to target those on which to focus, which is the second step.
Measurement is the third step. Yin’s (2008) process for developing an analytic strategy applies to
logic models, and to time series, explanation building, and pattern matching. He suggests the
strategy start with theoretical propositions, develop a case description, use qualitative and
quantitative data, and examine rival explanations. The model must have construct, internal, and
external validity, and be reliable, and Yin maintains that each strategy variously addresses each
of these issues.
Of course, the above discussion is about developing logic models of specific cases. My
goal is to provide a different general model because learning provides a different logic, which
can be applied to particular cases. I propose to provide a theory that can be the basis for a
learning logic model. Many of the concepts reviewed above, especially those regarding model
building and multiple levels, may apply to building a general model. But my general model will
necessarily have different components and a different structure.

Building a Multilevel Theory and Models of Learning
The purpose of model building is to identify the critical parts of a thing, and specify how
those parts interact, in order to explain and predict how the thing works. Multilevel models are
based on the realization that a thing might be affected by external context and environment, as
well as internal characteristics. Based on the literature reviewed above, any theory requires a
clear definition of the thing to be explained, and a multilevel theory requires similar clarity
regarding levels. The conceptual framework should plainly impute factors thought to influence
the thing to one and only one level. This not only makes research easier, it reduces the risk of
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false and trivial conclusion. A conceptual framework that makes levels distinct makes for
theoretical models that can be practically tested against reality.
I use the theory- and model-building methods reviewed above to suggest a simple yet
powerful explanation of learning that applies to various levels of social aggregation. I also
provide a conceptual framework to support it, for practical and scholarly purposes. The
objectives are to produce causal, mathematical, and logic models, discuss and illustrate the
putative theory, and indicate how the models might be tested and used. I specify underlying
assumptions—building on the definitions in the introduction—and provide precise language for
the theory.
In order to provide a comprehensive view, I focus on the areas between paradigms and
approaches as I develop my explanation of learning. I deduce theoretical propositions by
identifying gaps and overlaps between previously validated theories from different academic
disciplines. These theories are the data I analyze in order to generate conjectures and problem
statements that fit with but not within various academic perspectives. From these conjectures and
problem statements I deduce primitives and units, along with the assumptions and laws of
interaction (Dubin, 1969). Then, based on the assumptions and laws, I assemble primitives into
concepts and construct a transdisciplinary conceptual framework from those concepts.
To put this in the terms of the literature on theory- and model-building, I conduct
instantiation (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010) and retroduction (Fiorina, 1975). I use Weick’s (1989)
problem statements, thought trials, and selection criteria. In the process, I define unit(s) of
analysis, identify variables (input, intervening, and outputs) including time, and operationalize
them, and conjecture about the relationships (i.e., coefficients) between those variables (Babbie,
2010).
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Generally, I work in the area between naturalistic, interpretivist, and critical paradigms,
addressing all but hewing to none. To establish consensual validity I show how the proposed
theory applies to practice. Ultimately, I hope to provide a theory that is simple yet useful.
I offer three general models for practitioners and researchers. A mathematical model will
be provided as a means for describing the relationship between levels, how variation at one level
explains variation at other levels. A causal model will illustrate how the characteristics of
independent variables precede and determine the characteristics of the dependent variables. A
logic model will present this as a process via which factors are transformed into outcomes
through a series of functions. These models should prove useful for designing and implementing
learning programs, as well as for inquiry that advances our understanding of learning. The causal
and mathematical models will be variable-oriented, intended primarily for hypothesis testing.
The process-oriented logic model will be primarily for program design and evaluation. My
conceptual framework will act as a theory of composition to deal with data-aggregation issues
and avoid misspecification, and to isolate mediating or moderating effects of context.
As a theoretical dissertation, these models will only go so far as to establish construct
validity. I provide guidelines and suggestions for operationalizing variables and provide
examples of how the theory might be applied, but will not actually collect or analyze any original
data. The process-oriented model will translate learning into a general structure for a logic
model, and a general model of the learning process. The model will be applicable to multiple
levels, and will allow for transformation in subjects. It will emphasize the importance of
antecedents to learning and the general activities or events that generate learning. As with the
variable-oriented models, I provide some guidelines and suggestions on how to use the model for
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designing and evaluating learning, based on the model but I do not gather or analyze original
data.
The data for this dissertation are the theories from which I synthesize my proposed
theory. The results will be a qualitative analysis of this data, and a conceptual framework for
describing, integrating, and measuring these elements. So, I intend to make assertions about
learning that hold across levels of social aggregation, from individuals through organizations to
regions, and apply to various circumstances. I attempt to provide a coherent description and
explanation to predict outcomes and understand the interaction of learning that occurs across, as
well as within, levels. And, I provide means for documenting and testing those interactions and
their effects. As underpinnings for the theory and models, I provide an innovative conceptual
framework synthesized from the literature reviewed above.
Finally, in the discussion portion of this dissertation I illustrate use of my proposed
conceptual framework, models, and theory with a thought experiment. Thought experiments
have a long history and have been notably used by luminaries such as Galileo, Descartes,
Newton, and, more recently, by Albert Einstein and John Searle (Brown & Fehige, 2011). I use
thought experiment to illustrate my theory, which is a long-accepted use of thought experiment
(Brown & Fehige, 2011), especially given practical limitations of empirical investigation. The
thought experiment will allow me to discuss how my proposed theory might be applied and
tested.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS

Analysis of Literature
Learning theory for each level of social aggregation has different metaphors—“tools to
create compact descriptions of complex phenomena” (Weick, 1989, p. 529)—for framing the
process of increasing capabilities. The metaphors discussed here—the cognitive constructor,
loops of learning, and triple helix—come directly from literature reviewed in Chapter 2. At the
micro level, the overarching metaphor might be called “the cognitive constructor.” A person
makes the most of her or his innate, physical characteristics (including those that determine
mental capacity) by acquiring information through experience, by observing others, and from
texts—informational artifacts created by others. He or she constructs information into useful
knowledge, building schemata, generating connections between concepts and experience, and
producing behavior. Behavior invariably involves interaction with others, which constructs a
shared reality. All of this in response to diverse yet complementary innate human drives. As a
person, an individual’s general purpose is fulfillment of drives and needs. It should be noted that
all levels are defined by the actions of individuals, so it is redundant to refer to the micro level as
“individual.” Rather, this is the level at which individuals behave as persons rather than members
of organizations or residents of regions.
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The metaphor at the meso level is “loops of learning.” These are cyclic, iterated efforts to
clarify and strengthen the relations between individuals in order to form (or reform) the
organization. These loops occur at various scales, and are nested within each other. There are
various theoretical views of the phases, stages, or steps in this cyclic process. The specific steps
are not as important as is the common framework and shared experience for individuals that the
steps provide. Organizations exist for specific, well-defined purposes, to which everyone in an
organization relates. Individuals converge on purpose via the steps in loops of learning. The
general concept that is prominent in theories of organizational learning is that of feedback and
reflection. The organization provides a context for individuals to garner feedback from and
provide it to each other, to guide behavior toward purpose.
The “triple helix” is a metaphor for learning at the macro level. It is academia,
government, and industry learning interactively with diverse global and local agents, sharing
ordinary and special knowledge. Place not only matters at this level, it is a defining characteristic
of learning. Knowledge inheres to people in place. For regions, even more than organizations
level, learning is relatively independent of particular individuals. Theorists are interested in how
the structure of and interactions between economic-political-social institutions explain
differences between regions, and differences in what those regions produce. Theory at this level
emphasizes that learning is social.
Theories at each level attempt to explain a general output, or dependent variables. At the
micro level the output is capability (as defined by Sen (1988, 1999), Nussbaum (2000), and
Clark (2005)): ability to fulfill needs, how one acts in response to innate drives, and what
decisions one makes in particular situations, given one’s capacity. This is what individuals
construct, their capabilities. Of course, individuals can have many goals, purposes, and play
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many roles—some conflicting—that change over time. But, drives remain. This provides the
basis for judging capabilities. More subjectively, individuals, as persons, seek fulfillment;
personal fulfillment provides the basis for innate drives and the rationale for capabilities.
For organizations, at the meso level, the output is performance—essentially producing
goods and/or services via combination of capital and labor—in an economically or politically
viable manner. In contrast with individuals, organizations judge performance on a limited
number of relatively stable goals.
At the macro level the general regional output is advantage: some novel, unique, and
valuable characteristic of a place. While regions have a set of general goals—infrastructure, jobs,
quality of life, etc.—they are characterized by diverse, sometimes conflicting, sometimes
complementary, often unrelated, purposes, connected by place. Organizational performance and
regional advantage are undoubtedly dependent on individual capabilities, but the relationship
obviously goes the other direction as well. Personal fulfillment is dependent on organizational
performance and regional advantage, as well and individual capability. But because fulfillment is
subjective, the fundamental dependent variable is individual capability. There are moral as well
as practical reasons for making individual capability the fundamental unit of analysis, which I
discuss below.
There are common factors, or independent variables, for theories at each level, too.
Individual capabilities require information, models, stimuli, practice, feedback, etc., as well as
prior knowledge—attitudes, beliefs, etc. The function of the cognitive constructor is to construct
capabilities from these factors. Organizational performance depends on division of labor, means
of production, and technology (which is essentially instantiated knowledge). The loops of
learning are cognitive constructors operating on these organizational factors. Regional advantage
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results from different organizations interacting to align their capital, labor, and technology,
creating knowledge spillovers and network externalities in the process. The triple helix arises
from connecting loops of learning to reinforce each other. These metaphors come directly from
the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The relationship between levels is implied by the metaphors
but rarely if ever addressed in the literature.
Each of the factors and outputs are important at other levels, but each level seems to
focus on and situate particular variables. Individuals, with their drives and capabilities, are
situated in organizations via division of labor. Place-based advantages situate organizations in
regions, making them more competitive, productive, and profitable. Each level provides
synergies from lower-level aggregation. Indeed, synergy is what defines each level: Lower level
entities are not just aggregated; they are combined in such a way that the whole is greater than
the sum of its parts. How are these synergies realized and increased? What explains variation in
the synergies? What explains differences in combining cognitive constructors via division of
labor, and in connecting loops of learning to capture knowledge spillovers? How does the triple
helix improve division of labor for multiple organizations? And, how do loops of learning boost
capabilities of multiple individuals?
Theories at each level share certain fundamental realities. Agents tend to act in their own
interests, at times collectively. But agents’ understanding of their own and others’ interests is
limited; and circumstances can countervail. Each agent has a unique set of resources, particularly
information, at her or his disposal. To create meaning and maximize value, agents exchange
those resources as goods and symbols. Agents construct institutions with roles and rules, and
narratives about them, to provide additional certainty to those exchanges. Through interaction
agents develop a shared understanding of interests and resources. Undergirding all of this is the
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concept of development; that one can methodically improve one’s state, especially by acting
collectively.
Recursion and reflexivity are important in all learning theories at all levels: self-action,
self-awareness, and self-regulation. Whether individual, organizational, or regional, the learner
identifies herself, himself, or itself as an entity, and it acts upon itself, applying its output to its
factors. So, individuals behave to acquire better information. Organizational performance
includes restructuring capital and labor. Innovations generated by regions fuel interactions within
them. Self-action can be seen as the means by which the metaphors at each level are integrated:
Multiple individual cognitive constructors acting upon themselves in coordination generate
organizational loops of learning, and many of those loops acting upon themselves in concert
accrete into regional triple helixes.
The other concept or construct that is common to all theoretical areas is the information
network. The simplest version of this is nodes that sense and signal each other. These nodes
could be nerve endings, individuals, or enterprises. They sense reality and produce signals based
on the sense data, as determined by simple rules. The rules employed depend on signals from
other sensors. And, the sensing can never be passive; reality must somehow change the node,
activating or interfering with it. Conceptually, such a network depends on how sensors are
attuned to each other, how they sense signals from other sensors as distinct from other parts of
the world. The metaphors, outputs, factors, and common concepts related to learning at the
micro, meso, and macro levels are summarized in table 1.
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Table 1 Summary of Metaphors, Outputs, Factors, and Common Concepts for Learning at
Individual, Organizational, and Regional Levels
Learning
Metaphor
Cognitive
constructor

Meso:
Organizational

Loops of
learning

Performance

Capital, labor,
technology

Macro: Regional

Triple helix

Advantage

Institutions,
infrastructure,
resources

Common
Concepts

Reflexivity

Level
Micro: Individual
(personal)

Information networks

Factors/
Independent
Variables
Physical
characteristics,
information,
texts

Agentic action

Output/
Dependent
Variable
Fulfillment

The general theoretical picture is one of micro-level knowledge processes, applied
recursively and reflexively to allocation of capital and division of labor at the meso-level,
enabled by macro-level institutions and infrastructure. The socio-cognitive constructor is enabled
by being embedded in loops of learning and triple helices, by engaging in action and reflection
with others based on shared places and purposes. In this dissertation I conjecture that there is
phenomenon or process that occurs across levels whenever learning—particularly generative
learning and innovation—occurs: Community. The independent variables and shared realities
become factors of functions that determine learning across levels.

Proposed Theory
The theory of learning I propose to explain learning at all levels and the relationship
between learning at various levels is essentially quite simple: community yields learning.
Community results in learning, the stronger community is the greater the learning, and
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substantive learning does not occur without community. Community makes people smarter.
Community also makes organizations and regions smarter. This theory requires much
explication. Before doing so I provide a conceptual framework for use in applying and testing the
theory, and I clearly state some fundamental aspects of this theory. First, though, I should
provide some background on the theory and how it was developed.
This theory builds on existing validated theories and shows how those theories are
consistent across levels. This theory is transdisciplinary. It draws indiscriminately—so to speak,
because it is carefully considered—from numerous academic fields. My goal is a theory that is
comprehensive yet focused, that is both practically and scholastically useful. This theory has
been developed over the course of my doctoral work in a manner similar to those discussed by
Mill (1959), Weick (1989), Gioia and Pitre (1990), Lyndham (2002), Swanson (2007), Varian
(2009), Jaccard and Jacoby (2010) and Ouliaris (2011). Prior to my doctoral studies I was
concerned with the relationship between individual learning about technology, particularly
among traditional leaders, and how the organizations those individuals led adopted and used
technology, and how technology-use spilled over from those organizations into the surrounding
region. It is this conundrum that motivated me to pursue scholarly knowledge about leading and
learning.
My theory building process has been embedded in my studies, doing exactly as Mills
(1959) recommends: identifying relevant information, determining relationships between pieces
of information, eliminating the irrelevant, and restating my questions. I have found relevant
information in most all the behavioral and social sciences. The relationships became clear
through innumerable hours of discussion and study. My practical work in economic development
and education helped me understand what was relevant. And, the writing I’ve done has
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essentially been a continual restatement of my questions, artificially selecting ideas via
instantiation and thought experiments (as discussed by Weick (1989) and Jaccard & Jacoby
(2010)). My approach has not been as rigorous as Weick might like but it has been more
methodical than Varian’s (2009) approach.
The following text presents the results of this process. Ultimately, I illustrate the results
via a thought experiment regarding the impact of high-speed internet access (i.e., broadband) and
how that impact might be increased via innovative intervention by higher education. This will
replicate the theoretical instantiation (Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010) I’ve done over the last four years.
The core results are structured around Dubin’s (1969) Theory-Research Cycle. So, before
illustrating the theory, I specify units, identify laws of interaction, define boundaries, and posit
possible system states. As I work through these steps I provide three models for explaining,
predicting, and understanding multilevel learning, a causal model, a mathematical model, and a
logic model. Each of these models, and the theory itself, will be constructed within a conceptual
framework, which provides a basis for addressing each portion of the Theory-Research Cycle.
The methodology literature reviewed in chapter 2 of this dissertation makes it clear that a
good theory is falsifiable, if not verifiable. Theoretical constructs and measures must be valid
and reliable to use. A conceptual framework should make it clear how to validate and verify
theory. As discussed above, the three general criteria of truth (veracity) are coherence,
consistence, and correspondence, and the three forms of validity are subjective, objective, and
intersubjective. These characteristics also provide the diverse criteria promoted by Weick (1989)
for selecting theoretical propositions.
My conceptual framework establishes objective validity by building on existing,
validated theory. It seeks subjective validity via practical applicability. Intersubjective validity
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comes from finding commonalities between practice, theory, and various paradigms. This is a bit
of a challenge because scientists and professionals tend to focus at one level. Not only are there
paradigmatic conflicts within levels, there are also paradigmatic disconnects between levels. I
address this first by identifying how fundamental aspects at each level relate to each other, based
on literature reviewed above, and second by offering a way of thinking about structure that
applies at all levels. Each level functions differently, but in complementary manners. I feel these
conflicts and disconnects actually benefits my theorizing by providing the diverse perspectives
that Mills (1959) calls for. So, my conceptual framework integrates diverse academic
perspectives to provide diverse theoretical criteria in a manner that is reasonably simple yet
provides descriptive power and measurable constructs.
Before detailing my conceptual framework, allow me to briefly summarize it so the
reader does not get lost along the way. In this framework: (1) the fundamental unit of analysis is
the individual human being. Individuals act agentically at the micro level as persons, at the meso
level as members of organizations, and at the macro level residents of regions. Individuals’
behaviors can be observed to measure the information and materials they use, and to infer their
attitudes and beliefs. Their connections to others determine what information and materials
individuals have, and their attitudes and beliefs define individuals’ visions of what is desirable
and possible. (2) Individuals’ behaviors, connections, and visions can be described and
measured. Individuals’ connections and visions can be observed as behavior. Those behaviors
can be ascribed to micro, meso, or macro levels, analyzed to identify variation, and that variation
can correlated between and within levels. (3) The dependent variable is individual real freedoms,
or capabilities, which can be described in terms of knowledge and measured in terms of liberty,
prosperity, and wellness. An individual’s freedoms can be negatively or positively correlated,
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between and within levels, with the personal fulfillment of others, and with organizational
performance and regional advantage. (4) The independent variable is community, or rather the
socio-cognitive functions that result in a shared sense of community. These functions are the
input factors that cause individuals—personally, as organizations, and as regions—to gain
capabilities. Hypothetically, the level of community increases with each function, leading to
increased capabilities.
The next section discusses the conceptual framework and its elements in detail. Then I
explicate the multilevel theory of learning using the conceptual framework, including a causal
model, a logic model, and a mathematical model. Finally, I illustrate the theory by applying it to
higher education and information and communication technologies.

Conceptual Framework
A multilevel theory of learning should fill critical gaps in theories of learning. It should
enable educators, policymakers, and researchers to better understand the role of context in
learning and how learning aggregates. Here I seek to provide a set of concepts and propositions
that addresses how collective capabilities impact individuals, and how individual knowledge
impacts development of collectives. A conceptual framework for a multilevel theory can be built
on the individual as agent—drawing on the work of Bandura (2001)—acting in her or his own
interests, which emerge from innate drives (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Lawrence & Nohria, 2002) as
intentions (Ajzen, 1991) and motivations (Deci & Ryan, 1985). My fundamental unit of analysis
is the individual human being, who acts agentically as a (1) person, (2) member of organizations,
and (3) citizen of a region, and who sees, has, and does in different ways as each. This
conceptual framework affords three levels of analysis by distinguishing forms of agentic
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behavior each of which has a defining function. Those functions, and the levels, can be
distinguished by cognition, collectivity, place, and purpose.

Unit of Analysis
Individual human beings have inherent capacity to carry, handle, process, use, etc., some
quantity of information and materials, which I refer to as assets. Capacity is determined by
physical attributes, including cognitive capacity. Capacity is limited but can be allocated to
various purposes—generally, personal, organizational, or regional—and used in different ways.
It can be supplemented by other individuals or with implements, but is essentially fixed (at least
in the short-run). Individuals also have ability to affect or transform the quality of the
information and materials they handle. Ability can be enhanced and improved, but this requires
capacity. All of this is done via activities. (This is something of a restatement of Miller’s (1956)
theory that humans’ cognitive capacity is limited to seven plus or minus two bits of information,
but we are able to handle greater amounts of information by “chunking” these bits together.)
Psychologically, individuals use embodied mental models, or schemata, to guide action
(Piaget, 1973, 1983; Hirsch, 1987; Rumelhart, 1980; Isanski & West, 2010), for interpreting
information and manipulating materials. For example, humans only have two hands so can only
carry two relatively light things. This is our unaided carrying capacity. We have developed
numerous means with associated schemata to enhance our abilities: bags, baskets, carts, juggling,
trucks, etc. It takes time, as well as information and materials, to create, and even to use, these
things. So, consider a person carrying water. Unaided, he or she can carry little, if any, water.
Water-carrying capacity is greatly increased with a bucket, and that capacity is doubled with two
buckets. But, where do the buckets come from? First, there has to be the idea of a bucket,
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possibly from seeing rainwater trapped in a broken gourd. Then, the bucket must be constructed
from a gourd or animal hide or coopered wood. Then, the buckets must be filled and carried,
which can be physically difficult if the water is inaccessible. This is because our human arms can
only reach so far, and our hands can only grasp for a limited time. So, the person might create a
lever for drawing up water and a yoke for carrying two buckets. All of this takes time. The more
skilled the person is at constructing things, the more quickly he or she can make the buckets,
lever, and yoke. Also, some buckets, levers, and yokes are more functional—less likely to break,
require less physical effort or pain, don’t leak or spill water, etc.—than others. The individual
must have both the mental content about functional elements (buckets, lever, and yoke, but also
not to mention components like lumber and rope) and how those elements work together, and the
ability to realize that functionality by transforming natural materials into a water-carrying
system. While the individual is creating the components and putting them together in a system,
he or she is not carrying water. But, once constructed, the system greatly increases the
individual’s water-carrying capacity, so he or she can carry the needed water quicker.
So, what are we analyzing here, how much water an individual can carry? No, what we
are really interested in is what the individual does with the water when he or she doesn’t have to
carry it. People must have water. Prior to the water-carrying system the individual (and those
who rely on her or him) had to spend a lot of time carrying water. With the water-carrying
system, the individual can spends much less time on that task and has time to spend as he or she
sees fit. The individual does not exist to carry water. Rather, water is means to the individual’s
survival. The individual can use it personally, or he or she can use it as part of an organization, or
he or she can contribute to a system that is used by other individuals—as persons or
organizations—in a region.
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There are certain realities—from humans’ need for water to the fact that built systems
deteriorate—that create imperatives for individuals; things they must do. What I am focused on
here is how those imperatives arise and how they are addressed. These are really issues of what
determines individual capabilities, and of how individuals utilize their capacity and develop their
abilities. I am concerned with means and reasons, and how those arise.
As agents, individuals have common, complementary, and conflicting interests, they have
differing, but always limited, amounts of information (and materials), and they interact based on
these interests and information (Thibault & Kelley, 1952; Homans, 1958; Coase, 1960; Simon,
1976, 1991). There aren’t just complementary and conflicting interests between agents; different
interests exist within individuals as they act agentically at the micro level as a person, for an
organization at the meso level, or at the macro level in a region. Relationships between and
within levels can be positive or negative: the micro can enhance or undermine the meso, and vice
versa, and the same is true for the macro.
How to balance for personal, organizational, and regional agency is a fundamental issue
for individuals. Intentionally and methodically increasing abilities—learning—is one means for
achieving this balance, which allows individuals to accommodate competing demands or to
restructure those demands to be complementary. Another means for balancing differing interests
from various levels is to organize and to create infrastructure and institutions, or to restructure
existing organizations and institutions. These activities are also forms of learning—collective
learning.
For moral and practical reasons, this conceptual framework focuses on individuals as
ends rather than means. Practically, it can be difficult to define and determine ends in the context
of organizations and regions. For an organization, for example, is the end profitability or
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customer delight? Elsewhere I identify (from literature) organizational performance and regional
advantage as general goals or metrics. But who says exactly what these things are? Practically
(although, admittedly this is not unproblematic), individuals are the ultimate arbiters of what is
meaningful to them. While we can say organizations and regions—and persons, for that matter—
are social constructions, we cannot say that of individuals. It is individuals who create social
constructions. For research and theoretical purposes, we can reduce the risk of the cross-level
fallacies and ecological fallacies that are endemic to multilevel analysis (Rousseau, 1985; Klein,
Tosi & Cannella, 1999; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000) by consistently analyzing learning and its
effects at the individual level.
As notably pointed out by Kant (1785/1993), moral logic dictates that one should not
treat others as means. Researchers (and educators) who see knowledge as an end can too easily
objectify subjects in the process. Focusing on individuals as the ultimate unit of analysis helps to
avoid this moral pitfall. Even when considering regional and organizational learning, the
fundamental question is, “how do individuals benefit?” Of course, none of this is to say that
individuals cannot be considered in context. We can we analyze individuals in groups and places
by considering their activities and assets. We can analyze individuals’ context in terms of what
they do, have, and say, their behavior, connections, and visions.
In the end, though, the question must be what these things mean for the individuals
involved. The quality of a quantity—whether it is positive or negative—is determined by
whether it reduces or increases drives and needs of individual human beings. Ultimately,
fulfillment—reduced drives and needs—emerges as liberty, prosperity, and wellness. So, these
are what we ultimately must analyze about (and as) individuals to determine their learning.
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Levels of Analysis
Individuals act first and foremost to construct and maintain themselves as persons. Such
action defines and delimits the micro level of analysis. People have a general purpose—which I
shall refer to as fulfillment—that includes creating or finding specific purpose(s). Personal
purpose is based on innate drives and human needs. Personhood is the ultimate end, the most
compelling and general purpose: To be an autonomous, competent, and related person, who can
acquire, bond, and defend to satiate physiological and psychological needs. Persons function as
socio-cognitive constructors of capabilities and knowledge for fulfillment of drives and needs.
As discussed in more details below, capabilities are comprised of capacity and ability.
Capabilities are what others observe of one’s knowledge, which can be described as knowledge
elements or knoels (discussed below). Capabilities are evident in personal fulfillment (micro
level), organizational performance (meso level), and regional advantage (macro level). Ability is
enabled and capacity is limited by regional advantage and organizational performance.
Ultimately, capabilities can be described and measured in terms of liberty, prosperity, and
wellness, which are the ultimate goods, the dependent variables, and what is analyzed about
individuals.
People are cognitive constructors. Individuals achieve personhood, in part, by processing
perceived information (which is accessed via connections) for actions via rules (which are
integrated into vision). People continuously improve rules based on results of actions.
Individuals instantiate rules and schemata into artifacts and practices, which can then be
replicated and shared. Socially, these phenomena manifest as organizations that enable persons
to gather information and to act more effectively and efficiently (Smith, 1776/1904; Olson, 1965;
Williamson, 1981, 2000; Senge, 2006). Bandura (2001) points out that:
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[T]here is no emergent entity that operates independently of the beliefs
and actions of the individuals who make up a social system. It is people
acting conjointly on a shared belief, not a disembodied group mind that is
doing the cognizing, aspiring, motivating, and regulating. (p. 14)
Such action defines and delimits the meso level of analysis.
Metaphorically, organizations are not just aggregated agentic socio-cognitive
constructors. They function as groups engaged in loops of learning regarding collective
performance of some purpose, evaluated in terms of fulfillment (of customers, employees,
partners, etc.). Organizational performance is determined by the amount of capital and labor
(“means of production,” and aggregated individual capabilities allocated to organizational
purposes), and by division of labor and technological quality. These are the organizational
equivalents of capacity and ability, which can be described and measured.
Organizations emerge from general, innate human drives, but they do not have such
drives. Instead, organizations have particular purposes, e.g., their missions. Individuals divide up
their actions and pursue their drives via organizations. Organizations don’t have capabilities,
either, per se. An organization’s capacity is determined by the capital—buildings, equipment,
stock, and cash money—and employees/labor available for its purpose. The arrangement of
capital and labor, including technology, determine an organization’s ability to apply available
capacity to purpose. In this conceptual framework we are not so concerned with whether
capacity comes from capital or labor; the primary focus is how they contribute to organizational
performance. Conceptually, organization is a means to increase the collective ability of a group
with given capacity. So, two groups with similar physical characteristics and resources may
perform at very different levels simply because of how they are organized. For example, an
organization might have many resources—physical, human, financial, etc.—but still perform
98

poorly, whereas an organization with few resources may be highly effective. This is a difference
in ability and use of capacity.
Organizations impact individuals in two general ways. First, individuals use the products
of organizations for personal fulfillment, either directly as customers or indirectly via proximity
and society. For example, a company may produce laborsaving devices for their customers while
producing pollution that sickens the company’s neighbors. Second, organizations aggregate
individuals’ capabilities as employees. Individuals, in return, allocate some of their capabilities
to organizational purposes, either directly as an employee or indirectly as a customer/neighbor.
Such an allocation results can increase capabilities, but can also have a negative impact. Time
spent working can positively impact prosperity while negatively affecting wellness.
Organizations have a general purpose—to perform—that is tied to their specific purposes,
their missions. To maintain viability, members of an organization continually strive to improve
performance vis-à-vis its mission. Members collectively reiterate improvement processes, and
reflect critically on the mission and improvement processes (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Deming,
1986; Argyris, 1999; Liker, 2004; Senge, 2006). Collective cognition involves members of the
organization thinking together, in coordination, with a share base of knowledge and means of
communicating. How organizations combine people and resources may be more important than
what people and resources are combined. This how is technology: formalized, replicable means
of arranging things to achieve ends and solve problems. In many ways, technology is the social
equivalent of schema: Technologies are means for making sense of and manipulating the
environment that are common to a group or society.
Regions function as multiple loops of learning engaged in geography-based triple helix of
interactive learning for constructed advantage, evaluated in terms of performance and
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fulfillment. The environment, infrastructure, and location determine regional capacity; the
quality of institutions determines regional ability. Together these things determine regional
advantage. How regional advantage contributes to personal fulfillment is mediated by
organizational performance.
Place is the general context of agentic action, including organizations. Groups of people
organized for particular purposes interact and overlap with other such groups in place. This is
essentially the axiom of regions (Arensberg & Kimball, 1965; Sanders, 1975; Fischer, et al.,
1977; Fischer, 1982; Saxenian, 1994; Florida, 1995; Audretsch, 1998; Cooke & Morgan, 1998;
Asheim, 2003; Safford, 2009). Where the basic metric for persons is capability, and performance
for organizations, regions are evaluated in terms of the advantages they provide to those who
reside in them.
Regions have natural and built environments that individuals use for personal and
organized agentic action, and which are tied to location. The regional environment determines
the region’s capacity. Regions also have institutions (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Boschma and
Lambooy, 1999; Hauser, Tappeiner & Walde, 2007)—“complex social forms that reproduce
themselves such as governments, the family, human languages, universities, hospitals, business
corporations, and legal systems” (Miller, 2012, para. 1). Institutions are regions’ equivalent to
ability. Regional institutions in conjunction with infrastructure and other resources comprise the
regions’ capabilities: regional advantage.
Effective utilization of regional resources depends not just on individual and
organizational abilities, but also on interactions between organizations within and outside the
region (Granovetter, 1985; Saxenian, 1994; Amin and Thrift, 1995; Morgan, 1997; MacKinnon,
Cumbers, and Chapman, 2002; Boschma, 2005; Hauser, Tappeiner & Walde, 2007). Practically,
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there is coherent regional action that is distinct from that of particular organization and
individuals. They act differently together in place. Metaphorically, knowledge spills over from
organizations as they interact, and this knowledge becomes a place-based, regional resource for
organizations and individuals (Audretsch, 1998; Asheim, 2003).
Conceptually, persons, organizations, and regions have formal and functional differences.
Formally, people are socio-cogntive constructors that function to fulfill diverse drives—
physiological and psychological (Maslow, 1970), autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Ryan
& Deci, 2000), to acquire, to bond, and to defend (Lawrence & Nohria, 2002). Again, the basic
metric for persons is individual capabilities.
Organizations take the form of people interacting through loops of learning to combine
capital and labor. Organizations involve multiple individuals, and individuals can be involved in
multiple organizations. The general function of organizations is to produce a set of goods, and to
exchange those goods so as to benefit those within the organization and those involved in the
exchange. Performance is the essential metric.
Regions take the form geographic concentrations of people organized in groups
interacting and overlapping in a shared built and natural environment. Regions don’t have
explicit purposes, but they do function to capitalize on—to exploit, improve, and maintain—the
built and natural environment. All of this emerges as various sectors’ loops of learning interact.
Advantage is the essential metric for regions.
These levels are formally and functionally embedded in (or encompass) each other. A
simple way to say this is that people plus materials and technology comprise organizations, and
organizations plus infrastructure and institutions comprise regions. But this is not just an over
simplification, it is backward and treats individuals as means. Fundamentally, regions and
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organizations exist as collective agents for individual benefit. Regional capacity plus regional
ability determine regional advantage, which contributes to organizational capabilities.
Organizational capacity and organizational abilities determines organizational performance,
enhancing individual capabilities. Individuals allocate their capabilities to personal,
organizational, and regional purposes based on expected fulfillment. This is the simplest possible
way of describing the relationships between the levels of analysis without losing validity and
veracity.
There are a few salient characteristics of the personal-organizational-regional continuum
that should be noted. For one thing, to state the obvious, it varies in number from one to many
(millions, even). Although it could be argued that individuals might be decomposed into roles or
traits, the fundamental, indivisible unit is the individual. With the number of individuals there is
an increasing number and diversity of purposes; each individual has multiple (possibly
conflicting) drives and concomitant purposes, and each organization layers purposes on those.
While regions don’t have particular purposes, they are characterized by shared agendas (better
schools, less congestion, more jobs, etc.) and the general purpose of providing advantages to
residents. As scale increases so does the number of activities and assets; there is an increasing
number and diversity of resources. There is also less coherence and more diffuse ownership of
these resources. As resources aggregate, so do the roles and rules for acquiring, holding, and
using resources. The interplay of roles and rules increases exponentially. And, with all of this,
there are longer and longer time horizons. More people and more things mean more conflicts and
increased transaction costs (to find, reach agreements, and coordinate actions). The more people,
the longer things take.
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Description and Measurement
There are important structurally similarities between individuals, organizations, and
regions that provide a common basis for describing, measuring, and relating them.
Fundamentally each of these units can be seen as complex, adaptive, self-regulating, socially
constructed systems (Berger & Luckman, 1966; Bertalanffy, 1968; Maturana & Varela, 1980;
Luhmann, 1990; Holland, 2006). Systems at each level are of different scales, function
differently, and take different forms. But their structures—components and their interactions—
and synergistic natures are generally similar. As complex adaptive systems individuals,
organizations, and regions are contain and are embedded within each other and self-similar
across scale (Holland, 2006).
Self-similarity could be theoretically problematic because it translates into isomorphism.
This is a different type of isomorphism than that which worries Klein, Tosi, and Cannella (1999).
Where they were concerned about constructs having the same function with different structures
at different scales, what we have here is structural isomorphism: Similar structures with different
functions at various levels. Structural isomorphism allows for simple conceptual framework that
enables simplification, as recommended by Ashby (1970), Fiorina (1975), Weick (1989), Varian
(2009), Jaccard and Jacoby (2010), and helps to avoid problems with misspecification,
ecological fallacy, and cross-level fallacy discussed by Rousseau (1985). So what is it that
systems at all levels have in common?
All of these systems behave: they operate in a purposive, agentic manner, albeit with
different general purposes at each level. And, of course, beyond the individual level it is
collective agency. Second, each level has distinct systems of beliefs about what they are and
what they hope to become, why they exist, what they can and cannot do, and how they do and
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should operate; they have vision. More accurately, individuals see things differently as they act
as persons, organization members, and region residents, and operate under different sets of
beliefs. These beliefs exist in individuals’ minds but are instantiated in organizations’ roles and
rules and in regions’ infrastructure and institutions. Third, all of these systems have connections
with other, similar systems via which they exchange information and materials.
These are not independent characteristics; behavior, connections, and vision are different
aspects of a system. Visions are the internal subjective aspects of individuals, organizations, and
regions, which are qualitatively expressed via behavior. Connections are the external objective
aspects of these systems, which are quantitatively enacted via behavior. Behavior is the common
intersubjective aspect of these systems that is the means of enactment and expression.
There is an important conceptual and practical implication of structural isomorphism:
Conceptually, each aspect of a system at any level has the same information content. This is what
it means to different aspects of one system; a system has a unitary set of information, and
different systems have different information. Yet all systems are embedded in an environment,
so have a great deal of shared information.
Scientists, professionals, and others who might employ this proposed theory, and the
organizations and regions in which they are embedded, behave, too. While they can observe
enactment and expression of others, they can never be separate from them. The objective and
subjective are indefinite ideals that are transformed by observation. I delve into the implications
of this in more detail when I illustrate my theory. For now, let it suffice to say we must all learn
together, along with our subjects.
More immediately, as I discuss connections and vision in more detail remember that
behavior is implicit in them (and vice-versa). It impossible to fully separate and independently
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define the objective and subjective. We are all in this together so we cannot be either totally
independent of or totally integrated with any other. Complete knowledge may be asymptotically
approached but never achieved, which makes theory building all the more—not less—important
and interesting!

Vision
Vision is generally defined as “intelligent foresight … the manner in which one sees or
conceives of something … a mental image produced by the imagination,” as well as the faculty
of sight (vision, 2003). My definition of this construct is more detailed and specific, but the
standard definition includes the basic elements: belief about what is and what could and should
be. Vision encompasses two central elements of sociocognitive theory: perceived self-efficacy,
or belief regarding one’s ability, and outcomes expectations, or belief outcomes of action
(Bandura, 1986, 1997, 2001, 2006). It is a particular component of mental model (Senge, 2006)
and type of schema (Piaget, 1973, 1983; Hirsch, 1987).
Visions are beliefs about what is, what could be, and what should be—current and future
states, including self, others, and environment—often construed as mental images. Behind these
beliefs are practical theories regarding factors that drive or enable action, and about factors that
limit or disable action, including what is in the minds of others (e.g., their purposes, rationales,
and visions). Objective information and subjective feelings undergird vision, giving us a sense of
what is beneficial and what is desirable, which can be two very different things. Future and
present; drivers and limiters; information and feelings; these comprise the “sides” of vision,
which define a three-dimensional conceptual space, illustrated in figure 1. The intersubjective
resides in the middle of this space.
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Senge (2006) provides an extensive consideration of mental models and shared vision but
does not discuss personal vision in any detail, and treats the two as separate constructs. He
basically equates vision with purpose. My approach is more similar to Bandura’s (1997, 2001)
concept of collective efficacy. He characterizes it as “an emergent group-level property, not
simply the sum of the efficacy beliefs of individual members” (p. 14), that operates via
individuals in addition to their personal perceived self-efficacy. Thus personal vision and
collective vision are separate but co-determinant aspects of vision that are manifest by
individuals via their intentions and actions, which depend upon individuals situation and their
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Figure 1 The “Sides” of Vision
Let’s consider some examples or iterations of vision. A police officer chasing a suspect
sees that it is possible to speed after the suspect at 100 miles per hour. But, recognizing that it is
impractical because it puts others at risk, she calls for backup instead. A student taking a test
feels the desire to cheat but knows it is not acceptable. While a higher grade would be beneficial,
he will not benefit from increased knowledge needed for the test, and he definitely won’t benefit
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if he’s caught. A corporate executive considering an acquisition that is desirable for its assets
might feel that it as a bad cultural fit so her company would not benefit.
Each of these examples illustrates a different vision space—a different combination of
beneficial, desirable, possible, and practical. Each demonstrates visions of different intensity.
The police officer’s vision is low-intensity, overshadowed by the experience, as she is acting
almost automatically in response to intensive training. The student is contemplating his future
and his grade in a medium-intensity vision. The executive has a strong, if not clear, highintensity vision of what her company is and where it is going. It is easy to imagine others in the
same situation viewing it differently, or the same people having hindsight different from their
foresight. Each person is informed by backside experience and frontside expectation, as well as
topside drivers and bottomside constraints.
Three general points about vision: First, it is highly complex and dynamic, yet often
comes down to something quite simple that can be effectively communicated to others. Second,
vision is inherently subjective and qualitative. Even the “outside” of vision—viewing something
from a factual and objective perspective—is a subjective phenomenon that cannot be directly
measured. Third, although they are inherently qualitative, vision can vary greatly. When we
speak of a “visionary,” we usually mean someone who has a clear and compelling idea for some
ambitious goal. Sometimes we mean an artist or eccentric who has an odd perspective or unusual
goal. We do not refer to ordinary people with mundane visions. Regular folks have visions—
beliefs about what is, what could and should be—they just aren’t notable.
All visions, extraordinary or mundane, are nominally knowledge—informed true
beliefs—that can be described by knoels (knowledge elements, discussed below in the section on
“Knowledge”). This knowledge is expressed in texts, and can be verified in terms of coherence,
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consistence, and correspondence. So, for practical purposes, a text can be analyzed to ascertain
what it means, how sensible its meaning is, how its meaning varies, and how it relates to what
others see as meaningful. I provide more detail about how to describe vision in the discussion
section, below.

Connections
Connections are seemingly more straightforward than visions: A connection is a means of
transferring information or materials. They are discrete and clear cut, even when they are
qualitative: She is a police officer. He is a student. She is a corporate executive. Each of these
connections can be unpacked to reveal the information and materials that go along with them.
Many connections are simple, stable tethers of constancy that anchor identity and determine what
one has. Some connections happen very rapidly and are totally unique. And, such connections
can have huge implications.
Connections may be most commonly understood in economic terms, as exchange and
production. The concept of persons having roles, operating under rules, and working with
resources was well established by Smith (1776/1904), Ricardo (1817), and other classical
economists if not before. Trade, a primary concern of Smith, Ricardo, and many other
economists, is part and parcel of connections. The production function, an essential element of
neo-classical economics that states that production is a function of capital and labor (Mishra,
2007), is essentially a highly abstracted and simplified description of connections, at least their
results.
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981, 2000), social exchange theory (Blau,
1964; Befu, 1977), and resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) are essentially
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formal descriptions of how connections operate. Social capital and social networks (Granovetter,
1973, 1983; Fischer, et al., 1977; Putnam, 1993; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2002; Burt, 2004) are
purely sociological descriptions of connections, as is social identity theory (Turner & Reynolds,
2010) and actor-network theory (Latour, 2005). Much of this depends on theory of mind, the
belief that others have a mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Baron-Cohen, 1991), because it
enables connection and identification. A fundamental element of these theories is that individuals
interact and share resources based on socially constructed roles and rules, which links the
concept of connections to social construction (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Latour, 2003).
Connections manifest as quantities of information or materials with certain qualities,
associated with other persons, organizations, and regions: The police officer arrests a number of
criminals for various offenses; the student takes a number of tests at a university, making
different grades; the executive acquires another company for an amount of money. Economists
would note that each of these combines assets (capital) during activities (of labor) to achieve an
outcome (production). Assets, activities, and outcomes all have value associated with them,
determined by demand for, supply of, and uses for those things. Psychologists would put the
values in more subjective terms, based on drive reduction or needs fulfillment. Sociologists look
at roles, rules, and resources in a broader perspective, but basically these boil down to number
and types of connections.
Connections can be counted, subdivided by type, and measured by the amount or value of
information and materials conveyed. Generally, connections can be strong or weak, based on
their frequency and intensity (the amount of attention and/or resources involved). Drawing on
economics, strength can be measured in terms of activities (labor intensity) and assets (capital
intensity). As Granovetter (1973, 1983) notes in his seminal works, strong and weak ties both
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have particular value. Connections can serve to bond individuals into groups or to bridge
between the groups (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Lin, 2002). As Burt (2004) gaps can be as
important as bonds and bridge. Social network analysts measure nodes in terms of centrality:
betweenness, closeness, degree, and eigenvector (Lin, 2002; Knoke & Yang, 2008). In this
conceptual framework, focusing on connections, valence is the effect a connection has on
centrality. Connections can have positive or negative valence. The practical implication of
valence is that positive valence involves opportunities while negative valence is associated with
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problems. These elements create a three-dimensional conceptual space, illustrated in figure 2.

Figure 2 Connection Characteristics
Two general points about connections: First, they are basically simple—two parties,
exchanging one thing for another—yet they can easily become highly complex and dynamic.
Second, connections are intrinsically objective and quantitative; they are highly amenable to
valuation. Even in their most subjective form, connections come down to what I get, what I give,
and the relative value of these items. Connections have physical capacity to carry certain
amounts of information and materials, and have ability to accommodate certain qualities or types
of information and materials.
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Behaviors
Behaviors are patterns of action in determined by beliefs in context. Acts occur in a
shared, socially constructed reality, which makes them behaviors. While we can objectively
observe an act, we can never fully separate it from our own acts. While we can presume there is
subjective meaning for an act, we can never be truly sure that the meaning is the actors’ and not
our own. I reference a great deal of literature from across the behavioral sciences in this
dissertation, and summarize key concepts elsewhere in this section. Therefore, I do not rehash
the concepts regarding behavior, except to make four general points about it.
First, in order to understand behavior it helps to understand beliefs and context, the
internal and external aspects of behavior. This is where this conceptual framework helps:
Connections are all about context, visions composed of beliefs. Connections are amenable to
objective, quantitative measurement, and visions are amenable to subjective, qualitative
description. Measures of connections can be validated subjectively, objectively, and
intersubjectively. But propositions about connections cannot be verified, only falsified.
Descriptions of vision can be verified in terms of coherence, consistence, and correspondence.
But, as subjective beliefs, they cannot be validated; they must simply be accepted. In a sense the
behavior-connection-vision (BCV) framework is a means for triangulating to understanding
actors.
Second, unfortunately, it is impossible to directly measure connections or describe
visions because we are immersed in the intersubjective. Instead, we can only measure and
describe behaviors as indicators of connections and visions. The implication is that the BCV
framework turns behavioral science on its head. We are not really interested in behaviors; we are
interested in connections and visions. Rather than understanding behavior by considering
111

connections and visions, we are validating connections and verifying visions by observing
behaviors. What we’re really interested in are capabilities—the interplay between ability and
capacity, what is not chosen as well as what is. The BCV framework allows us to understand
capabilities, what they are, and how they change. To do this, we observe the behavior—doing—
and infer connections and visions.
Third, the distinction between personal, organizational, and regional capabilities—the
connections and visions for each level—can be discerned via behavior in context. Visions are the
internal aspect of an individual, organizational, or regional agent. When fully internalized, vision
becomes embodied in the agent, part of its form that is transparent to its functioning. No effort is
required to invoke the vision. Indeed, one can’t help but call it to mind. Behavior occurs without
thought. It is the “fast” element of thought (Kahneman, 2011), the “inferential” type of belief
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), and is implicit in the agent. It effectively becomes infrastructure—
“It is by definition invisible, part of the background for other kinds of work. It is ready-to-hand”
(Star, 1999, p. 380). Beliefs about what is and what should be become intrinsic to how one sees
the world via internalization. I refer to the general process of incorporating new information into
vision and internalizing it as seeing.
Connections are an agent’s external aspect. Highly externalized connections require a
huge amount of effort, or sense-making (Weick, 1995) and transaction costs (Williamson, 1981)
for decision-making (Simon, 1976). This is both what Kahneman (2011) calls “slow” thinking
and what Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) refer to as “descriptive” belief. At some indistinct point in
these processes, through experience and practice, slow thinking becomes fast, descriptive beliefs
become inferential, and connections are internalized into vision. Conversely, sometimes visions
must be externalized to create connections, particularly when there are major changes in the
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environment. Vision becomes enacted in connections to acquire information and materials,
which I refer to as having.
Externalization of vision occurs via learning. Rather, having is learning, or at least part of
it. Having is both a demonstration of and means to increase capabilities. The other side of
learning is reflection, or seeing. Both having and seeing can results from as well as feed into
learning. Having and seeing are, in this conceptual framework, practical aspects of being, along
with doing. Doing is the intersubjective aspect of being, having is the objective aspect, and
seeing is the subjective aspect. Doing is not just about action; it is about states-of-being. This is
illustrated in figure 3, which shows how connections and visions are conceptually integrated in
behavior. Externalized information requires inference and behavior happens slowly as one must
attend to assets to understand what they are and how they work. Internalized information allows
description and behavior happens rapidly as one is able to attend through assets to act in/on the
world.

CONNECTIONS

BEHAVIORS
Doing Activities

Avoiding

Internal
Descriptive-Fast

Observing

Limiters and
Problems

Seeking

External
Inferential-Slow

Drivers and
Opportunities

Creating

VISIONS
Saying Attends

Having Assets

Figure 3 The Behavioral Space
Behavior changes with externalization and internalization, as connections and visions
change. All of this manifests as behavior; indeed, behavior can be seen as an on-going interplay
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between externalization and internalization. It also describes how interpersonal relations arise.
Vision is manifest in behavior, and persons with complementary behavior connect. Behavior of
others with whom one is connected functions as a model, impacting that person’s behavior and
influencing her or his visions. These concepts align with philosophical perspectives such as those
of Ryle (1946, 2002), Polanyi (1958, 1983), and Habermas (1984), as well as with the views of
cognitive scientists such as Baldwin, et al. (1996) and Bargh and Ferguson (2000).
An individual who is highly capable in a particular context does not need to make
connections because those connections have already been made, internalized, and incorporated
into vision. Therefore he or she is engages in activities and utilizes assets effortlessly—literally,
unconsciously recognizing them. An incapable person literally cannot envision how things work
or what to do. He or she ends up attending to assets rather than attending through them to do the
activities. Or, if the person is marginally capable, he or she attends through the asset to the
activity but not to the purpose. For example, someone who is new to a company has a difficult
time getting a conference room, getting the projector to work, and getting on the conference call.
A more experienced worker can do all of those things but can’t keep attendees on topic or get a
decision. A highly capable worker skillfully facilitates the discussion and uses the facilities to get
through the meeting. A similar analysis could be conducted of persons in their individual and
regional contexts.
This brings me to a final point about behavior: The person is the fundamental object. This
dissertation and theory are really all about individual people. An individual manifests personal
behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V), organizational B-C-V, and regional B-C-V that are
distinct from each other. Individuals behave collectively as organizations and regions differently
than they do individually as persons. Differences in B-C-V between levels emerge as differences
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in form and function between levels. Persons have form and function different from
organizations. And, organizations have form and function different from regions. Conceptually,
individual, organizational, and regional capabilities can change independently (even if, in reality,
they never do). The behavior-connection-vision (B-C-V) framework provides a means for
assessing changes in capabilities at each level, for correlating those changes to each other, and
for ascertaining what causes capabilities to change.
To simplify and summarize, capabilities and knowledge—the dependent variables in this
theory and the outcomes of learning are evident in behavior—which is the manifestation of
internal visions and external connections. Behaviors, connections, and visions can also be used to
describe and measure the independent variables, or inputs, of this theory, which I discuss below.
If people learn, they will invariably exhibit particular types of behaviors-connections-visions (BC-V): liberty, prosperity, and wellness. These result from another particular type of B-C-V,
which is commonly referred to as community. Generally, applying and testing this theory
involves analysis of what individuals are at the micro, meso, and macro levels. To be valid and
verifiable, such an analysis must consider what individuals do (behavior, activities, purposeful
actions, etc.), have (connections, assets, information, materials resources, etc.), and say (vision,
attention, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, thoughts).
It is important to note that the precision, reliability, and validity of a measure (or
descriptor) depend on specificity. Bandura (2006) makes this point in reference to self-efficacy,
but it applies to behaviors and connections, as well as vision (which, in this conceptual
framework, encompasses self-efficacy):
There is no all-purpose measure of perceived self-efficacy. The “one
measure fits all” approach usually has limited explanatory and predictive
value because most of the items in an all-purpose test may have little or no
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relevance to the domain of functioning. Moreover, in an effort to serve all
purposes, items in such a measure are usually cast in general terms
divorced from the situational demands and circumstances. This leaves
much ambiguity about exactly what is being measured or the level of task
and situational demands that must be managed. (p. 307, emphasis in the
original)
Similar can be said of capabilities, freedom, and knowledge, and of community. The more
specific one can be about the aspect and context of the individual that is being described or
measured, the clearer and more useful that descriptor or measure will be. This conceptual
framework is intended to facilitate consistent specification of concepts and operationalization of
variables across instances and levels.

Capabilities, Freedom, and Knowledge
Capabilities and knowledge are covered in some detail in the literature review. I also
discussed capabilities in relation to levels of analysis. Here I focus on how they fit into and the
forms they take my conceptual framework. The capabilities approach (Sen, 1988, 1999;
Nussbaum, 2000; Clark, 2005) focuses on functionings, relative to the possible ways one could
choose to function, and the factors that enable and constrain those choices and functions.
Capabilities are what allow us to respond to innate drives, and capabilities can be constrained or
enhanced.
It is questionable whether drives can be definitively defined and differentiated as Ryan
and Deci (2000) or Lawrence and Nohria (2002) have done. For one thing, these definitions of
drives are different—competing or complementary—from each other and from Maslow’s (1970)
taxonomy of needs. Another issue, as discussed by Clark (2005), is that such expert-formulated
definitions can undermine capabilities by foreclosing on people’s opportunity to define their
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drives for themselves. It is reasonable and useful to propose general areas or aspects of capability
(freedom) based on the literature reviewed above (see table 2). This is just a framework.
Conceptually, one or more of the forms of freedom allow individuals to fulfill their drives and
live their values. But, individuals are fully able to name their own drives, responses, and guiding
values.
My definition of capabilities has two aspects. First is the inherent capacity to process
information and materials. Second is acquired ability to utilize capacity for valued outcomes.
Capacity is what the individual can accomplish unaided and without tools. It is what we have in
Hobbes’s (1651/1994) “state of nature,” or what has been commonly referred to as “nature” in
the behavioral sciences. For the sake of simplicity I assume, like Hobbes, that all persons have
essentially the same capacity. Ability, in contrast, is similar to “nurture.” It is what we acquire
through experience and from others.
Table 2 The Forms and Aspects of Freedom
Forms of Freedom

Positive Aspect

Negative aspect

Liberty

Freedom to associate and
speak as one sees fit

Freedom from coercion and
oppression

Prosperity

Freedom to benefit from one’s
effort and property

Freedom from exploitation and
privation

Wellness

Freedom to life and health

Freedom from disease, injury,
and infirmity

In this framework, capability is simply ability given capacity. Capacity is the quantity of
information or materials that can be acquired, handled, managed, processed, etc., over time.
Ability is the quality over time. Capacity can be measured in units, whereas as ability must be
valued to be measured. For example, an unaided person can carry five regular bricks at one time,
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or that person can carry one gold brick; the former is a larger quantity but the latter is more
qualitatively valuable.
Freedom, in this conceptual framework, is simply the exercise of choice or preferences,
including absence of that which impedes such exercise or presence of that which promotes it.
Freedom relates directly to individual persons. It has a wholly physical form (wellness), a
physical form in social context (prosperity), and a wholly social form (liberty). Liberty involves
freedom of association and expression, or freedom from coercion and oppression. Prosperity
involves freedom of ownership and work, or freedom from exploitation and privation. And,
wellness involves freedom of health and life, or freedom from disease and injury. Socioeconomic
circumstances can enable or constrain freedoms, and can be such that one persons freedoms are
enhanced via constraint of another’s. For example, slave owners’ freedoms are increased by
reducing their slaves’ freedoms. These are what I call the positive and negative aspects of
freedom.
Generally, a capability allows one to achieve some form of freedom. Indeed, capabilities
can be defined as that which increases freedom (which is complementary to, not contradictory of
my definition of capability as ability given capacity). There is a multiplicity of capabilities, but
we can think of them in terms of drives: as autonomy, competency, and relatedness, as evidenced
by acquiring, belonging, and defending. These can be described and measured in terms of
behaviors, connections, and visions, and the extent that these aspects of the agent have a positive
or negative impact (either by absence or presence) upon areas of freedom. Freedoms are
evidence of capabilities in context, described as visions and measured as connections both via
behaviors.
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An individual’s capacity is assumed to be fixed, given, and practically the same as others’
capacities. Organizations and regions cannot increase an individual’s capacity but they can affect
how that capacity is allocated. Higher level social structures can directly meet human needs—
can carry out important tasks for individuals—allowing them to do other less critical but higher
valued tasks. For example, farms and markets can produce food for individuals so that those
individuals can build houses, teach children, write poetry, etc. Organizations and regions can
constrain individuals’ capacities by limiting access to nourishment, barring them from the
marketplace, enslaving them, etc. Ability is the opposite: Organizations and regions can enhance
ability but cannot limit it.
External factors can reduce one’s capacity, resulting in negative freedom, or impede
gains in ability. It is more difficult for negative freedoms to reduce ability because ability is, as
Frankl (1984) notes, the contents of mind that only the individual can affect. Once you know
something it is practically impossible for others to make you unlearn it. On the other hand,
external forces can easily enhance ability, but they cannot easily enhance capacity. Note that
organizations and regions consist largely of “external factors.” So, conceptually, capabilities and
freedoms are closely related but not the same things. One way to look at this is that capacity is
objective, ability is subjective, and freedom is intersubjective. The forms of freedom are the
outputs of capabilities, the ways in which capabilities are evident.
At least as important as the amount or level of freedom is the extent to which one
freedom fosters or must be sacrificed for another—their correlation—may be more important.
One might have to sacrifice prosperity for liberty if he or she does not want to be constrained by
schedules and tasks dictated by work. Or, one may have to sacrifice health for prosperity in a job
that is dangerous, or simply involves sedentary activities. There are three general relationships:
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First, each form of freedom could be independent of—rising or falling without impacting—the
others. Second, increases or decreases in one form of freedom could have a similar impact on—
be positively correlated with—one or both of the other forms. Third, one form freedom could be
a trade-off for, negatively correlated with, the others. If it goes up the others go down and vice
versa. The subjectively desirable situation is for each form of freedom to complement and
promote the others, but this is often not the case. As much as we want to understand what
contributes to a particular form, we are even more interested in what causes them to be
complementary and to increase.
Knowledge is informed true belief. Or, to be more specific, it is probabilistic judgment
about the world—self and environment—that coheres together, is expressed consistently, and
corresponds to reality based on signals from the world. The validity of knowledge can be judged
by how it encompasses multiple divergent perspectives and by the amount of excess (unshared)
information associated with it.
Declarative knowledge is relatively easy to encode, make explicit, and share via
documents. Procedural knowledge is relatively difficult to encode, remains largely tacit, and
must be shared in person. Between these two forms is implicit knowledge that is built into
artifacts and infrastructure. Knowledge can be naturally divided into nine types, which relate to
explicit, implicit, and tacit forms. Generally, I refer to this typology as W7TH: Which and
whether are types decisive knowledge regarding choices. Why is causal or rational type of
knowledge. Who is agentic knowledge, and closely related to spatiotemporal knowledge when
and where, because these are all contextual types of knowledge. Indicative, objective knowledge
that and manipulative, subjective knowledge how are integrated in the most flexible type of
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knowledge, the intersubjective what. Figure 4 illustrates how the types of knowledge are
interconnected and how they formally manifest in the world.

Tacit
What

↔

↔

When
Where
Who

↔

Why

↔

Whether
Which

Implicit

How
That

Explicit

Figure 4 The W7TH Typology of Knowledge

Each instance of know-how, know-that, know-what, etc., is what I refer to as a
knowledge element, or a knoel. A knoel such as “how to jump” or “because it’s far” have no
meaning. Meaning comes from connecting knoels, for example, “jump because it’s too far to
step” and “don’t jump because it’s too far” are different ways of connecting these knoels. They
imply other connections, such as what is being done—crossing a chasm or a stream—and
whether to act.
Knoels are evident in expressions and artifacts regarding what we do (actions, roles),
have (possessions, states-of-being), and say (perceptions, thoughts). Know-that in particular, is
expressed in these terms. I do that: busy work, the polka, etc. I see that: a cat in a tree, you are
right, etc. I have that: a broken heart, a ’57 Chevy, an organization, etc. State of being is not
some ethereal, philosophical issue. It is very practical and real. And, it is important to assessing
knowledge. States-of-being begin with know-that and become more specific as they are
connected to other knoels.
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Particular knoels are linked in a complex, dynamic web of associations with other knoels.
For example, know-that it is Christmas is linked to know-who about Santa Claus as well as
know-what and know-when of Christmas, which depend on know-where (at a holiday party, the
mall, or the North Pole?). “Be nice” is know-whether based on Christmas know-why (because
you won’t get any presents!). This knowledge links back know-what it means to “be nice”:
know-that eating your vegetables, going to bed on time, etc., is nice, and know-how to behave
when Santa is watching. Schemata are patterns or general ways of connecting knoels.
Explicitness, implicitness, and tacitness are characteristics of knoels. Some knoels can be
expressed—“That is a reindeer”—and verified and evaluated. Other knoels, such as how to wrap
a present, can be enacted and validated (“He is really good at wrapping presents”). The knoels
and their connections are explicit in Christmas songs and stories, tacitly communicated by the
actions of others, and implicit in rituals associated with Christmas. They are possibly most
evident in states of being: doing, having, and seeing. As noted above, this is a practical issue,
which I revisit in the section on application and operationalization.
You have know-which about a toy or a lump of coal. Of course you’ll be nice! Figure 4
represents thinking from the abstract and general of know-how and know-that to the concrete and
specific of know-whether and know-which (which can be so well embedded in our environment
that we don’t have to consciously think and decide, we simply act). Kids have conceptual knowhow and know-that about being good, but it’s the other knoels of Christmas—the know-what, when, -where, -who, -why, -whether, and –which—that drive them to actually be good.
This portion of my conceptual framework—capabilities and knowledge—provides a
basis for description and measurement necessary to explore the theory. Capabilities and
knowledge are the latent dependent variables in my theory, which are evident as liberty,
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prosperity, and wellness. Capabilities and knowledge are means for individuals to achieve their
ends; liberty, prosperity, and wellness are those ends. This portion of the theoretical framework
allows for more detailed, in-depth analysis that addresses the issues raised in the methodology
section. The behavior-connection-vision portion of the framework provides means for valid
measures and verified descriptions of capabilities, knowledge, and their outcomes, liberty,
prosperity, and wellness. Figure 5 shows how these components fit together.

Capabilities and knowledge
Quality - Validity (positive
or negative)

Competence
Quantity of knoels,
relationships, and sources

Quality - Veracity (truth or
falsity)

Wellness

Quantity of information,
materials, and sources

Prosperity

Visions

Behavior

Connections

Ability
Liberty

Capacity

Figure 5 Integration of Constructs and Measures

Competence
Competence is an aspect of capabilities and knowledge that is particularly important in
context and in practice, basically, “The state or quality of being adequately or well qualified …
A specific range of skill, knowledge, or ability” (competence, 2000). Competence is primarily
procedural know-how, ability to carry out some task and to operate in some setting. There is, of
course, declarative knowledge involved in competence. But, the incompetent person who has
know-that but no know-how is practically a cliché and stereotype in many settings.
It has been noted that the first step to knowledge is to realize one does not know. Adams
(2011) maintains that competence develops through four stages, beginning with not knowing that
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one does not know. Once a person becomes aware that he or she does not know it is possible to
pursue competence and to become consciously competent. The ultimate stage is to be
unconsciously competent. Unconscious competence is essentially what Bransford, Brown, and
Cocking (2000) call expertise, and what I discuss as internalization. It is the integration of seeing
and doing into being. Bloom’s (Bloom, et al., 1956; Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001) taxonomy is
a more comprehensive framework for considering competence, learning activities and artifacts.
Bloom’s taxonomy includes cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains. Increasing
competence in each domain is characterized by increasing sophistication, from simply attending
to a model or some stimuli, to effective response, to generation of new knowledge.
The primary shortcoming of these approaches to knowledge is that they are inherent to
the micro-level. Bloom’s taxonomy is quite practical and well suited to assessment, but it less
applicable at the organizational and regional levels, although, Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder
(2002) do suggest how this might work. More importantly for present purposes, Bloom’s
taxonomy does little to help us understand how the learning at various levels is interrelated. In
my framework, competence is essentially an intermediate element between community and
capabilities. Competence does not just develop in the context of communities; competence is
created by and defined in communities. Competence operates in tandem with roles, rules, and
resources that emerge via community, are formalized into organizations, and are reified in
regions’ infrastructure and institutions. And, competence contributes to capabilities and
freedoms.
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Learning
I summarized the literature on learning, above, including definitions of the term and of
related terms. Let it suffice to say that learning is the process of gaining capabilities and
increasing knowledge. During learning, the mind gains informed true beliefs in the form of
interconnected knoels, and liberty, prosperity, and wellness increase. My primary objective here
is to highlight qualitatively different forms, or levels, of learning.
Senge (2006) makes the distinction between adaptive (or survival) learning and
generative learning. Increasing capabilities for adaptation and survival is important, of course.
But, “‘adaptive learning’ must be joined by ‘generative learning,’ learning that enhances our
capacity to create” (Senge, 2006, p. 14). “While adaptive learning is possible without vision,
generative learning occurs only when people are striving to accomplish something that matters
deeply to them” (p. 192). Senge argues that generative learning as a concept is meaningless
without clear, strong vision. He also maintains generative learning is a social activity.
When you ask people about what it is like being part of a great team, what
is most striking is the meaningfulness of the experience. People talk about
being part of something larger than themselves, of being connected, of
being generative. (Senge, 2006, p. 13)
Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder (2002) maintain that learning occurs in communities
and networks via interplay between accounts of activities and aspirations. The value of learning
increases in cycles from the immediate, through what’s possible, to actual application, to
impacts, and to changing values. The everyday accounts and aspirational narrative described by
Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder equate to the sides vision—aspects of what is and what could
be—in this conceptual framework. They see value creation in the tension between accounts and
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aspirations. I see gains in capabilities coming from cycles of externalizing vision and
internalizing connections; or, in more common terms, cycles of doing and seeing.
Wittrock (1992) presents a different, sub-individual type of generative learning. He
would likely agree with Senge’s (2006) take on generative learning, but Wittrock focuses on
generating new connections among concepts and between prior knowledge and new information
in the mind. He identifies behavior implications for teaching: generally, actively creating
materials, rather than passively absorbing information, results in greater retention and
understanding. Not to oversimplify, but active learning results in a higher level of learning—in
all senses—than does passive learning. It makes new knowledge more meaningful.
To put this in terms of my conceptual framework, creative behavior expands vision,
particularly when it is collective behavior. This collective behavior requires connections among
the actors, and those connections depend on common or complementary visions. Actors become
aware of others’ visions via behavior, generally whether that behavior is active and generative or
passive and adaptive. From Senge’s (2006) perspective, generative learning involves
externalization of visions into teamwork. From Wittrock’s (1992) perspective, generative
learning involves internalization of connections via creative acts. From my perspective, adaptive
learning is little more than redeployment of capacity, whereas generative learning substantially
increases ability.
In either case, from either perspective, generative learning has greater impact on
capabilities than adaptive learning. Thus, it is a higher level of learning. But, it requires capacity
to be reallocated. Generative learning also links the levels of social aggregation. Individuals gain
more capabilities by actively creating with others than by passively absorbing information.
Teams form as individuals create together, giving the group greater capabilities than the
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members have individually. The results are akin to March’s (1991) exploring technology versus
exploiting it, and to Christensen’s (2006) concepts of continuous, discontinuous, and disruptive
innovations. So generative learning appears, in the short-term, to a loss of capabilities, whereas
adaptive learning appears as a small increase in capabilities. Long term, though, generative
learning results in a large increase in capabilities, whereas adaptive learning can lead to a steep,
sudden decrease in capabilities.
Continuous innovation is an incremental improvement in a process that makes a firm
more efficient. Such improvements are important, but become irrelevant when there a major
socioeconomic shifts. It no longer matters how capable buggy whip makers or cassette tape
manufacturers were. Disruptive innovations are entirely new products that fundamentally
reshape markets and create new value networks. These are different levels of impacts and
responses to change, which obtain at the personal and regional, as well as organizational, levels.
Indeed, innovation at the organizational level is generative learning that requires generative
learning at the individual level, and benefits from generative learning at the regional level (from
organizations creating together).
The fundamental challenge for practitioners and theoreticians is to determine whether a
reduction in capabilities is the short-term effect of generative learning—meaning it will lead to a
substantial increase in capabilities—or of adaptive learning. Capabilities lost due to adaptive
learning are lost forever and must be replaced by other capabilities to avoid an increase in unmet
human drives and needs. For this reason, I shall refer to generative learning as substantial and
adaptive learning as superficial. A key objective of this dissertation is to help us see the
differences between these forms of learning in practice, and to understand how build on
superficial learning in order to achieve substantial learning.
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Community Functions
Community is the independent variable in my proposed theory. More than that,
community is the phenomenon that hypothetically invariably precedes increases in capabilities
(i.e., learning). There are communities between and within—so to speak—individuals,
organizations, and regions. The fundamental proposition of this theory is that the more robust
and stronger the community, the more robust and faster the learning. And this effect multiplies
when community exists across levels. Capabilities increase faster and stronger when persons,
organizations, and region all contain the same community.
As discussed above, MacQueen, et al. (2001) define community as, “a group of people
with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and
engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings” (para. 3). In the context of the
behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V) conceptual framework social ties are shared connections,
common perspectives are shared visions, joint action is shared behavior. Geographic locations or
settings is shared contexts and imply shared behaviors, connections, and visions. People in the
same place tend to do, say, and use similar things simply because they share a context.
The “diverse characteristics” portion of MacQueen, et al.’s definition implies that
community members are connected because they are different, not in spite of their differences.
Such connections provide access to different resources, different sources of information and
different pools of resources; they have high positive valence. Diversity is essentially what
Wenger, Trayner, and de Laat (2011) refer to as noise, and is the source of the spontaneity and
unpredictability that allows for generation of new ideas and resources. Diversity and all that
comes with it must be optimized: Too little and the community becomes calcified and stops
operating; too much and the community becomes incoherent and stops operating effectively.
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This is essentially institutional thickness or thinness (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Hauser, Tappeiner
& Walde, 2007), is similar to the leakiness and stickiness of local knowledge (Brown and
Duguid, 2002), and is comparable to balance bonding and bridging social capital (Putnam,
1993).
The fundamental proposition of this dissertation—that community yields learning—isn’t
so much about what community is, as its functions, how community operates. McMillan and
Chavez (1986) maintain that for people to have a sense of community they must experience
membership in, influence on, needs fulfillment by, and shared emotional commitment to…
what? They go on to say communities “offer members positive ways to interact, important events
to share and ways to resolve them positively, opportunities to honor members, opportunities to
invest in the community, and opportunities to experience spiritual bond among members” (p.
14). These are the output functions of community; what community offers to members. The
implication is that communities function to optimize noise, institutional thickness, leakiness and
stickiness of local knowledge, and bonding and bridging social capital.
Peck (1987) presents a similar, simplified version of the characteristics of community,
consisting of commitment, consensus, and inclusivity. In contrast to McMillan and Chavez
(1986), Peck sees these as characteristics of how the community operates, rather than members’
perceptions (as McMillan & Chavez (1986) do). Peck suggests that communities develop in four
stages from pseudo-community, through the chaos of member conflict, into “emptiness’” as
members relinquish egoistic expectations, and finally to “true” community. These can be seen as
paralleling the phases or stages of many of the cyclic loops of learning models of organizational
learning. It also parallels other sequential models of development at other levels, particularly
Piaget’s (Piaget & Inhelder, 1958/1999) micro-level model of cognitive development and
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Kirkpatrick’s meso-level model of training impacts. Development, though, is much more
complex than such models suggest, and rarely occurs in an across-the-board, clear sequence
(Papalia, Olds & Feldman, 1998).
Block (2008) suggests that community emerges or is transformed via a series of
conversations based on powerful questions. He maintains that the first conversation must be one
of invitation, and that this must be followed by conversations about possibility, ownership,
dissent, commitment, and gifts in the community. (By “gifts” Block means what each member
brings to the community, including what might be typically thought of as a disability.) The
conversations must answer questions, “that engage people in an intimate way, confront them
with their freedom, and invite them to cocreate a future possibility” (Block, 2008, p. 105). Other
than the invitation conversation occurring first, Block says the sequence of conversations is not
critical, as long as all the concomitant questions are addressed.
What Peck (1987) and Block (2008) are essentially discussing are the functions via which
a group is transformed into a community and generates new possibilities. These are what I term
the input functions of community. It may be useful to apply the W7TH model of knowledge to
community in order to better understand what these input functions are.
In the W7TH model, know-what is a synthesis of know-how and know-that, ability to
affect and identify. So when we ask, “what is community?” we are effectively asking about the
facts and functions of community. By looking the other side of what in the W7TH model, we can
say community requires know-when activities community occur, know-where community assets
reside, and know-who is part of the community. The means for sharing information and materials
defines community and those engaged in the sharing. Community is defined by sharing.
Community is shared connections, but also shared behaviors and visions.
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As a synthesis know-how and know-that, know-what is greater than the sum of its parts.
Similarly, community is more than knowing that you share something with certain others and
knowing how to share certain things with them, which I would term affiliation, the basis of a
network. We affiliate with others out of personal self-interest, as self-agents, creating what
Tönnies’ (1887/2001) termed Gesellschaft. In this framework networks are implicit in
communities, but a community is more than a network. Communities are not things, but we refer
to them as such—“my community” or “the business community.” There is shared identity and
people act as agents for that identity, even if it’s not clearly their self-interest, based on mutual
respect and common beliefs, giving rise to something like Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft.
Putnam (1993) maintains that prosperity arises from networks of civic engagement, “rich
networks of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity” (p 3). Such networks support prosperity
in three ways, he says. First, they promote norms of caring and sharing, or “generalized
reciprocity: I’ll do this for you now, in the expectation that down the road you or someone else
will return the favor” (p. 3). Members of communities help each other without expecting direct
compensation. But, members of community expect that if they need help other community
members will come to their aid. Second, such networks transmit and respond to information
about reputation and trustworthiness, such that “incentives for opportunism and malfeasance are
reduced” (p. 4). So, if you take advantage of the communal resources without giving back you
will be ostracized. Third, “networks of civic engagement embody past successes of
collaboration, which can serve as a cultural template for future collaboration” (p. 4). Putnam
makes the important point that the social capital in these networks is a “resource whose supply
increases rather than decreases through use and which (unlike physical capital) becomes depleted
if not used” (p. 4).
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But where do these networks come from, how do they arise? As discussed in chapter 2,
Sanders (1975) maintains that a community must:
1. Recruit new members either through birth, in-migration, or
annexation, and maintain existing members;
2. Train the new members to play the appropriate roles as they take their
places and achieve status in the community;
3. Exert some form of control over individuals who deviate too far from
the norm. (p. 192)
These activities involve allocation of resources, roles, power and prestige to members of the
community and communication regarding how the community performs allocation. Both
functions are essential to recruitment, socialization, and control, and are carried out by
connections.
In my conceptual framework, connections transmit information and materials. The
amount and usefulness of these resources determine the valence of connections. This is not to say
that information and materials necessarily have positive value. Connections can have negative
valence, transmitting misinformation and junk—i.e., noise—causing negative freedom. Some of
this is inevitable, even useful (as discussed in Wenger, Trayner, & de Laat, 2011), in processes
of creating and producing; junk and noise can spur substantive learning. But, too much junk and
noise can force individuals to act adaptively, limiting opportunity to act generatively (and too
little can lull individuals into acting adaptively, limiting intention and motivation to act
generatively).
An individual must evaluate connections and their content, balancing certainty and
uncertainty, but such evaluation can be costly and risky. A group that can filter the noise and
balance it with meaningful content is greatly helpful. It is even better if that group is actively
helpful, like Putnam’s (1993) networks of civic engagement. This is what community does, and
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how I distinguish a community from a network. In a network, each node (person) must evaluate
connection in terms of direct benefits. In a community, the nodes validate and verify connections
for each other in terms of benefits—actual and potential, direct and indirect—for all.
Vision can only be externalized into connections with positive valence if it is true—
coherent, consistence, and correspondent. Community verifies visions. Similarly, connections
can only be internalized if they are subjectively, objectively, and intersubjectively valid.
Community validates connections. Validation and verification occur via behavior. Community is
the context of behavioral changes that accompany internalization-externalization. As community
members becomes more liberated, prosperous, and well—as they learn—they are hypothetically
better able to contribute to the community and its functions. So, a community’s outputs—what it
offers—should improve as the outcomes of behavior improve.
It is also important to note how community does not do what it does: There are few if any
formal roles and rules, fully private resources, governance, or hierarchy. People construct and
find themselves within communities. Organizations develop from interpersonal interactions
within communities. Regions are defined by inter-organizational interactions within
communities. It is the flexibility and lack of formality of communities that allow the generative
functions that create persons, organizations, and regions. Hypothetically, if and when formal
hierarchy, roles, and rules are created for a community, it will cease to be a community and
become something else and/or cease to be. Conceptually, hierarchy, roles, and rules enable
production of previously defined goods and services (which is akin to adaptive learning or
sustaining innovation), but can get in the way of learning, too. They facilitate stability and
impede change.

133

So, in the terms of this conceptual framework, communities enable members to translate
vision into connections and capitalize on connections to improve visions. In doing so, people not
only gain capabilities and knowledge, they create socioeconomic structures. Community is the
primordial soup from which organizations and regions emerge. Community allows us to deal
with bounded rationality (Simon, 1991), provides members with economical access to activities
and assets, and validates and verifies information and materials for members. This leads to the
behavior changes—improvements—that evidence learning. To relate this to key concepts and
literature regarding learning at each level, community provides:
•

A means of self-reflection, scaffolding for self-regulation, and source of models for
persons (Bandura, 1997, 2001, 2006), informing and shaping drives, intentions, and
motivations (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000;
Lawrence & Nohria, 2002)

•

A decision-making aid (Simon, 1976), means for improving sense-making (Weick,
1995), and a way to reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1981) for organizations

•

A medium for interactive learning (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Cooke, 2002),
knowledge spillovers (Audretsch, 1998) for regions, optimizing institutional thickness
(Amin and Thrift, 1995; Hauser, Tappeiner & Walde, 2007) and the leakiness and
stickiness of local knowledge (Brown and Duguid, 2002)

Now that I have defined community and what it does, the question becomes how does
community do these things? What creates community? First, note that this is a process—“A
series of actions, changes, or functions bringing about a result … performed in the making or
treatment of a product” (process, 2003, para. 2-3)—of community building. Second, note that,
since community is not a thing, community does not carry out these functions. People do. Lastly,
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before considering what the series of community input functions might be, let us recall that
people act agentically. We act in our own interests. While we might work in the community’s
interest once it’s established, there must be means and motivations for proto-community to arise.
These means and motivations must arise from innate human drives.
So, drive theory is a starting point for thinking about how community operates. Ryan and
Deci (2000) identify the basic human drives as resulting from needs for autonomy, competence,
and relatedness; Lawrence and Nohria (2002) see the drives to acquire, bond, and defend (and to
learn, or improvement in responses to other drives). Ryan and Deci’s drives are states of being
(or feelings and perception about one’s state of being), which are internal, passive, and
subjective. Lawrence and Nohria’s drives are active, external, and objective. The former maps to
my concept of vision and the latter to connection. Ryan and Deci’s drives are based in one’s
beliefs about what is and what could be. Lawrence and Nohria’s are about one’s acquisition of
information and resources.
If these are the innate drives of human behavior, and community represents a set of
behaviors, then community must arise from these drives and, once in operation, must continue to
reduce these drives if it is to be sustained. Going back to Ryle (1946, 2002) and Senge (2006),
once individuals experience generative connections they know such connections are possible and
desirable. “I was part of something, and I want to be part of something.” Thus “being part of
something” becomes part of their identities—or at least their vision regarding identity—and they
seek to identify others who have similar identities.
I suggest that community has three general input functions that not only build community
but also generate capabilities. As shown in table 3, these functions draw on and relate to a range
of economic, psychological, and sociological constructs. These three functions describe how
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input factors are transformed to create and sustain community. Generally, these functions create
and sustain community by increasing their members’ capabilities. Indeed, capabilities,
knowledge, and freedom are the result of this process of community building. Liberty,
prosperity, and wellness are the output functions.

Table 3 Concepts Related to Community Functions from Various Disciplines
Literature Topic

Identification

Integration

Differentiation

Reputational
information

Generalized reciprocity

Templates for
collaboration

(Sanders, 1975)

Recruit new members

Have members play
the appropriate roles

Control members’
behavior

(McMillan & Chavez,
1986)

Belonging

Shared emotional
commitment

Influence and needs
fulfillment

Analysis

Design

Execution

(Lawrence & Nohria,
2002)

Acquire

Bond

Defend

(Ryan & Deci, 2000)

Competence

Relatedness

Autonomy

Learning communities
(Senge & Scharmer,
2006)

Research
Guiding ideas

Capacity-building
Infrastructure

Practice
Common work

Sense-making (Weick,
1995)

Environmental
scanning

Interpretation

Guides for action

Transaction costs
(Williamson, 1981)

Searching

Contracting

Coordinating

Civic engagement
(Putnam, 1993)
Community

Decision-making (Simon,
1976)
Drives

My concepts of identification, integration, and differentiation are similar to but different
from theoretical constructs in social psychology. (They are also similar to the mathematical
meaning of these terms.) In this conceptual framework, identification, integration, and
differentiation are functions. They things that people do naturally—part of human nature—but
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also a relationship between a set of inputs and another set of outputs. Each function describes
how the inputs are transformed into the outputs. Identification, integration, and differentiation
are behaviors and changes in behavior, which means they also have associated connections and
visions. In the following sections I’ll discuss these aspects of each function, and relate the
concepts and constructs as I define them to existing theory.
In social philosophy and science, identification, integration, and differentiation are
subsumed under role theory. Role theory, based on the seminal works of Mead (1934), Merton
(1949), and Parsons (1951/1991), seeks to explain how people are expected to and do actually
behave in social situations. My conceptual framework implies a taxonomy of roles: Individuals
act in personal, organizational, and regional roles. Building on Merton (1949), problems arise
when these roles conflict. Such conflict hypothetically reduces functional capabilities because
capacity must be allocated to balancing, making a trade-off, or switching between roles. An
important implication of my proposed theory is that such conflicts are minimized—and even
become synergies—via community, through a process of identification, integration, and
differentiation.
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Identification
Identification is a fundamental cognitive operation that involves noting a thing’s
separateness from everything else and its distinguishing characteristics, and giving it a name.
Identification enables categorization and relation as well as discrimination; it allows us to say
what things go together either because they are the same, complementary, or conflicting. For
example, we identify retail employees as a group. The employees who stock the shelves are
complementary to those who run the register. The employees of one grocery store compete with
those of another.
Identification becomes an input function to community when it becomes social. When we
self-identify and other-identify, we have nascent community. Thus community depends on prior
knowledge of personal characteristics—our own and others—including the extent to which we
value relatedness. Identification also depends on our interests and motivations because these
determine how and whether we seek others who identify themselves similarly. People connect
over specific identity commonalities—liking football, working on a project, living in a certain
place. Then they identify themselves collectively, as a group to which others might belong.
So, there are multiple aspects to identification: identification as, identification by,
identification of, identification with, etc. Identification involves multiple forms of knowledge:
Know-how, know-that, etc., as well as know-who. Identification is derived from prior knowledge
and from intentions and motivations. It is evident in connections and visions via behaviors:
One’s identity determines what one does, has, and sees, and vice-versa.
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Identification is a minimal response to internal and external drives. Depending on
circumstances, it might be adequate, or identification may suggest other possibilities, generate
new opportunities, and drive more group-oriented behavior. The key is that an individual cannot
identify alone, others also have to identify, too. Individuals can only identify together if they
share vision, and when they identify together they begin to share connections; they exchange
information and materials with each other, but also share means of acquiring information and
materials. In the process, the individuals involved will express knoels about their selves, about
others, and about perceived commonalities.
Social psychology has developed two theories of identity (Stets & Burke, 2000), one that
focuses self-knowledge regarding membership in a group and another that is concerned with how
roles are integrated into self-concept. Both involve theory of mind—which is not a theory, per se,
but the phenomenon of sense that others have minds and act agentically (Baron-Chohen, 1991).
So, identity theories are meta-theories about how we use ordinary, practical theories about
others’ minds to connect with others. Stets and Burke (2000) note that in both theories identities
are based on social categories, groups, and roles within groups; identification or selfcategorization is, according to these theories, how identities are formed. These theories focus on
affiliation to an in-group, in contrast to the out-group:
The consequence of self-categorization is an accentuation of the perceived
similarities between the self and other in-group members, and an
accentuation of perceived differences between the self and out-group
members. The accentuation occurs for all the attitudes, beliefs and values,
affective reactions, behavioral norms, styles of speech, and other
properties that are believed to be correlated with the relevant intergroup
categorization. (Stets & Berke, 2000, p. 225)
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This is part of what I refer to as integration in my conceptual framework. Beyond the
individual integrating into the group, there is the broader phenomenon of the group becoming
more coherent and better integrated. Such integration is not easy or simple. It requires models
and stimuli to guide individual, and lots of practice.

Integration
Once persons have identified themselves as part of a community (or at least as similar),
the question becomes how coherent and formalized the group should be; whether they should
integrate as a community. If members envision that they can acquire or defend better via the
group, they will tend to integrate (i.e., bond) faster and stronger. Their behavior will manifest as
a change in vision, evident in the community-related knoels they express: know-that and knowhow derived from know-what based on know-when, -where, and –who, all flowing from knowwhy, the rationale for the community. In particular, the community must establish rules for
behavior. This leads members exhibit more and stronger connections, which should manifest as
increased capabilities. Here we see the potential conflict between autonomy (Ryan and Deci,
2000) and bonding (Lawrence and Nohria, 2002). Integration intrinsically reduces one’s drive to
bond, and can undermine one’s autonomy. The consequence is that it can be difficult for
communities for fully integrate, or they can become over integrated so members have no
personal identities, and then they can’t move to the next level.
Integration creates networks, and is evident in new connections, new patterns of
transacting information and materials. Integration also involves developing and sharing beliefs
and ideas, i.e., visions. Durkheim’s (1897/1997) seminal sociological theory holds that persons
who are well integrated into society are less prone to antisocial and destructive (and self140

destructive) behaviors. In my conceptual framework integration provides only weak social
controls because networks based on self-interest (as discussed by Wenger, Trayner, & de Laat,
2011) rather than collective agency (prior to integration there is only weak collective identity or
sense of community. What Stets and Burke (2000) refers to as having a social identity is
integration in my conceptual framework:
Having a particular social identity means being at one with a certain
group, being like others in the group, and seeing things from the group’s
perspective. (p. 226)
Stets and Burke a distinction between from having a social identity and a role identity, which is
more like what I refer as differentiation:
[H]aving a particular role identity means acting to fulfill the expectations
of the role, coordinating and negotiating interaction with role partners, and
manipulating the environment to control the resources for which the role
has responsibility. (p. 226)
Feedback and reflection are essential factors for differentiation. These factors are the
interpersonal and intrapersonal communications that make individuals aware that their drives
have been met—that they are acquiring, bonding, and defending effectively—and builds their
sense of community. Feedback and reflection tell an individual if they setting expectations,
coordinating and negotiating, and manipulating assets in a meaningful and somewhat unique
manner.

Differentiation
If members of a community want to be especially effective at acquiring or defending,
they must act collectively. Acting collectively does not mean that everyone does the same thing.
It means that individuals perform complementary, mutually supportive roles. These roles need to
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be established, along with criteria and a means of accounting for performance. Thus the
community—the persons who comprise it—must differentiate. Social psychologists see this
occurring, at least in part, from social comparison:
The consequence of the social comparison process is the selective
application of the accentuation effect [of similarities with the in-group and
differences with the out-group], primarily to those dimensions that will
result in self-enhancing outcomes for the self. Specifically, one’s selfesteem is enhancing by evaluating the in-group and the out-group on
dimensions that lead the in-group to be judged positively and the outgroup to be judged negatively. (Stets & Berke, 2000, p. 225)
Differentiation is especially powerful for addressing members’ drives for autonomy and
competence in context, while also enhancing bonds and relatedness. It is something that
individuals could not do without community. Differentiation makes community members feel
simultaneously outstanding and part of something. Community doesn’t just require individuals to
fit in; it enables them to stand out. Drive conflict can arise with differentiation if members feel
diminished, pigeonholed, or threatened by differentiation.
Differentiation will be evident in behavior-vision-connections. Individuals will continue
to identify the community as such—as a valued thing—but will also identify themselves in new
terms relative to the group, for example “I’m the leader,” or “I’m the bookkeeper,” or “I take out
the trash,” for the group. Similarly, individuals will continue to share information and materials
via and with the group, but they will also develop new connections and begin exchanging new
types of information and materials. These new connections will be related to their new, different
role, but the information and materials will also be evaluated in terms of the community:
purchased 100 roles of toilet paper for, found a new office for, created a logo for, etc., the group.
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With differentiation individuals value the group—which has become a community—in terms of
what they contribute rather than what they derive from it.
On a much broader scope, differentiation was seen in the seminal sociological definition
of a system as means of dealing with complexity (Parsons, 1951/1991; Luhmann, 2006). A
system has to be as complex as the phenomena with which it must deal with. Luhmann (2006)
builds on the work of Maturana and Varela (1980) to suggest that reflexivity, which is integral to
theories of identity (Stets & Burke, 2000), is the means by which social systems differentiate
themselves.
The implication is that differentiation enables organizations and regions to operate—
differentiation is central to the division of labor and nature of institutions—even as it gives
individuals subjectively meaningful roles and tasks. These roles and tasks fulfill the individuals’
drives by meeting the needs of the group—now a full-fledged community. Differentiation
changes the ways that other must interact with the individual. And, differentiation disrupts the
environment around the community and impacts others in that environment to the extent that
differentiation fosters organization performance and regional advantage, as well as personal
capabilities for other members of the community.

Cooking the Potato
So, in order to generate outputs—positive ways to interact, etc.—and allow individuals to
reduce their drives, members of a community must (1) identify themselves and their community,
(2) integrate into a cohesive and coherent group, and (3) differentiate themselves within the
community in ways that generate value, particularly by enabling the community to differentiate
itself from the environment. These functions can be seen as integrated into a community building
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process, as illustrated in figure 6. My colleague Eleanor Cooper termed this process “cooking the
potato” when I first sketched out this process, before even giving each step a name. (The
metaphor is apt because there is so much more that can be done with potatoes as they are
cooked.)
Each step—identification, integration, and differentiation, as discussed above—in this
process—community-building—brings changes in behaviors-connections-visions that represent
gains in capabilities and knowledge. As Smelser (1965) pointed out about collective action, each
step builds up in a cascading analytical process until together they become sufficient for
community. And, we can see these gains go from adaptive and increment gains in the
identification process, to generative and disruptive gains in the differentiation process.

Figure 6 The Input Functions of Community as Steps in the Community-Building Process

One community input function does not necessarily follow the other. Communities lose
their identity as a result of too little (or too much) integration, and disintegrate from too little (or
too much) differentiation. Identification, integration, and differentiation are levels of community
behavior. Each function represents an increase in extent and strength of community. Ultimately,
the greatest value in terms of capabilities is realized as each level is flexibly but fully established.

144

These levels of behavior emerge differently at various levels of socioeconomic
aggregation. At the individual level a person experiences various levels of identification,
integration, and differentiation with others. The level of community functioning is an aspect of
self-concept. It determines how he or she attends to and responds to her or his environment. For
organizations, community functions emerge in changes in division of labor, in collective
behavior, and in organizational boundaries. At the regional level, community functions
determine the buzz that draws in residents (or drives them away).

A Multilevel Theory of Learning
The functions of community—identification, integration, and differentiation—lead to
increases in capabilities and knowledge, and mutually-reinforcing relationships between, liberty,
prosperity, and wellness. As individuals build communities they improve their personal,
organizational, and regional vision, and expand their connections. This gives persons a truer
understanding of what is and what is possible at each level, and it increases their access to
information and materials.
Community emerges in different forms at each level via the factors that determine
outputs at that level. At the personal level community provides better models and support for
self-regulation, which increase capabilities. At the organizational level community provides for
improvements to division of labor, resulting in better performance. At the regional level
community promotes stronger yet more flexible institutions, which fosters knowledge sharing
across sectors, and enhances advantages from location and natural resources. Across all levels
community facilitates agentic action, reflexivity, and information networks.
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At the highest level of community, individuals come to define themselves and their worth
vis-à-vis the community. At this level community becomes generative, and the forms of freedom
become mutually supportive. Liberty enhances prosperity, which fosters wellness, which
promotes liberty. The innate human drives become aligned such that drives for autonomy and to
bond, for example, reinforce each other: Persons achieve autonomy by bonding. The functioning
of the community takes on greater meaning and value than the individuals’ personal functioning.
In order to reach this level of community, one must invest a great deal of time, resources,
and attention in conjunction with others. This can only happen if all share a clear and compelling
vision of the future that they believe is not only beneficial but desirable, and not only possible
but practical. The highest level of community can only occur if members not only share strong
and flexible connections among themselves, but also share connections outside the community
(in order to draw in requisite information and materials). Otherwise the community members will
be driven to avoid risk and seek short-term gratification, which means they will not make the
necessary investment, and the community will breakdown or fail to develop. Or, they will
exclude others from the community, undermining its ability to generate new knowledge and
contribute to personal capabilities, organizational performance, or regional advantage.
A high level of community at the regional level creates knowledge spillovers that provide
organizations in the regional with competitive advantage. It is means to constructed advantage
(Cooke & Leydesdorff, 2006). At the organizational level, a high-level of community improves
division of labor, which increases performance for those within the organization. Individuals’
capabilities increase as availability of models and support for self-regulation increase with the
level of community.
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Theoretical Models
I provide three models of learning based on this theory: a causal model, a logic model,
and a mathematical model. A causal model shows how the independent variable’s (community)
input functions (identification, integration, and differentiation) lead to the dependent variable’s
(capabilities) output functions (liberty, prosperity, and wellness). It is intersubjective—useful for
practical application and for theoretical testing—and is amenable to qualitative description and
quantitative measurement. The logic model is most amenable to qualitative description. It is a
subjective version of the theory that is primarily intended for practical purposes, for planning and
evaluation. The mathematical model describes the relationships between elements of the theory,
and is a basis for quantitative hypothesis testing.

A Causal Multilevel Model of Learning
The essence of this theory is that community yields learning. Or, the input functions to
community cause increases in the output functions of capabilities, and learning the process of
increasing capabilities. The causal model is not a normative statement about what is best, nor is it
a hypothetical proposition that can be falsified. It has some aspects of both, and could be
interpreted for those purposes. Instead, it is a general view of the way the learning works,
synthesized from the literature reviewed in this paper. This model is the result of a virtual dialog
among academic disciplines and between theoreticians and practitioners. Of course, the dialog
has not actually occurred, which is part of this dissertation’s contribution to the field via an
applied, trans-disciplinary approach.
The causal model is described in the discussion of levels and units of analysis and
variables, above. At the core of this model are community and capabilities, which are clearly
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latent, unobservable variables. They are complex, abstract socio-cognitive constructs. There are
indicators or mediators of these things—for example, a specific competence may indicate
capabilities—but they do not equate. So, if a person is competent at auto repair or computer
programming, that does not mean they are prosperous, let alone liberated and prosperous. Or,
just because a person refers to her or his neighborhood as “community,” that does not mean the
neighborhood substantially contributes to that person’s capabilities. It is important to understand
the relationship between these mediating factors, but it is beyond the scope of the present
discussion because we are focused on the “big picture” causes of learning. I revisit the issue of
indicators and mediators in the discussion section, below.
The input and output functions are more concrete than community and capabilities, and I
treat them as observable variables for the moment. These variables need to be further
operationalized, which I address in detail in the “Discussion” section. While one might
experience identification or liberty, they are not directly observable. I discuss this below, also:
We cannot observe identification or liberty but we can observe behavior and states of being
associated with these functions. For the moment I will focus on the conceptual, theoretical
aspects of the model, illustrated in figure 7.
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Figure 7 Causal Model of Learning
Simply, identification, integration, and differentiation are functions that create
community; they lead to a shared sense of belonging, influence, needs fulfillment, and emotional
commitment (McMillan & Chavez, 1986). The strength of each function depends on prior
functions: differentiation can only occur among the integrated, and integration can only occur for
the identified. The curved arrows from identification to integration and from integration to
differentiation indicate this cascade effect. These functions occur at each level. There are
personal, organizational, and regional communities. The core issue is not “where” the
community is—remember, in this framework, communities are not “things” that have location—
but what purposes and topics are invoked in the functions; the behaviors-connections-visions that
go into the functions.
At the personal level, community directly impacts capabilities (see figure 7). Each input
function directly increases liberty, prosperity, and wellness; reduces drives and needs; and fulfills
the individual as a person. Each function also allows individuals greater access to models,
stimuli, means of self-reflection, and scaffolding for self-regulation. These are the means to
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increasing capabilities, but community and its input functions are the causes. One set of
behaviors-connections-visions come in, and identification, integration, and differentiation
transform them into very different behaviors-visions-connections.
The personal level community functions are supplemented by similar functions at
organizational and regional levels. Of course, personal capabilities contribute to organizational
capabilities, which contribute to regional capabilities, but for moral and practical reasons (as
discussed above) this theory focuses on how all of these impact individuals’ real freedoms. It is
important to understand the causes and factors of organizational performance and regional
advantage in order to understand personal fulfillment and individual freedoms. The literature
reviewed in this dissertation is not even the tip of the proverbial iceberg on these topics, yet
knowledgeable persons would likely admit there are still may questions to answer. This
dissertation could help with such questions. An important proposition is implicit in this theory,
and particularly in this model: Organizational performance and regional advantage come from
fostering personal fulfillment and individual freedoms. Community causes increase in individual
freedoms and personal fulfillment. Thus, organizations and regions can improve by cultivating
communities within them. I revisit this proposition in discussion section.
On the output end of the causal model, the latent variable capabilities lead to liberty,
prosperity, and wellness. As discussed above, the relationships between liberty, prosperity, and
wellness are as important as the levels. Hypothetically, the stronger the input factors the greater
the positive relationships among the output factors. The causal model shows that there is an
interactive relationship between levels. Regions contribute to organizations, which contribute to
persons, but causation also goes in the other direction: Persons contribute to organizations, which
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contribute to regions. That said, the ultimate unit of analysis is the individual, and the dependent
variables are liberty, prosperity, and wellness.

A Learning Logic Model
The logic model of this theory is basically an idealized version of the learning process, of
how learning should operate. I theorize that community functions cause or lead to learning. The
learning logic model shows how community functions do that, how they are integrated into the
learning process. The specific elements of the model—what qualifies as learning activities and
assets, or even as outcomes—is contingent and subjective. The content depends on the subject
but, theoretically, for learning to occur, learning activities must fit the steps of the model
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illustrated in figure 8.

Figure 8 The Learning Logic Model

The primary purpose of the logic model is to qualitatively describe or document increases
in capabilities and the activities that led up to those increases. Such a description can be
invaluable for evaluating learning, for using during the process to improve outcomes or after the
process to assess its efficacy. The logic model is also useful for planning a learning process, for
anything from creating a lesson plan to planning a regional economic development project. Of
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course, it is a logic model for learning, not planning, so the focus is on freedom outcomes—
liberty, prosperity, and wellness—rather than on an event or object.
The logic model makes the role of behaviors-connections-visions (or doing, having, and
seeing) explicit. Essentially, behaviors-connections-visions are means to describe, measure, and
specify the content of each step in the model. The community functions are implicit in the steps
in the logic model: Identification is a natural outgrowth of prior knowledge, intentions, and
motivations. Imitating models and responding to stimuli via practice is effectively integration.
Feedback and reflection, together, differentiate the community and those within it. I have not
discussed the learning process elsewhere, and it is an important part of this dissertation
particularly the learning logic model, so I discuss each component is some detail before moving
on to describe the mathematical model.
Prior knowledge. Knowledge is what learning is all about, and prior knowledge is the
starting point for learning. It is an understatement to say that knowledge has been to topic of a
great deal of discussion and study. Rather than attempting to review the voluminous literature on
the topic I shall simply build upon the classical philosophical definition of knowledge as justified
true belief (Audi, 2010) with more contemporary perspectives, such that:
Humans are viewed as goal-directed agents who actively seek information.
They come to formal education with a range of prior knowledge, skills,
beliefs, and concepts that significantly influence what they notice about
the environment and how they organize and interpret it. This, in turn,
affects their abilities to remember, reason, solve problems, and acquire
new knowledge. ... In the most general sense, the contemporary view of
learning is that people construct new knowledge and understandings based
on what they already know and believe. (Commission on Behavioral and
Social Sciences and Education, 2000, pg. 10)
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Roschelle (1995) maintains that prior knowledge is not just the foundation upon which
new knowledge is built, it is the raw material for constructing new knowledge, the lens through
which they perceive new knowledge, and “[n]eglect of prior knowledge can result in the
audience learning something opposed to the educator's intentions, no matter how well those
intentions are executed” (Roschelle, paragraph 1). Roschelle suggests three assumptions or
insights for designers of interactive educational experience:
First, designers should seek to refine prior knowledge, and not attempt to
replace learners' understanding with their own. Second, designers must
anticipate a long-term learning process, of which the short-term
experience will form an incremental part. Third, designers must remember
that learning depends on social interaction; conversations shape the
form and content of the concepts that learners construct. Only part of
specialized knowledge can exist explicitly as information; the rest must
come from engagement in the practice of discourse of the community.
(1995, paragraph 27, emphasis in the original)
Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (2000) sum up seminal literature to make many of the
same points, noting that, “If students’ initial ideas and beliefs are ignored, the understandings
that they develop can be very different from what the teacher intends” (p. 10). Prior knowledge
must be analyzed and enhanced, they maintain, as it is built into and transferred to new subjects.
Ability of an organization to recognize new, valuable information (innovation) and
incorporate it into practices or processes depends on prior collective knowledge, according to
Cohen and Levinthal (1990):
[P]rior knowledge includes basic skills or even a shared language but may
also include knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological
developments in a given field. [It] confers an ability to recognize the value
of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. These
abilities collectively constitute what we call a firm's “absorptive capacity.”
(p. 128)
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Absorptive capacity builds on diverse general knowledge, problem solving, and learning skills
through intensive and repeated exposure. It is different than the sum of individual parts,
involving communication across organizational subunits, and within units, as well as from the
environment. Christensen (2006) extends prior knowledge to include the value networks in
which organizations are embedded. Regional theorists such as Boschma (2005; Boschma &
Lambooy, 1999), Cooke (2002; Cooke & Morgan, 1998; Cooke & Leydesdorff, 2006), and
Florida (1995) make similar contentions about regions. Over-reliance on prior knowledge can
lock firms and regions into technologies, causing them to miss innovations and to
socioeconomically decline as the technologies become obsolete.
Intention and motivation. Intention and motivation are primary cognitive determinants of
behavior, in general, and learning, more specifically, and are fundamentally shaped by selfconcept interacting with social circumstance (Heider, 1958; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Bandura,
1977, 1986, 1989, 1997; Ajzen, 1985, 1991; Ryan and Deci, 2000). Generally, intention’s
influence is a function of what one believes he or she can do (behavioral control or self-efficacy)
and what he or she expects to result from that behavior. Attitudes, beliefs, and norms related to
behavior are derived via experience and observation in various social settings. Together,
outcomes-expectations and self-efficacy, based on experience and observation, add up to agency,
or self-determination, the capability to act on one’s intentions, in one’s own interest: the greater
the sense of agency on some topic, the harder and longer one will work toward success.
Scholars have often differentiated between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, based
largely on the works of Deci and Ryan (1985; Ryan and Deci, 2000), between innate curiosity
and drive, and enticements and threats from others. Other scholars, particularly those studying
second language acquisition, have made a further distinction between behavior as an end or a
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means, and between instrumental and integrative motivations (Carreira, 2005). The fundamental
issues are the source of motivation—other or self—and motive purpose for the behavior as either
a means or end. Self-motivation can be integral to self-concept, or peripheral to what one desires
or feels important.
Identification. How we identify ourselves, others, and objects in our environment
depends on prior knowledge, and on our intentions and motivations. We are identified by what
we do and have, and how we identify others depends on how and what we see.
Models and stimuli. Learning involves a change in behavior. Just as any behavior
involves intentions, motivations, and knowledge, so does any change in behavior, particularly
intentional, methodical behavioral change. This need not be explicit: there is a natural tendency
to imitate behavior, which is reinforced when the observed behavior results in valued outcomes
and reversed when it results in undesirable outcomes. Classical conditioning research shows that
some stimulus, when associated with a particularly desirable or feared thing, evokes a response
appropriate to that thing, even when the thing is not presented (Pavlov, 1927/2003).
In nature, all living beings learn the connection between cause and effect in very practical
terms, informing them about dangers and opportunities. Learning by observing others, or
modeling, was developed by Bandura (1977, 1986) as a central element of social learning theory.
He noted that the learner must attend to the modeled behavior, be able to recall and reproduce it,
and have the motivation and opportunity to do so; and similar holds for avoiding undesirable
behavior. Collectively, the issue becomes how individuals attend to others as they respond to
models and/or stimuli, how does one change her/his behavior in response to the behavior of
others, and how are autonomy and relatedness balanced by competency?

155

Practice. Practice, as related to learning, typically means “repeated performance or
systematic exercise for the purpose of acquiring skill or proficiency” (practice, n.d.). But other
definitions of the term—“ habitual or customary performance ... habit; custom ... the action or
process of performing or doing something ... the exercise or pursuit of a profession or
occupation” (practice, n.d.)—involve acquisition or creation of knowledge and potential for
different behavior, or learning. Practice involves components similar to those involved in
modeling: awareness of what the behavioral ideal is, breaking it into components, repetition of
those components, integrating those components into a performance, and continuing the enhance
the performance (cf., Moretti, 2009).
Practice is essentially the process and result of habituating behavior to the point that
ceases to depend on a model or stimulus. It is the difference between a novice and an expert.
Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (2000) discuss the differences between novices and experts,
beginning with several fundamental principles of expertise:
1. Experts notice features and meaningful patterns of information
that are not noticed by novices.
2. Experts have acquired a great deal of content knowledge that is
organized in ways that reflect a deep understanding of their
subject matter.
3. Experts’ knowledge cannot be reduced to sets of isolated facts
or propositions but, instead, reflects contexts of applicability:
that is, the knowledge is “conditionalized” on a set of
circumstances.
4. Experts are able to flexibly retrieve important aspects of their
knowledge with little attentional effort.
5. Though experts know their disciplines thoroughly, this does
not guarantee that they are able to teach others.
6. Experts have varying levels of flexibility in their approach to
new situations. (p. 31)
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To relate this back to earlier discussions, experts have fully integrated their knowledge
into their behaviors such that intention is coincident with action, and motivation ceases to be an
issue because the behavior is so automatic and natural that it needs no motivation. It is simply
part of the expert’s identity. It is fully internalized. Where novices struggle to remember facts
and rules, experts organize their knowledge around “big ideas,” enabling them to see patterns in
and deal handily with novel situations, and transfer their knowledge to others in other settings
(Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, 2000).
The issue for collective learning is how expertise is dynamically distributed throughout
the group. How practice is defined within the group, executed by its members, and structured for
the purpose of improvement? How does the method allow the group, as a whole, to move from
rote application of rules to knowledge organized around big ideas.
Integration. Practice is the means for integrating new knowledge into one’s capabilities.
It is also the means by which one becomes integrated into a group. Models and stimuli—once
identified—inform the individual about appropriate, expected behavior. As a group practices, its
members become more integrated and more able. They begin to find meaning in their collective
activity. So, integration feeds back to prior knowledge, to motivations, and to intentions.
Feedback and Reflection. Feedback is the phenomenon of and process by which current
action is informed by the results of past actions. It is essential to control systems of all sorts,
including biological, cognitive, mechanical, and social. Feedback tells whether our behavior is
acceptable or effective. Reflection is a more complex and richer version of feedback for
conscious entities, whereby they consider the nature and implications their actions. Askew and
Lodge (2000) maintain that “[f]eedback is a complex notion, often embedded in a common-sense
and simplistic dominant discourse” (pg. 1) about education, but “effective learning must include
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a wider conception of feedback ... challenging the implicit assumptions on which approaches to
feedback are based, and touch on a bigger question – what is ‘effective’ learning?” (pp. 2-3).
Feedback which is intended to provide information and increase
understanding is necessary when something is not for negotiation, when it
is important to relate rules within a social context or social conventions
regarding work and behaviour, and to indicate the consequences of
complying with conventions. But where we want to engage people in a
deeper process of understanding, making connections, further insights or
learning about their learning, this form of feedback is less effective. (pg.
6)
They suggest that models of teaching must be expanded to include facilitating discovery
of new knowledge, encouraging reflection, and practicing collaborative dialog. The view of
learning implicit in these models “involves making connections between old and new
experiences,” incorporates the emotional and social with the cognitive, and includes metalearning. Where the dominant model of education views feedback as a gift from the teacher to
student, Askew and Lodge (2000) tell us, expanded approaches use feedback as a two-way
process for description and discussion, illuminating learning and connecting participants.
Argyris and Schön (1978) developed these concepts outside the realm of education as the
means for moving beyond simply detecting and correcting errors, and by Senge (2006), as means
to enhance capabilities to create. One strategy is to simply make minor modifications to behavior
until error is no longer detect. A more sophisticated and powerful strategy, Argyris and Schön
observe, is to reconsider the assumptions and explanations upon which one’s behavior is based,
which they refer to as “double loop” learning: “Double-loop learning occurs when error is
detected and corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organization’s underlying
norms, policies and objectives” (p. 3). It involves meta-learning and restructuring connections.
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Senge (2006) presents a different kind of double loop, in which reinforcing feedback
promotes behavior and balancing feedback attenuates it. Seeing and structuring such interacting
systems requires ability to construct mental models, achieve personal mastery, develop shared
vision, and engage in team learning, all of which depend on systems thinking, understanding not
only the pieces but how they—including feedback—fit into the whole. Reflection is critical to
rebuilding mental models, to intentionally thinking different, to include entire systems. In
Senge’s view, feedback is an essentially mechanical process, whereas reflection is the means for
understanding the effects of feedback.
Schön (1983) notes that problems rarely present themselves in simple, unambiguous
situations. Consequently, it is often necessary to construct the problem, exploring the problem
setting, via practical experiments. The results comprise feedback that is more nuanced and useful
than Askew and Lodge’s “gift” feedback or Senge’s double loop feedback because it emerges
organically from practice. Schön describes this integration of feedback and reflection with the
example:
When good jazz musicians improvise together, they also manifest a “feel
for” their material and they make on-the-spot adjustments to the sounds
they hear. Listening to one another and to themselves, they feel where the
music is going and adjust their playing accordingly. (p. 55)
Differentiation. Schön’s quote describes how jazz musicians integrate as a group, but it
also implies—particularly for anyone who is familiar with jazz—how members differentiate. The
bassist, drummer, and pianist all have complementary yet distinct roles. Other instrumentalists—
sax, horns, guitar, etc.—add to the performance in unique ways. It is the differentiation that
determines impacts and contributes to personal freedoms. Differentiation cannot occur without
integration, and identification before it. But it is this last function that makes community truly
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meaningful and valuable to its members. And, it is differentiation that those outside the
community identify the community and by which the evaluate it. There is nothing that makes a
person want to play jazz like seeing a truly talent jazz musician step out and play a solo. That is
true freedom!
Multilevel Learning Logic. The underlying principle for a learning logic model is that all
content and ultimate outcomes must be put in terms of individual freedoms. While it may be
useful to consider how personal fulfillment contributes to organizational performance, and how
that contributes to regional advantage, ultimately we must ask how all other these contribute
individual freedoms. There are two general ways to accomplish this with the learning logic
model. The first, as illustrated in figure 8, is to simply incorporate personal, organizational, and
regional behaviors-connections-visions into descriptions/specifications of each step in the model.
While this approach is conceptually simple, it could easily become impractically complex.
The second approach is basically that of Cooksy, Gill, and Kelly (2000); Yang, Shen,
Cao, and Warfield (2004); and Beer and Reed (2009): Multilevel case studies. But, where their
studies aggregate up—micro feeds into meso, which feeds into macro—the learning logic model
cascades down: regional learning enables (or constrains) organizational learning, which enables
(or constrains) personal learning. Under this approach the learning logic model is to conduct one
or a few regional case studies (or plans), several case studies of organizations in each region, and
multiple case studies of persons in each organization. Then the learning logic model can be used
to identify differences and similarities between cases at each level and between levels.
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A Mathematical Model of Multilevel Learning
The mathematical model is a set of propositions about the relationships between elements
of the theory: how variation in the independent variables explains variation in the dependent
variable. The mathematical model discussed below, more than the causal model and logic model
I presented above, addresses the issue of levels. Each level is embedded in the higher level such
that variation between persons is the same as variation within organizations and/or regions. The
purpose of this mathematical model is to allow the theory to be quantitatively tested. In order to
advance our understanding how learning occurs it is useful to test hypotheses about similarity
between learning at different levels of socioeconomic aggregation, and about how learning at one
level affects learning at other levels.
The measures and data used in this model, as with the constructs and variables I lay out in
this study, must be empirically validated. The model and its outputs might be useful in decisionmaking after it has been rigorously tested and consistently supported (not falsified) in a variety
of settings. Even then, because this is a general, highly abstracted version of the theory, much
work will need to be done to achieve more detailed and nuanced understanding.
Actually, what I present here are two different mathematical models, one descriptive and
one explanatory. The descriptive model, summarized in figure 9, is a mathematical restatement
of the levels of analysis discussion, above. To recap: Capabilities are a function of capacity,
which is determined by physical form and is practically fixed, and by ability, which is
determined by socio-cognitive functions. Capacity of a unit (person or organization) can be
impeded and supplemented by higher levels adding more units, but it cannot be increased.
Ability can be developed and utilized by higher levels, but cannot be diminished.
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Figure 9 A Descriptive Mathematical Model of Multilevel Learning
(adapted from Heck & Thomas, 2009)
As with all models in this dissertation, the unit of analysis is the individual, and the
general question for this model is, “What explains variation in individual freedoms?” While, it
may be useful to understand how lower level factors—individual freedoms and personal
fulfillment—contribute to organizational performance and/or regional advantage, my concern
here is with what maximizes the capabilities of individual human beings. My general purpose is
to promote freedom through learning, and that can only be accomplished by focusing on the
individual. It is only by and for individuals that we can build better organizations and regions.
Personal fulfillment is equivalent to individual freedoms.
Figure 9 shows personal fulfillment as a function of personal capacity, personal ability,
organizational performance, and regional advantage. Organizational and regional capabilities can
constrain personal capacity and/or enhance personal ability. Regional capabilities can either

162

constrain an organization’s capacity (capital and labor) or enhance its ability (division of labor
and technology). The combination of ability and capacity explains variation within levels—
between persons within organizations and regions, and between organizations within regions.
Equation 1 puts this in mathematical terms. Individual freedoms and personal fulfillment
(which are equivalent) are represented by yijk. This is an observation (measurement of some
salient action/asset) of the ith individual in the jth organization in the kth region are. The
intercept, β0ijk, represents the personal capacity, which is assumed to be fixed—although,
conceptually, it is constrained by negative coefficients by organizational and regional
variables—and the same for all individuals. x1ijk is an observation of personal ability and β1ijk is
the slope coefficient, representing the relationship between {y,x}, between
measurements/observations of ability and freedoms/fulfillment. x2jk and x3k are organizational
and regional capabilities (or, at least, particular measurements/ observations of indicators of
capabilities), respectively, and β2jk and β3k are the slope coefficients. A key empirical and
practical issue is whether these coefficients are positive or negative. The error term, eijk,
represents unexplained variation in personal fulfillment/individual freedoms. It is assumed to
have a mean of zero and constant variation across all persons/individuals.
y ijk = β0ijk + β1ijk x1ijk + β2ijk x 2ijk + β3ijk x 3ijk + eijk

(1)

Essentially, what equation 1 says is that variation in individual freedoms and personal
€
fulfillment are explained by individual capacity, individual ability, organizational performance,
and regional advantage. Equations 2 and 3 describe variation in organizational performance and
regional advantage. Equation 2 basically indicates that variation in organizational performance is
explained by capital and labor (organizational capacity, β0jk); division of labor and technology
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(organizational ability, β1jkz1jk); and regional capabilities (β3kx3k). Equation 3 is a similar
explanation of regional advantage: Environment, infrastructure, and location (regional capacity,

β0k) and institutions (regional ability, β1ka1k) explain its variation. The primary structural
difference between these two equations and equation 1 is that β0jk and β0k are randomly varying
rather than fixed. That is, while we can assume that individuals all have the same capacity, we
cannot make the same assumption about organizations and regions.
x 2 jk = β0 jk + β1 jk z1 jk + β3k z3k + e jk

(2)

x 2 jk = β0k + β1k a1k + ek

(3)

€
So, if we assume that organizational and regional capacities vary, what explains that
€
variation? Organizations have various sets of capital and labor. Each region has an environment,

infrastructure, and environment that are different from any other region. Both organizations and
regions are socio-cognitive constructions. People, using their capabilities, build them. So,
variations in organizational and regional capacities—capital and labor; and environment,
infrastructure, and location—are explained by the individuals that comprise them.

β0 jk = ϕ00 + ϕ01 y ij + u0 jk

(4)

β0 jk = ϕ00 + ϕ01 y ijk + ϕ10 x 2 jk + u0k

(5)

€
Equation 4 indicates that organizational capacity (capital and labor, symbolized by β0jk) is
€

determined by the overall mean for measurements/observations of individuals over organizations
(ϕ00) and the capabilities of individuals in that organization (y1ij, and ϕ01 is the coefficient of
relation between individual capabilities and organizational capacity). Equation 5 shows a similar
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explanation for variation in regional capacity (environment, infrastructure, and location), except
that it includes organizational capabilities (ϕ00 y2jk).
These equations describe how capabilities at various levels are related. But they do not
explain how capabilities change. This theory explains learning as a result of community input
functions—identification, integration, and differentiation—across levels: Gains in capabilities
are caused by extent and strength of community. While there are personal, organizational, and
regional communities, community functions extend across and connect these levels.
Hypothetically, the more extensive the reach of a community is, the greater its learning potential.
It is community that determines how higher-level activities and assets impact lower level
capabilities, enhancing abilities or impeding capacity.
Equation 7 appears to be the same as equation 1 but it represents very different variables.
yijk still represents capability but here it is an observation of individual in the ith differentiation
function from the jth integration from the kth identification function. So, here the levels are
levels of community. This equation basically says that the stronger the community input
functions are the greater the resulting capabilities are. Equation 6 states this in non-mathematical
terms. β0ijk in equation 7 represents capabilities without community, which is essentially the
same as capacity (capability with no ability), so it is the same as the intercept coefficient in
equation 1. And, x1ijk in equation 7 represents measurements of differentiation, and β1ijk is the
effect that differentiation has on capabilities (how much of the variation in yijk is explained by
variation in x1ijk). x2jk and x3k in equation 7 represent measurements, respectively, of integration
and identification.
Capabilities = f (Differentiation, Identification, Integration)
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(6)

y ijk = β0ijk + β1ijk x1ijk + β2 jk x 2 jk + β3k x 3k + eijk

(7)

Equations 8 through 13 break this down further. They show how the community input
€

functions are embedded in each other. Equation 8 shows that the extent to which differentiation
explains variation in capabilities is a function of integration as well as feedback and reflection. In
equation 9, which states this in mathematical terms, x1ijk represents measurements of feedback,
x2ijk are measurements of reflection, and x3jk represents measurements of integration. The
intercept, γ0ijk, represents the effect of differentiation on capabilities without integration,
feedback, or reflection, which is 0. The regression coefficients—γ1ijk, γ2ijk, and γ3jk—are the
effects that integration, feedback, and reflection have on capabilities via differentiation.
Equations 10 and 11 illustrate that integration is embedded in identification in the same way that
differentiation is embedded in integration. Equations 12 and 13 indicate that identification is a
function of prior knowledge, and motivation.
Differentiation = f (Integration, feedback, reflection)

(8)

x1ijk = γ 0ijk + γ1ijk z1ijk + γ 2k z2k + eijk

(9)

Integration = f (Identification, models & stimuli, practice)

(10)

€

x 2 jk = ϕ0 jk + ϕ1 jk a1 jk + ϕ2 jk a2 jk + ϕ3k a3k + e jk

(11)

Identification = f (prior knowledge, intention & motivation)

(12)

€

x 3k = τ 0k + τ1k b1k + τ 2k b2k + ek

(13)

The implications of these equations are simple. An individual’s capabilities are correlated
€
with her or his experience of community. The strength of that is determined by identification,
integration, and differentiation of members at the personal, organizational, and regional levels.
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Individuals must experience integration to experience differentiation, and must experience
identification to experience integration. What then is the difference between capabilities and
community? Capabilities inhere to the individual; community is a collective experience, which
must be shared by all members.
There is one more aspect of the mathematical model, which is described in equations 14
through 21: Capabilities are correlated with liberty, prosperity, and wellness. And, liberty,
prosperity, and wellness are correlated with each other. In the ideal situation, the regression
coefficient with each output function of capabilities on each other is positive; they are mutually
reinforcing. In the worse situation, they are trade-offs and the regression coefficients are
negative. If liberty, prosperity, and wellness have no effect on each other, the regression
coefficients would be zero.
Capabilities = f (Liberty, Prosperity, Wellness)

(14)

y i = β0i + β1i x1i + β2i x 2i + β3i x 3i + ei

(15)

Liberty = f (Prosperity, Wellness)

(16)

β1i = γ 0i + γ 2i x 2i + γ 3i x 3i + ui

(17)

Prosperity = f (Liberty, Wellness)

(18)

β2i = ϕ0i + ϕ1i x1i + ϕ3i x 3i + u2i

(19)

Wellness = f (Liberty, Prosperity)

(20)

β3i = τ 0i + τ1i x1i + τ 2i x 2i + u3i

(21)

€

€

€

This mathematical model describes how personal, organizational, and regional learning
€
relate to each other, and how community and its input functions relate to capabilities and its
output functions. The learning logic model describes the process by which community is built
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and how that results in increased capabilities (individual freedoms and personal fulfillment). The
causal model describes how community invariably precedes increases in capabilities.
While the mathematical model is conceptually more amenable to testing than the other
two models, it contains variables that are not so easy to operationalize. This is because it
considers capabilities as the result of capacity and ability, rather than knowledge (which can be
described via knoels) or real freedoms (which can be observed). The two general approaches that
one might take to operationalizing these variables objective and subjective. The objective
approach would be to define the variables in economic/financial terms. Capacity, in this
approach, would be the cost or replacement value of what each level has, e.g., infrastructure,
natural resources, equipment, facilities, labor, etc. Ability would be the functional value—costs
avoided or revenue generated—with these assets. The subjective approach would be to develop
scales for subjects to rate the capacity of resources available to them and their (or others) ability
to use those resources. I discuss these approaches more in Chapter 5.

Summary
Community makes people smarter and increases real freedoms. But, community is not a
thing. It is a set of psychosocial functions that operates differently at different levels; not because
the functions are different, but because the levels are. Metaphors at each level—individual
cognitive constructer, organizational loops of learning, and regional triple helix—point to
integrative theory. They provide the bases for a theory of composition for independent variables.
Capacity and ability at the individual/personal level have equivalent factors at organizational
(capital & labor, division of labor & technology) and regional (environment & infrastructure, and
institutions) levels. Learning requires capacity (quantity of information & materials over time) to
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increase ability, which means a temporary decrease in capability during the learning process.
Dependent variable(s)—real freedoms—liberty, prosperity, and wellness are objective and only
pertain to individuals. Personal fulfillment is the subjective version of this. Organizational
performance and regional advantage are intersubjective versions. All of these can be described in
terms of vision, measured in terms of connection, and are evident in behavior.
These factors are independent across levels, which is essentially what distinguishes the
levels: Regional advantage does not necessarily translate into organizational performance or
personal fulfillment, or vice versa. My proposed theory suggests that community functions link,
as well as contribute to, capabilities across levels. So, based on this theory, we would predict that
the more pervasive and stronger community functions are at multiple levels, the more rapid and
sustainable the capability gains will be.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Literature on Learning at Micro, Meso, and Macro Levels
There are distinct bodies of theoretical literature regarding learning by individuals,
organizations, and regions. All three bodies of literature deal with how knowledge is acquired,
applied, and created. There are other overlaps, as discussed in Chapter 2. Theoretically, each
level involves entities acting in their own interests. Another common concept is that the agents
are embedded in information networks. An implication is that agents also act in the interest of
others as they exchange information. Information networks are simply patterns of transactions.
The third theoretical overlap between levels is that agents are aware of, reflect on, and modify
their actions based those reflections. This reflexivity is essential to agentic action, and is enabled
by information networks. All of the literature is about individual human beings, their agentic
action, reflexivity, and information networks.
Beyond their common concern and common underlying concepts, texts about learning
can be divided into three bodies based on level of analysis, the context of individual action as
persons, organizations, or regions. I refer to these as the micro, meso, and macro levels. Most of
literature advances and/or refutes particular concepts or metaphors regarding how learning
occurs at one level. The literature includes a wide range of outputs, or dependent variables, and
inputs, or independent variables, for each level. These diverse variables can be boiled down to a
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few core constructs based on the recognition that learning is essentially an improvement or
increase in the output resulting from modifying a fixed set of input factors.
At the micro level, the overarching metaphor is that of a human “machine” cognitively
constructs itself and its world, which I refer to as the “cognitive constructor.” While the concept
of agentic action appears throughout the literature, this metaphor exemplifies this concept.
Individuals generally act to achieve fulfillment as persons based on models and
stimulus/reinforcement. Individuals learn directly from models and stimulus/reinforcement, or
indirectly from texts about these things. For example, an individual might learn to dance by
imitating others, watching videos, and being told he or she dances nicely, which give her or him
a sense of personal fulfillment. Thus, personal fulfillment is the output produced by cognitive
constructors from information derived from models, stimulus/reinforcement, and texts about
these things.
The metaphor at the meso level is “loops of learning,” which involves groups of
cognitive constructors repeatedly working together to improve their organizations. This
metaphor illustrates the concept of reflexivity. Individuals act together as organizations to
increase their collective performance, as determined by the ways they arrange available capital
and labor. Technology is essentially these arrangements compiled into replicable, standardized
forms. For example, a restaurant performs well if it has employees, quality foodstuffs,
equipment, and a well-located building, but only if those employees know what to do, how to
work together, and technologies for managing the restaurant and its funds. These things don’t
simply appear; they must be acquired, developed, and maintained through an iterative process.
So, organizational performance is produced via loops of learning based on capital, labor, and
technology.
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The macro level metaphor is the “triple helix” formed by loops of learning from various
economic sectors interacting within a geographic region. The concept of information networks is
especially important to this metaphor. The output of this interaction is that those within the
region have an advantage over those in other regions. The advantage is derived from the region’s
infrastructure and institutions, which translate physical characteristics of the region into usable
resources. For example, a river becomes a transportation asset, potable water, and a source of
electric power only via interaction between public agencies, private corporations, and academic
institutions. Effective utilization of transportation, water, and power that gives those around the
river an edge over those around other rivers requires an even higher level of interaction. This
illustrates how the triple helix produces regional advantage from infrastructure, institutions, and
resources.
The gap between literature on individual learning, organizational learning, and regional
learning is twofold. First, there appears to be no theory that is applicable at the micro, meso, and
macro levels. If we can say that learning occurs at all levels, then it stands to reason that there
should be a consistent explanation of this phenomenon that applies at all levels. In addition, there
appears to be no conceptual framework that applies equally to all levels, which would make it
difficult to develop a theory that applies to all levels. (There are the concepts of agentic action,
information networks, and reflexivity, but I have found no literature that integrates them into a
theory of learning that applies to multiple levels of social aggregation.)
The second gap between theories of individual, organizational, and regional learning
regards the relationship between learning at different levels. There seems to be no complete
theory about how learning at one level affects learning at other levels. So, for example, does an
increase in capabilities of an organization necessarily involve an increase in the capabilities of
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individuals within that organization or of the regions in which the organization operates?
Coleman (1988) and Upton and Egan (2010) partially address the relationship between learning
by individuals and organizations, but their theories are not comprehensive, nor do they address
regional learning. Bapuji and Crossan (2004) and Morse (2004) note this gap. I contend that
these gaps can only be filled simultaneously, that we cannot understand how learning at different
levels relate until we are clear about how they are similar, about how improvements in persons,
organizations, and regions can all be validly characterized as learning.

A Conceptual Framework, Theory, and Three Models
The first step in filling the theoretical gaps is to recognize structural similarities across
scale. Persons, organizations, and regions, I maintain, all have behaviors, connections, and
visions. Or, more accurately, individual human beings have behaviors, connections, and visions
that can be ascribed to them personally, to their organizations, and to their regions. Behaviors,
connections, and visions are not separate things; they are different aspects of a system. In other
words, a system is formally defined by the behaviors, connections, and visions individuals
ascribe to it.
Visions are the internal, subjective aspect of individual human beings. These are their
attitudes and beliefs about what is beneficial, desirable, possible, and practical. Connections
make up individuals’ external, objective aspect, via which they acquire the information and
materials they need to operate. Behaviors are individuals’ intersubjective aspect, which bridges
the internal and external. Behaviors are the interchange between connections and visions.
I should explicate an implicit point: The unit of analysis in this theory is the individual
human being, her or his behaviors, connections, and visions. This is because (a) we cannot
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observe persons, organizations, or regions except through individual B-C-V and (b) because to
do otherwise would involve the morally dubious practice of treating individuals as means to
regional, organizational, and even personal ends. To put this another way, individuals are the
sum of the personal, organizational, and regional B-C-V, and this theory presumes that personal,
organizational, and regional activities and assets exist to benefit individuals.
Together behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V) define what a psycho-social system is.
Behaviors are evidence of what persons, organizations, and regions do, their activities.
Connections are evidence of what they have, their assets. And, visions are evidence of what they
say, in expressions about what they are. Of course, connections and visions can only be
evidenced (observed) indirectly via behaviors.
Systems (and statements about them) are verified by B-C-V that are coherently enacted
and expressed, consistent with other B-C-V of the system in question and others like it, and that
correspond to reality. So, for example, an individual’s role in an organization is verified if he or
she can clearly describe the role, if others describe it similarly, and if he or she actually processes
the information and materials of that role. Connections can be measured via behavior, by
measuring information and materials and the ways in which they are processed. Visions are
described by behaviors, by what I call knoels—short for knowledge elements—which are simply
information chunks regarding how, that, what, when, where, who, why, whether, and which.
B-C-V provides the metrics for the theory I propose. It is a means for consistently
describing and measuring persons, organizations, and regions. Differences in B-C-V define the
micro, meso, and macro, but it is not the theory or even the central constructs or variables of the
theory.

174

The theory is essentially quiet simple: community yields learning. This theory involves
somewhat different definition of community, although my definition fits well in the diverse and
often indefinite definitions of the term. For the purpose of this theory, a community is not a place
or a thing. Instead, it is a phenomenon and a process. Drawing on theories of community
(Sanders, 1975; McMillan & Chavez, 1986; Putnam, 1993; Senge & Scharmer, 2006), I suggest
that three sociocognitive functions make up community: identification, integration, and
differentiation. Identification involves recognizes others as similar to self, and that others and
self are part of a group. Integration is the adoption of similar idioms, language, norms, rituals,
etc., and interacting with each other. Differentiation is the phenomenon of individuals filling
unique and valuable roles within the group. These functions also parallel theoretical
sociocognitive functions from economics (Williamson, 1981), psychology (Simon, 1976; Ryan
& Deci, 2000; Lawrence & Nohria, 2002), and sociology (Weick, 1995). Identification,
integration, and differentiation are the independent variables in my theory, and impact
capabilities to the extent that they culminate in community.
The dependent variables in my theory are liberty, prosperity, and wellness, which I refer
to as real freedoms. These variables are derived from the human capabilities approach to
economic pioneered by Sen (1988, 1999; Nussbaum, 2000; Clark, 2005). Essentially, this
approach breaks from much of economics by suggesting that the ultimate measure of value is not
utility but freedom, which is practically measureable unlike utility, and it equates capabilities
with freedoms. I go a bit farther to define capabilities as ability given capacity. Capacity is the
quantity of information and materials a system can handle, and is determined by its physical
components. Ability is quality of information and materials a system can handle, which is
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determined by how the physical components are arranged and employed. Capacity is how much.
Ability is how well.
The dependent variables represent the intersubjective, objective, and subjective aspects of
capabilities. Liberty is the subjective capability to associate with others and express oneself
freely. It is freedom from coercion and persecution. Prosperity is the intersubjective capability to
benefit from one’s efforts. It is freedom from exploitation and privation. Wellness is the
objective capability to function as a living creature. It is freedom from disease and infirmity.
These not only have sound philosophical basis, they are easy to describe and are eminently
measureable via B-C-V. Another aspect of these output factors is their relationship to each other.
Liberty, prosperity, and wellness can be complementary—each promoting the others—or
mutually exclusive. Increasing one at the detriment of another—becoming more prosperous by
sacrificing one’s liberty or wellness, for example—represents a superficial form or learning.
Substantial learning occurs when the real freedoms feed into and foster each other.
My proposed theory is that community makes people smarter. People make better, more
productive decisions and act in their own interests more effectively than they would in the
absence of community. To state this in terms of my variables: liberty, prosperity, and wellness
become complementary and grow where identification feeds into integration and integration
results in differentiation. Or, more simply community improves and increases capabilities. The
stronger the community input functions are, the stronger the capability output functions are. This
is learning. There are numerous factors in learning, but the extent to which those factors are
translated into capabilities—into liberty, prosperity, and wellness—is determined by the
community input functions: identification, integration, and differentiation.
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I draw on the literature on theory- and model-building (especially Dubin, 1969, and
Jaccard & Jacoby, 2010) and literature regarding multi-level models (Rousseau, 1985; Klein,
Tosi & Cannella, 1999; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; Heck & Thomas, 2009) to develop three
general models from my putative theory. The mathematical model focuses on the relationships
between and within levels. It does not consider causality, how community yields learning. The
causal model is variable-oriented like the mathematical model, but deals only with how the
community input functions are necessary and sufficient precursors to gains in capabilities. The
logic model is process-oriented and incorporates the factors of learning. It is useful for
describing and planning learning processes, but not for specifying relationships or testing
theoretical propositions.

Illustrating the Proposed Theory with a Thought Experiment
I will now illustrate how a multilevel theory of learning might be applied and tested by
presenting a thought experiment. This thought experiment asks what would happen if a region
were to suddenly get broadband. I consider two different scenarios, one in which there is no
community learning, and a second in which there is a community learning process. The first
scenario is equivalent to an experimental control and the second is essentially the treatment
group. It should be emphasized that both scenarios are totally fictitious illustrations of the
concepts, explanations, and predictions of this study. Both scenarios feature rather unlikely
occurrences: A regional foundation investing in broadband and a major telecommunications
company taking on that investment, as occurs in scenario one, is rather unlikely in reality.
Similarly, it is rather unlikely that several universities would collaborate to help a region get and
use broadband, as occurs in scenario two. I ask the reader to suspend any doubts about such
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occurrences and consider what might result in these scenarios, without and with communitylearning.
The unit of analysis for this thought experiment is the individual human being, and the
levels of analysis are personal, organizational, and regional. Analysis involves observing
behavior to describe vision and measure connections, and comparing them to find relationships
between behaviors and other factors. The independent variables are the input functions of
community: identification, integration, and differentiation. These functions can be described and
measured in terms of what those at each level do, have, and say. The dependent variables are the
output functions of capabilities: liberty, prosperity, and wellness. These real freedoms are
observed as particular patterns of connections and visions, measured and described via
behaviors. Liberty involves easy connections and vision unimpeded by fear. Benefit from one’s
labor is the essential vision of prosperity, and is evident in bountiful connections. Physical
disease can profoundly limit visions and connections, so wellness means active, dynamic
connections and inclusive, positive visions.
The proposed theory suggests that the real freedoms will be strongest in situations where
the community input functions operate across layers of socioeconomic aggregation, that
individual, organizational, and regional learning are strongest when aligned via identification,
integration, and differentiation. Based on this theory the effect of broadband depends on the
extent to which individuals identify, integrate, and differentiate around and through it, as
persons, organizations, and regions. If community is weak, my theory predicts, the benefits of
broadband will be low and the costs will be high. If community is strong, according to this
theory, the benefits will be high and the costs will be low. Real freedoms will increase in
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conjunction with broadband use if and only if the technology is deployed in conjunction with
community building.

Introducing Greenfield, Georgia
Greenfield, Georgia, is a fictitious city of 100,000, in a region with 250,000 people in just
over 90,000 households. Greenfield is the regional hub, sitting halfway between two major
metropolitan areas, near the border with two adjoining states, at the confluence of two rivers,
between low mountains and hilly lowlands. Greenfield has a diverse economy, with abundant
public and non-profit agencies as well as retail and service sectors. The economy is based largely
on a cluster of tractor companies and related industries. Indeed, Greenfield promotes itself as the
“tractor capital of the world.” The region boasts numerous specialty manufacturers and a very
capable, inexpensive, but also under-educated workforce (many of the best workers in the tractor
industry have not completed high school).
At the dawn of the 21st century, Greenfield had only dial-up internet access. A scion of
the tractor industry, whose family had become very wealthy and established a foundation for
regional development, was deeply troubled by this. “How can we attract new business and create
jobs,” she asked regional leaders, “without broadband.” “What’s broadband?” they replied. So,
this young person decided to do something. With the support of her father and uncles (the tractor
industry was highly patriarchal), she used the family foundation to get Major Telecom (MT), a
multinational telecommunications provider headquartered in Dallas, Texas, to bring broadband
to the region. Basically, the foundation paid to build network infrastructure, which Major
Telecom would operate and use to sell broadband internet access.
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The partnership, Greenfield Broadband, or GB launched in 2003, and by 2005 was
providing high-speed internet access via optical fiber and wi-fi (wireless data network) to every
home and business in the region. Even more amazing, subscribers—commercial and
residential—could get the first three months’ broadband for free! The Greenfield regional
broadband project was widely hailed as a real “game-changer” that would fuel regional
economic development.
So, what might happen in and around Greenfield, what might the socioeconomic impact
of broadband be? Before I address that question, I look at Greenfield through the lens of my
conceptual framework. I review the academic perspectives related to this question. Then I
address the question about broadband impacts, and discuss how my proposed theory explains the
results.

Operationalizing the Variables, Testing the Hypothesis
I present behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V) as means to describe and measure
sociocognitive phenomena. The general hypothesis is that the stronger communities are, the
greater the gain in capabilities. This means that certain B-C-V—identification, integration, and
differentiation, in combination—result in an expansion of B-C-V, and the more extensive or
stronger the community input functions, the great the expansion will be. For Greenfield, this
means that the benefits of broadband depend on the extent to which individuals identify,
integrate, and differentiate around the technology. The dependent variables are capabilities
related to liberty, prosperity, and wellness. The civic, economic, and health effects from using
broadband—negative or positive—are the putative outcomes in Greenfield. These outcomes are
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evident in behavior-connections-visions about association, expression, earnings, work, disease,
exercise, etc.
The independent variables are the community input functions, which, for GB (Greenfield
Broadband), are the extent to which individuals engage with each other regarding and via
information and communication technologies (ICTs), specifically broadband. When, where, and
with whom to Greenfielders exchange information and materials (including money)? What do
they see as desirable and why? Does the internet afford more beneficial decisions about whether
and which? Does GB lead to an increase in capabilities? Change in behaviors-connectionsvisions that would indicate strong community input functions include interaction with diverse
others around ICTs. Cognitive constructors interacting in loops of learning connected via a triple
helix. Hypothetically, this leads participants to identify better uses and reduce costs; they climb
the learning curve farther and faster. The construction, looping, and helices can be described,
measured, and analyzed to understand how community affects learning about ICTs.
Behavior-connection-vision in this case is how Greenfielders spend their money and
time; what they do, have, and say. Doing involves activities, which can be recorded via diaries,
measured by an observer (including a digital one), or recalled from memory during an interview
or survey. Having has to do with things—assets. The rationale is that better or more things
increases real freedoms and satisfies innate drives. Regardless, what one has can be measured
monetarily, in terms of market value, or described in terms of reducing uncertainty, the
informational content. One’s perspective, including attitudes and beliefs, can be captured via
interviews and survey, and inferred from observations.
The elements of vision can be analyzed by categorization and quantization around the
sides of vision, particularly what is considered beneficial verses desirable verses possible verses
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practical. Then changes in vision can be evaluated by comparing B-C-V (behaviors-connectionsvisions). At a given point in time actions and expressions can be compared for an individual or a
group to evaluate veracity. B-C-V can be analyzed across time identify changes. Those changes
can then be evaluated in terms of relations to other factors, to establish validity. For example,
meeting a person who knows how ICTs (information and communication technology) can really
benefit one can be analyzed in terms of spending on ICTs, talking about ICTs, and using them
before and after that meeting, and in terms of the actual benefits derived—for personal,
organizational, and regional purposes—from using ICTs.
What determines whether the two people interact and whether one changes behavior
(along with connection and vision) as a result of that interaction? The B-C-V framework makes
it practical to answer such questions. The W7TH framework—my typology of knowledge
elements, or knoels, as how, that, what, when, where, who, why, which, and whether (W7TH)—
is useful here, too. Throughout the discussion above and below, the situation with Greenfield is
discussed in terms of how, that, what, when, where, whether, which, who, and why. All of this is
amenable to description, measurement, and relating. Indeed, W7TH (how, that, what, when,
where, who, why, which, and whether) is the means for describing and measuring B-C-V
(behaviors-connections-visions).

Behaviors, Connections, and Visions of the Greenfield Region
The starting point for analyzing the Greenfield region with my conceptual framework is
behavior, or what individuals in the region do. Much like the nation, about three quarters of the
region’s population is of working age, and just over half of the working age adults are employed.
Fifteen percent of those work in manufacturing and other private goods producing industries,
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20% in government services, and 85% work in service industries. Almost a quarter of the
employed persons work in retail, food service, and clerical positions, and earn a median wage of
$22,000, less than half the nation’s median earnings. The highest paying managerial and
technical professionals make up less than 10% of employed workforce. A quarter of the region’s
citizens are retired, 14% are in college, and unemployment is right around 5%.
The Greenfield region has relatively more agriculture, educational services,
manufacturing, retail, transportation, and utilities than the rest of the country. Unfortunately,
these are not the highest paying sectors, which are under-represented in the region. Greenfield
was notably weak in arts and entertainment; information; management; mining; professional,
scientific, and technical services; and other higher-paying enterprises. Locally, the most firms
and employees are in accommodations and food services; construction; healthcare;
manufacturing; and professional, scientific, and technical services. A trend behind the numbers is
a large-scale economic shift from goods to services. The number of information and knowledge
firms and workers are increasing even faster than most other services. Greenfield is being
impacted by the trends discussed in chapter one: technology is replacing labor in the global
marketplace making innovation and knowledge increasingly critical. Inclusiveness and openness
are necessary for making this happen humanely.
Needless to say, this is a very brief and even simplistic description of individuals’
behaviors in the Greenfield region. Occupation is the yardstick by which most policymakers and
politicians (particularly those concerned with the economic impact of broadband) describe and
measure our world. Clearly, occupation tells us little about how people actually behave,
particularly outside their organizational roles. That said, it is possible to make some rudimentary
presumptions about connections and visions even from such a superficial description. For
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example, half of the regions’ residents rely on non-work connections—parents, spouses,
children, etc.—for their livings. And, at least a quarter of the working population does not see
how they can earn a decent wage.
There is a range of other high-level observations we could make about what individuals
have and say—their connections and visions—in the Greenfield region, based on the summary
above. But, rather than delving into these specifics, let us consider generally how to
operationalize the components of my conceptual framework. The starting point is behavior,
connections, and visions, or what individuals do, have, and say. As implied by the discussion
above, behaviors in this framework are activities, events, habits, etc. These can be assigned to
non-exclusive categories or spaces: personal space, organizational space, and regional space.
Personal space can be defined as the home, but conceptually personal space is anything that
primarily impacts the person with minimal influence by organizational or regional concerns. For
connections, this means family and friends, personal belongings, personal media use. For
visions, this means attitudes and beliefs about such things. All of this is evidenced by behavior:
who an individual communicates and spends time with, what he or she has control over or
possession of, and what are her or his sources of entertainment, news, etc. Where one behaves is
also informative.
The W7TH (how, that, what, when, where, who, why, which, and whether) framework is
useful here to describe subjective visions and measure objective connections, particularly in
specific context (e.g., Greenfield gets broadband). W7TH provides a means to describe and
measure where individuals spend their time and money, the appliances, devices, tools, and
vehicles they use, and how these things are used. It is also a way to assess attitudes toward and
beliefs about these activities, items, and others. Specifically, in Greenfield, this framework can
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be used to document what people see as beneficial/possible with and desirable/practical about
broadband—what drives and what limits their broadband use. Current attitudes and beliefs about
these things now and in future can be compared with past attitudes and beliefs. And, both are
true for comparison and contrasting across organizations, based on individuals’ personal
orientation, organizational affiliations, and regions. The same is true for available information
and materials: current versus past amounts and types by personal, organizational, and regional
characteristics.
When applied to the proposition that community causes an increase in capabilities, the
framework should allow valid measurement and verifiable description of the dependent and
independent variables. With the combination of B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions) and
W7TH researchers, policymakers, and practitioners can assess the impacts of broad in the
Greenfield region across persons and organizations, and can compare them to other regions.
More importantly for the theory presented in this dissertation, the B-C-V/W7TH framework
makes it possible to examine the assertion that the community input functions occur before, and
are positively correlated with, the impacts. And, that this effect is stronger when those functions
occur across personal, organizational, and regional spaces.

Broadband
Much of the investment in broadband around the turn of the 21st century, particularly
public investment, was based on the Field of Dreams (Robinson, Gordon, & Gordon, 1989)
metaphor, “If you build it, they will come.” This metaphor has two presumptions built into it (for
examples of the presumptions see Eaton (2012), Helms (2012), and Worstall (2012)). First, if
broadband service becomes available people will take it up and use it. This is about adoption.
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Second, broadband will attract companies to relocate to, start up in, and hire employees where it
is available, which is about impact. Both presumptions involve use. Individuals will change
behavior by using the broadband, or at least to use it. Organizations that use broadband will favor
those with it, or at least shun places without broadband.

Broadband Adoption
In some ways, broadband is a prime example of the adoption of new technologies (i.e.,
innovations) as described by Rogers (2003)—generally known as “diffusion of innovations
theory,” or just “diffusion theory.” According to this theory, there are five steps—knowledge,
persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation—in a linear adoption process. Diffusion
occurs at varied speed: slowly at first with a few early adopters then it increases rapidly as the
majority adopts the new technology relatively quickly until diffusion tapers off with a few
laggards holding out and the innovation becomes generally accepted. Represented graphically,
diffusion takes the form of a learning curve (Yelle, 1979; Adler & Clark, 1991).
The rate of adoption/diffusion—the slope of the learning curve—according to Rogers
(2003) depends on characteristics of the innovation, the number and type of communication
channels, the structure of the social system. Adoption can be contingent on authorities or
collective decisions. Communications with different agents promote knowledge of innovations,
according to diffusion theory. Opinion leaders effect persuasion and decision via evaluation. Of
course, the process doesn’t happen with every innovation, and different types of innovation
diffuse differently. General-purpose technologies diffuse differently from special purpose
technologies. Technologies that become more beneficial as more adopt them—exhibit network
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effects—diffuse differently than those that don’t. Fax machines and e-mail, for example, diffused
differently than automobiles, the plow, and radio.
Information and communication technology (ICT) researchers have evolved diffusion
theory into the technology acceptance model (TAM), which sees perceived usefulness and
perceived ease-of-use as the primary factors in adoption of ICTs. Perceived ease-of-use
determines whether a person will try an ICT, and perceived usefulness determines whether he or
she will continue using it. Major contributions to TAM come from Davis (1989) and from Davis,
Bagozzi, and Warshaw (1989). Attewell (1992), King and Teo (1994), Taylor and Todd (1995),
and Thong and Yap (1995) emphasize the role of leaders’ experience with and knowledge of
ICTs in organizational adoption. Chuttur (2009) provides an overview of this literature.
In this literature, adoption is an individualistic and rational process. The literature, not
coincidentally, downplays the role of social norms and generally does not consider
organizational or social arrangements. Other approaches to learning, particularly Bandura’s
social learning theory (1977, 1988, 1997, 2006), conceive of learning as an intrinsically social
process. Others see knowledge as socially constructed (Berger and Luckman, 1966) and learning
as situated in particular culture, context, and activities (Brown, Collins, and Duguid, 1989).
The technology acceptance model (TAM) has been extended with social influence and
cognitive processes (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000), focusing on intention to use ICTs (information
and communication technology) as the best indicator of actual use. Hybrids of TAM with sociocognitive theory and other approaches are used to investigate ICTs for higher education (Yi &
Hwang, 2003), online tax (Wu & Chen, 2005), healthcare (Yi, et al., 2006), virtual communities
(Chiu, Hsu & Wang, 2006), mobile banking (Ratten & Ratten, 2007), and knowledge
management (Lin & Huang, 2008). Results are mixed.
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Venkatesh, et al., (2003) draw from eight theoretical perspectives to suggest that
performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions are the
determinants of adoption. TAM is the best overall explanation of ICT adoption and use (Hong,
Thong & Tam, 2006), but SCT (social cognitive theory) explains intentions to use ICTs (Ratten
& Ratten, 2007), and task-technology fit is important for explaining ICT adoption and use in
situations with strong task interdependence (Lin & Huang, 2008). LaRose, et al. (2007), studied
intention to use broadband among rural residents through the lens of sociocognitive theory, and
found that:
Prior experience with the Internet, the expected outcomes of broadband
usage, direct personal experience with broadband, and self-efficacy had
direct effects on broadband intentions. Age and income, but not education
or ethnicity, also had direct impacts. (p. 359)
Beyond their conclusions about broadband adoption, LaRose, et al., find that:
Social-cognitive theory and the conventional diffusion of innovations
paradigm provide complementary views of the adoption process. The
present research equated the diffusion concept of relative advantage with
the socio-cognitive concept of expected outcomes, trialability with
enactive learning, observability with observational learning, complexity
with self-efficacy, and compatibility with prior experience with related
technologies. This presented a fresh approach to conceptualizing
innovation attributes that stressed the role of the adopter/user rather than
the properties of the innovation. (p. 368)
Beyond the theoretical explanations, actual internet adoption and use have been tracked
by the Federal Communications Commission (Horrigan, 2010) and Pew Internet and American
Life Project (Pew Internet, 2012). They find that 81% of Americans use the internet, and show
an adoption trend that takes a learning-curve form. Two-thirds of Americans have broadband at
home. Internet users tend to be younger, white, higher income, and more educated. The internet
is used for a wide range of general and special purposes and tasks according to Pew Internet.
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Horrigan (2010) notes that the social aspects of the internet are more important than
entertainment. The more knowledgeable users are, the more they get from broadband, according
to Horrigan (2010), and cost is major barrier to adoption. Dwivedi and Lal (2007) found the
difference between adopters and non-adopters to be attributable to socioeconomic factors—age,
education, income, occupation, etc.—except for gender.
So we know how many people have adopted the internet, the characteristics of those
people, and generally what they do with it. We know the when, where, and who of internet use.
What we’re less clear of is why, particularly in relation to innate drives to acquire, bond, and
defend. The literature on adoption of broadband and other ICTs (information and communication
technology) implies various impacts. Hypothetically, the practical value of the internet comes
from it being actually useful. The individuals, organizations, and regions that acquire broadband
do so with expectation of benefits of use to outweigh the costs. Are there benefits? What
determines the value of ICTs? What are their impacts?
Diffusion theory provides understanding of how awareness and use of innovations
spread. TAM (technology acceptance model) highlights the importance of expectations and
intentions, especially fit between tasks and the technology. The extensions of TAM—particularly
sociocognitive theory—suggest that social and other-oriented factors are important in ICT
(information and communication technology) adoption, but results are inconsistent. The
questions become what makes broadband use important, how it increases individual capabilities,
and what the nature of the social factors are; are they community?
Through my conceptual lens, the adoption issue is one of change in B-C-V (behaviorsconnections-visions). A person (or organization or region) does not use digital technology; then
he or she does. He or she uses it a little, then uses it a lot, or doesn’t, and stops using it. Certain
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types of connections precede and follow change in behavior, as do general beliefs—a new source
of information is credible, ICT could be beneficial, costs and risks are low, etc. Theoretically, the
concept of community input functions builds on factors in the range of literature on the topic. So,
social networks, models, and self-efficacy are important factors, but these functions explain how
those factors—specifically, regarding broadband and other ICTs—are translated into real
freedoms.

Broadband Impacts
The impacts of ICTs, and broadband specifically, are construed in several ways—as gross
economic product, in terms of social integration, and on productivity. Fischer (1992) says the
telephone as one of the harbingers of modernity was accompanied by concerns about:
The growth of cities, wider communication, more material goods, mass
media, and the specialization of land use and institutions … fostered
individualism and interpersonal alienation, abraded the bonds of social
groups, and bred skepticism in place of faith. (p. 4)
The technology is seen as both alienating and liberating, Fischer notes, which are common
themes in social history of technology. Indeed, we see the alienating and liberating themes in
discussion of impacts of broadband and other ICTs (information and communication
technology). Fischer (1992) concludes that:
[W]hile a material change as fundamental as the telephone alters the
conditions of daily life, it does not determine the basic character of that
life. Instead, people turn new devices to various purposes, even ones that
the producers could hardly have foreseen or desired. As much as people
adapt their lives to the changed circumstances created by the new
technology, they also adapt that technology to their lives. The telephone
did not radically alter American ways of life; rather, Americans used it to
more vigorously pursue their characteristic ways of life. (p. 5)

190

Fischer emphasizes the importance of considering both first- and second-order consequences of
technology: the effect for or on the user, and what widespread use means for others. For ICTs in
general, and broadband in particular, scholars see these effects in terms of two paradoxes.

The Productivity Paradox
Solow (1987) pointed out the first paradox, “You can see the computer age everywhere
but in the productivity statistics” (p. 36). The rationale for investing in ICTs is that they make
organizations more productive, profitable, and successful. Research supports this rationale
(Mahmood and Mann, 1993; Melville, et al., 2007), particularly for specific industries and with
specific technologies (Mukhopadhyay, et al., 1997; McAfee, 2002; Bartel, et al., 2007). These
effects were not evident to Solow—an eminent economist—in 1987 because ICTs require
learning, and learning takes time. Consequently, the benefits from ICTs tend to lag behind the
costs.
Productivity tends to decrease immediately after deployment before rising above pre-ICT
(information and communication technology) levels (Attewell, 1992; Nilsson, 1995; Greenwood,
1999; Lee and Barua, 1999; McAfee, 2002). This gives the cost/benefit curve for ICTs look
much like the diffusion learning curve, discussed above. The steeper the curve, the stronger the
return on ICT investment is, and the greater the gain in organizational performance.
What factors determine whether ICTs increase performance and improve outcomes?
Organizations that utilize ICTs tend to have integrated products and services, complex and
informal structures, melding of technical and manual jobs, and participative management (Burris,
1998; Wozny & Regli, 1996; Vizard & Neel, 2000; Black & Lynch, 2001). Organizations that
invest in ICTs tend to be smaller and less vertically integrated, and have closer working
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relationships with a relatively smaller set of suppliers (Reddi, et al., 1993; Brynjolfsson, et al.
1994). Organizations in diverse, dynamic industries realize greater benefits from ICTs than those
in highly concentrated, static industries (Melville, et al., 2007), as do organizations from
advanced economies as opposed to those in developing countries (Tam, 1998). Clearly, there are
contextual—including cultural—issues that impact utilization of ICTs, and that are impacted by
it. Organizations must have a form and structure, and be in an environment, that enables them to
capitalize on ICTs.
The organizations that are most successful with ICTs digitize their processes as well as
their products (McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2008). These organizations focus on non-routine
information, delegating routine information tasks to their information systems (Martin, 1999),
and they experiment with various types of ICTs (Haltiwanger, et al., 2003). They have small
production runs and make frequent changes in production (Kelley, 1986, 1994), and have more
customized products. ICT utilization is correlated with higher skill requirements, particularly for
problem-solving and technical skills, and for executives and managers as well as workers
(Swanson 1994; King and Teo, 1994; Thong and Yap, 1995; Mata, et al., 1995; Burris, 1998;
Bartel, et al., 2007). The implication, which is not explicit in the literature, is that firms that
benefit from ICTs are not low-quality commodity producers who compete solely on cost. Firms
that benefit from ICTs are flexible yet specialized, with highly collaborative and knowledgeable
employees that compete on the basis of relationships, quality, and uniqueness.
The broad conclusions are that ICTs do drive economic growth, particularly increases in
labor productivity (Oliner and Sichel, 2000), but “the business value of computers is limited less
by computational capability and more by the ability of managers to invent new processes,
procedures and organizational structures that leverage this capability” (Brynjolfsson and Hitt,
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2000, pg. 24). The quality of information, service, and system determine the net benefits of ICTs
via use and user satisfaction (DeLone and McLean, 2003), but the use has to be appropriate to
the competitive environment (Soh and Markus, 1995). Return on ICT investment is increased by
assuring that executives, technologists, and users share reasonable assumptions and expectations
for the technology, and by having focused goals for ICT investment that aligns with the
organization’s strategic goals (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994; Tallon, et al., 2001)
The later research discussed here (McAfee, 2002; Bartel, et al., 2007; Melville, et al.,
2007; McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2008) suggests that the competitive environment itself is
experiencing fundamental changes enabled by ICTs. Popular business press books reiterate and
expand this thesis. One of the earliest such books, Re-inventing the Corporation (Naisbitt and
Aburdene, 1985), argued that the very nature of organizations and work was going to change
from the bottom up, driven by ICTs. The predicted changes weren’t about ICTs—many, such as
fostering employees’ personal growth and paramount importance of quality, seem to have little
to do with ICTs. It is a broader shift in the environment, enabled by ICTs, that is driving these
changes. Naisbitt and Aburdene’s predictions are borne out in ways that even they could likely
not have imagined, as documented in books such as A Whole New Mind (Pink, 2005), The Spider
and the Starfish (Brafman and Beckstrom, 2006), Wikinomics (Tapscott and Williams, 2006),
Here Comes Everybody (Shirky, 2008), and Tribes (Godin, 2008). By decentralized and open
organizations that tap their customers’—as well as employees’—capabilities, organizations are
able to solve intractable problems, radically reduce costs, and create innovations and new
knowledge. These improvements enable the organizations to overturn markets and traditional
market leaders. All of this is because ICTs reduce the need for formal organizational structure.
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In sum, the literature reviewed above makes some bold propositions about the impacts of
ICTs. The literature suggests that ICTs are not just tools for increasing productivity, or even for
changing what is produced—although use of ICTs is having these effects. ICTs are changing the
way production is carried out and even very concept of what it means to produce, according to
this literature. ICTs are being integrated into organizations as transparent infrastructure (Star,
1999) even as they transform the organization. The literature suggests that to fully benefit from
ICTs, organizations must fundamentally change the way they do business by eliminating
hierarchy, opening up to customers, developing intangibles assets, and, most of all, focusing like
a laser beam on customer-defined quality. ICTs do not invariably lead to these changes; they
enable such changes when coupled with willingness to learn and disciplined, visionary
leadership.

The Internet Paradox
The internet paradox, as discussed by Kraut, et al. (1998, 2002), occurs when use of
internet technology, which is presumably social, causes depression and loneliness. The internet
was predicted to engage and mobilize citizens (and consumers), but in more fragmented manner
independent of existing institutions (Bimber, 1998; Calhoun, 1998). Galston (2000) worried over
autonomy versus connection, and whether online communities had limited membership, shared
norms, affective ties, and a sense of mutual obligation. Exit is too easy online to drive
development of mutual obligation or personal voice, and there will be scant acknowledgement of
authority.
Early results showed that the combination of face-to-face and online communication
builds stronger community than either approach alone (Etzioni & Etzioni, 1999; Hampton &
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Wellman, 2000). Community-related internet content emerged from non-profit, governmental,
and commercial sources, but the technology did not build social capital or increase civic
participation (Tonn, Zambrano & Moore, 2001). The internet makes it easy extend and maintain
social connections (Howard, Rainie & Jones, 2001), especially to reach those “just out of reach”
(Hampton & Wellman, 2001). Internet use does not decrease or increase attachment to place or
civic involvement, but does increase communication and social interaction (Katz, Rice, &
Aspden, 2001; Kavanaugh & Patterson, 2001; Stern, 2006).
These things hold especially for the tech-savvy, who tend to be more involved (Howard,
Rainie & Jones, 2001; Kavanaugh & Patterson, 2001; Stern, 2006). People with greater
participation and more connections are more likely to use internet because they are better off,
more educated, and younger (Nie, 2001; Stern, 2006). Those who are online the least and the
most tend to be less involved and committed than those who balance online and face-to-face
(Wellman, Haase, Witte & Hampton, 2001).
“Explaining Internet behaviors entails understanding that the Internet is not a separate
entity but instead a (potential) complement to ongoing activity” (Haythornthwaite, 2001, p. 379).
In re-examination of the Internet paradox, any depressive effects seemed associated with initial
frustrations and faded (Kraut, et al., 2002). LaRose, Eastin, and Gregg (2001) found that internet
use could only be connected to depression via self-efficacy, but social support via e-mail reduced
depression.
The internet paradox does not address why people would, or would not, adopt internet,
but the literature implies that the general purpose is to access information and communicate. It
seems that sociability can suffer as one learns ICTs (information and communication
technology), but also those who are pre-disposed to sociability use ICTs more than others. The
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internet paradox literature doesn’t delve into economic issues but it is reasonable to presume this
effect would hold for productive activities and work. Could it be that individual ICT impacts can
be explained by factors similar to those of organizations? Based on the internet paradox
literature, could it be said that flexible yet specialized persons with ability to invent, reasonable
expectations, focused goals, and less need for formal structure would make the most of
broadband.
The internet has real potential to enhance productivity, conclude Litan and Rivlin (2001),
but the greatest impacts may be in “old economy” industries due to changes in information
flows. The internet creates many opportunities for efficiencies in various areas of business
performance, adding 0.2 to 0.4 percent to the economy’s total output according the Litan and
Rivlin. This estimate does not include the value of improved choice and convenience, which may
be even more valuable than productivity gains and lower costs.
Crandall, Jackson, and Singer (2003) estimate the consumer surplus, investment in
broadband infrastructure, and broadband equipment production, but focus on employment and
output for telecommunications providers. Crandall, Lehr, and Litan (2007) find that broadband
contributes to employment in education, healthcare, financial services, and manufacturing.
Pilat and Wolfl (2003) examine the impacts of ICT production and ICT (information and
communication technology) use, as well as ICT diffusion. They delve into explanations for
variation in national investment, factors that firms benefit from ICTs, and how ICTs impact
performance. They find that ICT cost differentials, need for complementary investments, and
regulations impede adoption. ICTs contribute to capital deepening as the replace labor, increase
firm efficiency, and contribute to network effects. The ICT-producing sectors are strongly
impacted by these contributions, and are well-positioned to overcome the impediments. Pilat and
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Wolfl found relatively high productivity growth among ICT-using industries, particularly
business services, finance and insurance, transportation, wholesale trades, and retail.
Lehr, et al. (2005) begin their assessment by noting that broadband affords information
productivity and innovation, complex, non-routine problem-solving, and more intensive use than
dial-up. They also noted that literature on ICTs and productivity focuses on organizations while
broadband policy has focused on residential. Flexible work arrangements, home-based
businesses, higher quality labor force, and higher quality of life could contribute to the impacts
of broadband at home. Their findings confirm the link between internet and economic
development, but “[t]he positive impact on establishment growth was higher for larger
establishments and for IT intensive sectors of the economy” (Lehr, et al., 2005, p. 22).
Broadband boosts employment, productivity, property values and rents, but not wages. Places
with broadband had more businesses per capita but relatively fewer small businesses. They leave
open the question of whether these are short-term, transitory effects, or whether they can be
sustained. They conclude that, “differences in economic outcomes are likely to depend more on
how broadband is used than on its basic availability” (Lehr, et al., 2005, p. 24).
In a cross-country analysis, Quang, Rossotto, and Kimura (2009) found that broadband
impacts knowledge, productivity, and community competitiveness via various sectors. The
technical qualities of broadband, including complementary products, are important to impacts.
Quang, Rossotto, and Kimura maintain that the literature misses the importance of critical mass,
confuses activities and applications with benefits, and has issues with bias and causality. Human
capital as an “impact” of broadband—skill learning-by-doing, dynamic knowledge sharing, and
attracting talent—transcends traditional institutions enabling collective innovation. Quang,
Rossotto, and Kimura found impacts via efficiency and productivity and community
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competitiveness, but emphasized that broadband is “general purpose technology that can
fundamentally restructure the economy” (p. 39). They conclude by emphasizing the need for
complementary investments:
[Broadband’s] benefits are major and robust for both developed and
developing countries, although the significance is higher for the former,
which have a longer track record of broadband diffusion. … Realizing the
benefits of broadband also requires development of new content, services,
and applications, as well as increased human capacity to adopt the
technology in economic activities. (p. 45)
Katz (2009, 2010) also finds that broadband has positive economic impact, which
increases with penetration. ICT investment is associated with broadband penetration, and with
productivity and growth. Broadband is fostering an economic transition, Katz (2009) maintains,
that is strengthening this relationship. “Economic impact varies by region indicating that
broadband deployment needs to be carefully coordinated with economic development policies
(training, firm relocation, etc.) to maximize impact” (Katz, 2010, p. 13).
Applying my B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions)/W7TH (how, that, what, when,
where, who, why, whether, which) framework to the issue of ICT (information and
communication technology) impacts begins with what it is that’s being impacted: Real freedoms.
Human capabilities, as the ultimate ends—improvements in individuals’ liberty, prosperity, and
wellness, provide a philosophically and practically sound basis for evaluating ICT impacts. The
framework allows for multilevel analysis because it applies at all levels—individual/personal,
organizational, and regional. The fundamentally different natures of the levels—cognitive
constructor versus loops of learning versus triple helix—can be translated into real freedoms:
personal fulfillment, organizational performance, and regional advantage. The B-C-V/W7TH
framework also allows adoption and related factors to be related to impacts. With the framework,
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it is more practical to related changes in B-C-V related to (use of) ICTs to more general changes
in B-C-V that indicate real freedoms. More fundamentally, this dissertation suggests that the
difference in adoption and impacts of ICTs for individuals, organizations, and regions can be
explained by the extent to which community input functions were applied to their situations.

Broadband in Greenfield
The most important thing to consider in regards to broadband in Greenfield is the
individual, her or his interests, and how he or she is able to pursue them. Individuals putatively
use broadband for personal, organizational, and regional purposes, and they think and act on
broadband for those purposes. How does broadband impact individuals’ capabilities? What
determines individuals’ adoption of—or just investment in—broadband? How does broadband
relate to fundamental drives? The following describes what might occur, inferred from the
empirical literature reviewed above.
In Greenfield, the scion sees broadband as critical infrastructure and is connected to a
foundation that can be focused on broadband. The visions of the scion and the foundation board
members converge on broadband as a business attractor. And, it could be good for existing
organizations, for improvements in business, education, healthcare, safety, etc. The board
members and many of their peers have no real experience with internet technologies, though, so
they can’t envision applications. They think in terms of computer-, mainframe-, or even paperbased processes. How internet applications enable social interaction is not even a consideration.
And, they do not see economic transformation necessarily as a good thing. They see broadband
as an infrastructure game-changer. The game is industrial attraction.
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For Major Telecom (MT), Greenfield Broadband (GB) is an odd thing. It’s not a gamechanger, but it’s definitely not a standard operation. The Greenfield Regional Foundation (GRF)
put up the capital for the infrastructure (along with state and federal grants), and they cover the
maintenance costs, too. Major Telecom pays the marketing and customer service costs, including
provisioning service and tracking accounts. GB contracts much of the construction and
maintenance to MT. The hybrid fiber and wi-fi network is not something that they—MT’s
directors—are used to; they’ll bring in contractors to do the work. GB doesn’t compete with any
of their existing offerings, and they feel they can convert GB customers to their customers when
the time comes. They see it as project, and as a learning opportunity.
So, who signs up for GB, what do they do with it, and why? In the first three months of
GB’s operations, over 3,000 households and almost 700 organizations sign up. The strongest
response by far (given their portion of the population) comes from young, well-educated
families. When Greenfielders get broadband, they spend time online. For many of them,
particularly those who have little or no exposure to the internet, much of this time is spent
exploring—surfing the web—by searching for people and things of interest to them. GB
(Greenfield Broadband) is used to supplement other media—particularly newspapers and TV
(television), searching for information about artists, authors, recordings, shows, etc.—and
telecommunications. Other uses include finding classmates, old friends, and, relatives;
investigating hobbies; looking for cars, clothes, music, news, and jobs. Much of this is done
alone, although about a quarter of Greenfielders’ time online involves communicating with other
people. There is some social surfing, about 20% of time online, in family and social settings,
particularly young people helping parents and elders to find particular information or use certain
internet features. More experienced users do similar things, but tend to have more distributed and
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extensive social networks so spend more time communicating with distant relations. They also
tend to do more work online, more than do individuals with less internet experience, and spend
more personal time working, due to easy and fast internet access.
This level of adoption and use mirrors the results discussed in the literature. People use
Greenfield Broadband (GB) to do what is meaningful to them, activities they enjoy, pursuing
valued outcomes and fulfilling their commitments and responsibilities. This includes acquiring
resources that are means to valued ends. Some may value GB intrinsically, as something to
experiment with or explore, but even these people will use GB only provides some benefits. GB
must directly or indirectly ameliorate fundamental human drives and motivations. It may be
assumed that people are already responding to their innate drives as best they can. Even if GB or
similar information and communication technologies (ICT) could greatly improve their efforts
and increase capabilities, people are not going to significantly alter their B-C-V without high
levels of certainty (information) about exactly how and how much things will improve. And,
they have to be sure the cost or difficulty of using the technology is fully offset by the benefits of
using it. The costs are not just for the technology, they are the sociocognitive expense—the
attention, time, and relationships—required to benefit from the technology. What we seen in this
scenario is that individuals generally don’t clearly see the personal benefits of GB. Indeed, they
don’t what the benefits might be, or how to realize them.
What about organizational use? Only a few companies sign up for GB right away.
Slightly more non-profits do, but then unsubscribe after a couple months. Most public agencies
sign up for GB, but only one location per agency. To better understand the organizations’
behavior one might conduct case studies, or just do interviews. The basic questions are: What
information and communication technologies (ICTs) does the organization have? What does the
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organization do with ICTs, who uses them, and how to they use and talk about the ICTs? Why do
they have ICTs, and how do they make ICT decisions? Generally, what do Greenfield’s
organizations know about ICTs?
The organizations that sign up already have substantial technology resources, and mainly
sign up to replace more expensive, slower internet access. Greenfield’s organizations, overall,
have limited ICT-related capabilities. They have pockets of expertise. The experts are young,
relatively well educated (associates or bachelors degrees) lower-level employees who report to
older, less-educated managers, often to financial managers who see ICTs as an expense to be
minimized. Greenfield region organizations use ICTs primarily for accounting. Some have ICTs
for sales and order entry through account aging and collections, anything having to do with
money. The larger private companies have more extensive ICT applications for controlling and
designing. They use ICTs to create artistic/technical works or physically manufactured goods.
ICTs are used heavily for administrative, clerical, marketing, and media purposes; all of which
generate digital files. ICTs are also used extensively to control manufacturing machinery,
although a relatively small number of organizations are in manufacturing (ten of the 700
organizational GB (Greenfield Broadband) subscribers were manufacturers). Governmental and
non-profit organizations, with generally less technology than their private counterparts, used it in
much the same way, for accounting.
Organizations with GB see an increase in e-mail and web surfing, but much of it is nonproductive and not work-related. Organizations in the Greenfield region only reallocate a few
resources to ICTs due to GB. Their technology funding stays constant, and they do not
significantly change what technology they are spending money on. The results at the
organizational level can be explained as the results at the personal level: There is little
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understanding of the potential benefits of GB or how to realize those benefits. So, there is little
change in B-C-V at either level as a result of GB.
By the time GB is built, a quarter of the residents of the Greenfield region have e-mail, a
third of which is work e-mail. They are generally aware of online commerce and educational
resources, and they know of internet searching. But, since Greenfield has had only dial up
internet, few people have experienced these things. Over half the households have a computer,
three quarters of which are over three years old. Twenty percent of workers use computers. Use
varies greatly, but computers are used largely for documents and for e-mails. ICTs (information
and communication technology) are used to capture and share information about what people do,
have, and say. Few people in the region have thought about exactly what they might do with
ICTs, and only a few business people have considered that ICTs might enable them to change
how they operate and even what they do.
The use of GB (Greenfield Broadband) in the first three months is almost totally
personal. Individuals reallocate personal time to broadband. On average, GB subscribers spent
10 hours per week online during their first three months, totaling over 1.5 million online hours.
There is also an increase in personal computer ownership and ICT spending. GB subscribers
spent an average of $450 online on hardware and software over the first three months. After the
first three months, GB subscribers pay $45 per month for broadband, so in month four over one
hundred thousand dollars a month flows out of Greenfield to Major Telecom. And, that’s just the
beginning. Subscriptions rates follow the classic diffusion curve (Rogers, 2003) through the first
18 months, leveling out at 60% subscription rate or about fifty-four thousand residential
subscribers. At that point, GB is generating $2.4 million a month for Major Telecom.
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GB subscribers also shifted much of their other spending online. The average Greenfield
household spent $3,000 per month on non-durables. GB households spent $330 online on these
goods, and spent more online in hobbies and travel than non-GB households. Over their first
three months of GB service, initial subscribers spent nearly $2.5 million on non-durable goods.
The same is true for subscribers’ time. Although they were physically in the region, the bulk of
their time spent online involved extra-local activities and relations. Baseball, cats, diets, hiking,
Hummel figurines, and minerals are just a few of the interest Greenfielders explore online. They
also discover online gambling, gaming, and pornography. Subscribers gained competencies from
using GB—learning to find, interpret, and share information. Unfortunately, those competencies
do not do not have work value for most subscribers because they don’t use internet in their jobs.
Fifty subscribers, half with strong technology backgrounds, reported using GB to find jobs
outside the region and plan to leave Greenfield. Greenfielders just kept on doing what was
important to them; GB simply eliminated the constraints of place.
Subsequent subscribers exhibited similar behavior. At the end of 18 months, Greenfield
citizens were spending over $17 million online per month, or some $216 million over a year and
a half. Since very few organizations in the region had an online presence, effectively all of this
money was spent outside the Greenfield region. Along with online purchases of computer
hardware and software and spending on broadband, at the end of 18 months over $240 million
has flowed out of Greenfield due to GB. With an average of 2 users per household spending 10
hours per week online, Greenfielders spent nearly 4.6 million hours per month online, most on
non-local topics.
The effect is that individuals with GB spend less time with family and friends as they
explore and learn the internet. Individuals don’t connect to local organizations online because
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those organizations aren’t online. When individuals buy online, they buy from distant vendors.
They pursue their interests by engaging distant others and finding information from distant
resources. The result is a major shift in Greenfielders’ activities, assets, and attention away from
and out of the region. They discover the possibilities to do and have new things, based on their
prior knowledge, that were limited by availability of information and materials in the region. As
their connections expand via the internet, so do Greenfielders’ visions.
GB (Greenfield Broadband) resulted in a change in Greenfielders’ behaviors,
connections, and visions, derived from their innate drives as persons, organizations, and a region.
The simplest way to see this is by looking at how Greenfielders spend their time and money.
With GB, they simply pursued pre-existing interests via new means. This took them out of the
region, economically and socially if not physically. They found new possibilities based on their
interests, possibilities that were more beneficial or desirable, or both, than possible activities and
assets near Greenfield. GB users found new, non-local sources of information and material, and
then they spent their money and time on/with these sources. Greenfielders found personal
fulfillment via GB independent of their organizations and region. That’s about individuals;
organizations were different.
GB meant only incremental, at most, changes in organizational connections and visions.
The changes in collective behavior did not extend much beyond subscribing to GB, and some,
such as personal web surfing on company time, were not good for organizations’ purposes.
Organizational vision saw the downside of broadband more clearly than the upside, and GB did
not impact their information and materials. GB simply didn’t affect organizations’ capital and
labor, their assets and activities. At the regional level, GB was an infrastructure enhancement,
but a relatively small one in comparison to transportation, utilities, and other traditional
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infrastructure. The B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions) of regional institutions—as evidenced
in businesses, churches, hospitals, schools—does not change, either. General interest in
Greenfield as a business location increases due to GB, but no company opens or expands because
of it. There is only minor improvement in regional advantage. So, individuals use GB to find
fulfillment, and leave behind organizations and the region in the process, which also deprives
others in the region of financial, human, and social capital.
Individuals’ vision for GB (Greenfield Broadband) gained on the topside. Prior to GB
Greenfielders didn’t know what was possible because internet functions were not practical
without high-speed access. GB eliminated a bandwidth constraint, and it eliminated a place
constraint on information. Increased availability of information enabled individual behavioral
change. Organizations, in contrast, gained no information regarding the topside, about how
internet technology might benefit them or about why, when, and under what circumstances the
internet is desirable.
The analysis here is the W7TH—how, that, what, when, where, who, why, whether, and
which knowledge elements, or knoels—of individuals’ personal, organizational, and regional BC-V. GB subscribers saw major personal B-C-V change; as organizations, they did not.
Organizations, with particular purposes, could not see the benefit—particularly vis-à-vis the
costs—while persons’ diverse interests were better served by the technology. Early adopters
faced low personal costs relative to organizations in both direct technology costs and soft costs
of using GB. What appeared as a limiter to organizations—personal use of the internet—was a
driver for individuals. Organizations’ structure—capital assets, division of labor, processes,
etc.—did not change as a result of GB. At the regional level GB entailed an objective physical
change in infrastructure assets but no concomitant change in institutions. GB did not impact the
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region’s rules, roles, or resources; at least, not in a directly observable manner. Regional leaders
sought to attract business investment and create jobs, but GB ended up enabling reallocation of
personal money and time to things outside the region. Essentially, GB functioned as a sump
pump, pulling personal financial and social capital out of Greenfield.
The dependent variable that I posit is capabilities as evident in liberty, prosperity, and
wellness. In the absence of community-learning, how did GB impact Greenfielder’s capabilities?
It was most useful for the relatively young, affluent, and well educated residents of Greenfield.
GB increased ability to associate with others, access to information, and opportunity for selfexpression. There was some concern about privacy and government surveillance, but not enough
to stop people who want to be online. Those who wanted to be online saw some boost in
prosperity, too, either from purchasing something at lower cost, reducing commuting and other
work expenses, or finding a better job. GB users gained some competencies with internet
technologies and communications, which were useful in finding a job in a few cases. Wellness
was a wash because some people did find useful diet, exercise, or other health information but
GB users also increased sedentary activities. Most of this happened at the personal level.
Clearly, this scenario is not what was intended by “if you build it, they will come.” Of
course, this is not an account of actual events; it is a consideration of what might happen if a
region were to suddenly get broadband. The point of this illustration is that it’s not what you
have (or say) that matters; it’s what you do. And, community is the means by which we discover
what to do, as a person, an organization member, and a region resident. The “build it and they
will come” metaphor that guided Greenfield Broadband (GB) does not consider this.
Consequently, there were few and weak community-input functions within the region, linking
individuals to each other and to regional organizations. There was limited learning, few real
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gains in capabilities or improvements in real freedoms, and those were realized by going outside
the region. Those who instigated GB so fully internalized the “build it and they will come”
metaphor into their vision that they were not fully conscious of it. They had no cause (model or
stimulus) to question the metaphoric assumption or its implications.
Essentially, what occurred at the personal and organizational level also occurred at the
regional level: institutions used GB to keep doing what they were already doing rather than as a
way to do new things, let alone to accomplish new ends. This is what existing theory would
predict, and an extension of what has been found in empirical literature. But, because of the gaps
between single-level theories of learning, and because of academic and practical difficulties of
studying multilevel phenomena, there are scant means to predict what might happen if learning
were to be aligned across and between levels. I maintain that the phenomenon that enables the
structural changes necessary for substantive learning is community, or the emergence of
community via iterated sequences of identification, integration, and differentiation.
In scenario two, below, I consider what might occur if those involved intentionally build
community and facilitate substantive learning across levels. As with scenario one, the second
scenario is an illustration of my propositions that is purely fictional and involves some unlikely
occurrences. Where the first scenario acts as the “control group” for my thought experiment—in
which there is an absence of community-learning—the second scenario is an illustration what
might occur with community-learning. In the first scenario, the roles and actions of the tractor
industry scion, Greenfield Regional Foundations, and Major Telecom as instigators require some
suspension of disbelief. But, once one accepts how the scenario was instigated, the results are
quite reasonable, albeit totally fictional. Similar is true of scenario two: The premise might be
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dubious, but the results, given the premise, have verisimilitude. First, though, let us consider how
scholars might research GB in this first scenario.

Researching Scenario One
Above, I discuss scenario one, in which Greenfield gets broadband with no communitybuilding, omnisciently. If this were a real research project, the information I provide would have
to be gathered and analyzed by researchers. So, let’s say this is the case: In scenario one, a team
of university researchers studies the impacts of GB (Greenfield Broadband). How would they do
this? First, they would have to define what they are researching, their variables. Clearly, one set
of variables relate to GB. Let’s say the researchers are interested in signing up for and using GB.
Going from the literature, we can see this as a dependent variable—what factors determine
whether one subscribes to GB and/or how much one uses it—or as an independent variable—
what are the effects of subscribing to and/or using GB.
Whether researchers are interested in effects or factors, it will be necessary for them to
specify whether the effects/factors of interest are economic, organizational, psychological,
sociological, etc. Of course, this may be implicit in the researchers’ academic disciplines, or they
may opt to study effects/factors at multiple levels. The former situation is pervasive in the
literature, so let’s just say that the researchers for scenario one are interested in effects. This
implies that GB is the independent variable. Researchers must further specify whether this is
simply subscribing to GB, or whether it’s amount of time spent on GB and/or for what purposes.
And, they must specify the unit or level of analysis: individual, household, firm, etc.
The researchers are looking at both households and organizations. So, the researchers are
essentially asking, “what is the impact of GB on households and organizations?” To answer this
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question, researchers cannot simply compare non-subscribers to subscribers because it could
very well be that these two groups are systematically different. Instead, researchers would need
to observe households and organizations prior to GB and after subscribing to GB (ideally at
multiple intervals since, based on theory, effects are expected to lag treatment). The researchers
also need to control for systematic differences between subscribers and non-subscribers—i.e.,
effects are not due to GB, per se, but to other factors that cause the subjects to take up the
service. The simplest way to address this is to ignore it, and to look only at GB subscribers, but it
requires a set of assumptions that may be difficult to explain let alone justify. It also requires
ante facto knowledge of who will and will not subscribe.
For scenario one, researchers can address these issues by selecting a random cohort of
households and organizations to study. There are several issues here. First, the researchers must
know well in advance about plans for GB. Second, presuming they must have a reasonably
complete list of households and organizations, the researchers must make sure that there is not a
systematic non-participation bias. For example, households of low socioeconomic status and
struggling organizations may be highly unlikely to participate. The researchers in this thought
experiment deal with this by oversampling households and organizations with characteristics
might cause them to not participate. The researchers also work to make sure their cohort reflects
Greenfield’s population in important ways, particularly demographics and line of business.
The researchers also need to define exactly what they are measuring. For the ultimate
dependent variable, they focus on income—earnings for households and revenue for
organizations—as an indicator of capabilities. They then use a simple model of household and
organization operations to develop independent and intervening variables. The model consists of
acquiring resources, processing those resources, and generating income. The researchers use
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qualitative methods (interview) to create case studies for randomly selected members of the
cohort to describe them prior to adopting GB. They also use these case studies, along with
relevant literature, to create metrics, which they measure via survey to produce quantitative data
nine months after subjects subscribe to GB and then again after the free subscription runs out at
the end of eighteen months. Essentially, the surveys ask how much household/organization
members spend on GB and other ICTs (information and communication technology), how the
technologies are used, and what impact that usage has on the costs or income related to those
tasks. And, along with the surveys, researchers conduct follow-up interviews to more fully
describe the uses and impacts. This is a pretty standard, and expensive, approach, which is
academically valid but has limited practical value (see, for example, Borgida, et al. (2002) and
Youtie, Shapira & Laudeman (2007)).

Higher Education
The second scenario for Greenfield Broadband (GB) is even more hypothetical than the
first. Scenario two doesn’t just involve a region just deploying its own broadband—which is not
too unusual, although the rapidity and means of deployment in scenario one are unprecedented—
it also involves universities partnering to supporting a learning process in conjunction with this
deployment. Universities offer classes about business and technology relevant to a broadband
project, and professors conduct research into the impacts of technology. But, it is admittedly
unlikely that three universities would work together to support a regional broadband project,
especially without funding. Regardless of the unlikelihood of such an occurrence, I maintain that
the resulting events are quite reasonable. Indeed, I am suggesting that a different approach by
universities might have huge positive effects. The next subsection substantiates both the need for
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and possibilities of innovation by universities. Having said that, I should restate that the
scenarios I present here are entirely fictional meant to illustrate the theory I propose in this study,
to suggest how my conceptual framework can help explain learning across social levels.
An Impending Crisis?
Many universities are facing financial problems, with a shrinking portion of escalating
costs going to classroom instruction, especially at research universities, tuition rising faster than
incomes, and a growing gap between elite universities and those that serve the majority of
students (Vedder, 2010). State budget shortfalls are squeezing public universities (Colindres,
2009; Boehnke, 2010)—but private universities are also feeling the pinch (Jan, 2010)—even
“revenue generating” program such as athletics are being squeezed (Humphreys, 2010). Forprofit universities are being criticized for their business practices and results (Lewis, 2007;
Marklein, 2010). While college enrollment is at an all-time high (Rampell, 2010), the degree
completion rates are too low and time to completion too long (Bound, Lovenheim, & Turner,
2007; Lumina Foundation, 2010).
A number of commentators see deeper issues with higher education. At a recent
UNESCO world conference on higher education a researcher suggested that we are in the midst
of “an almost unprecedented revolution in higher education—not just small changes around the
edges, but fundamental changes” (Redden, 2009, paragraph 3). Others see more than change,
they see calamity: a higher education “bubble bursting” (Barone, 2010), going extinct (Sines,
2009; Lipton, 2010), melting down (Godin, 2010), or just becoming irrelevant (Hanson, 2008).
None other than Bill Gates of Microsoft predicts that the technologies will make place-based
colleges good for little more than parties (Young, 2010).
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While finances are a factor, these observers see other root causes. Technology could
increase access and quality. Instead, costs are rising as educational technology leaps ahead and
quality is slipping as more people enter higher education (Barone, 2010; Redden, 2009; Vedder,
2010). College experiences in and out of the classroom bear less and less resemblance to
students’ life experiences (Hanson, 2008), and college degrees fail to keep pace with the
evolving needs of employers (Schwartz, 2006), while academic disciplines are increasingly
fragmented and disconnected from each other (Hollingsworth, 1986; Rowland, 2002; Weislogel,
2008). Best selling author and internet marketing expert Seth Godin, enumerates what he sees as
the core problems:
1. Most colleges are organized to give an average education to average students. ... They
are mass marketers ... emphasizing mass and sameness and rankings.
2. College has gotten expensive far faster than wages have gone up. ... As a result, there
are millions of people in very serious debt.
3. The definition of ‘best’ is under siege ... The more applicants [universities] reject, the
higher they rank
4. The correlation between a typical college degree and success is suspect.
5. Accreditation isn't the solution, it’s the problem ... uniform accreditation programs
that have pushed high-cost, low-reward policies on institutions and rewarded schools
that churn out young wanna-be professors instead of experiences that turn out leaders
and problem-solvers. (2010, paragraphs 3 - 13)
The functions and functioning of higher education is a regular blog topic for Rich
DeMillo (2009), Distinguished Professor of Computing and Management at Georgia Tech,
former Dean of the Georgia Tech College of Computing, and technology entrepreneur and
executive. He maintains that:
There are no statistical control charts for higher education, and models borrowed from
manufacturing and social science are leading college administrators seriously astray. The
real disruptors are MIT’s Open Courseware, peer-to-peer tutoring ... , social networking
sites like Atlanta’s OpenStudy.com, and online exchanges. These are the worlds that are
colliding, and if they do, the next economic bubble to burst will be American higher
education. (2009, paragraph 9)
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DeMillo (2010a) sees the ephemeralization of higher education—disassociating the learning
content from the physical place and experience—as inevitable and desirable, at least for the first
couple years of general education requirements. He derides the majority of universities for not
doing a better job of graduating researchers to fuel America’s innovation engine (DeMillo,
2010b). Most traditional universities cannot—but must—face the possibility of their extinction,
maintains another Georgia Tech professor, Dick Lipton (2010), and fundamentally change their
functions, focusing on what they can do better than non-traditional universities: advanced
degrees, innovation, and research. Lipton, too, echoes Gates (Young, 2010) when he notes the
traditional universities may be better at networking and socializing student, but not at basic
education.
Economic historian and director of the Center for College Affordability and Productivity
at Ohio University, Richard Vetter (2010) notes that, “[b]ig change is being resisted at all costs”
and dismisses talk about “the 3 ‘A’s”—access, affordability, and accountability—as “rhetorical
flourishes” (paragraphs 11-12). Instead, he calls for more “attention to the three ‘I’s—
information, incentives, and innovation” (paragraph 12). Universities have far too little
information about their performance, he insists, pointing out that “[f]or a sector that worships
research, the amount of money devoted to R and D towards improving higher education
performance is pathetic” (paragraph 12). Vetter calls for incentives to be aligned with goals,
rewarding professors who teach a lot and well, administrators who streamline operations,
development that doesn’t compromise principles for funding, and universities that admit students
rather than turn them away. Increased information and realigned incentives will result in better
and more innovations, according to Vetter.
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The Innovation Imperative
Many in and out of academia see the fundamental, structural issues facing higher
education. The general solution is innovation: a profoundly new and radically different approach,
or the process transforming knowledge into improved or new products and services. Higher
education needs innovation even as universities are seen as critical to innovation. In a knowledge
economy innovation is the economic imperative, and society is the overall beneficiary of the
imperative. Unfortunately, many are left out of the knowledge society (David & Foray, 2002),
and many are displaced by transition to a knowledge-based economy, particularly those with less
education and fewer skills (OECD, 1996; Powell & Snellman, 2004). Thus, universities have
roles as a consumers, generators, and supporters of innovation.
Innovations, as things, evolve via variation and selection in their environments, Nelson
and Winter (1977) tell us. “Most innovations … especially the successful ones, result from a
conscious, purposeful search for innovation opportunities,” Drucker (1985, pg. 5) maintains.
Innovations do not necessarily come from producers, points out von Hippel (1988), they can
come from those who use the innovation or those who supply components, as well as those who
manufacturer the innovation. Not only is innovation a distributed process, it often involves
informal know-how trading between firms, even competitors (von Hippel, 1988). Inter-firm
networks—which can be seen as an alternative to hierarchies and markets—are essential to
producing and capitalizing on innovations, particularly during periods of rapid growth;
domination by a single large organization can impede innovation (Freeman, 1991). Abernathy
and Clark (1985) look at innovation as a contingent and evolving process, based upon interplay
between competitors and their customers in the market place.
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The ability of an organization to recognize a useful innovation and incorporate it into
practices or processes depends on prior collective knowledge, according to Cohen and Levinthal
(1990):
[P]rior knowledge includes basic skills or even a shared language but may also include
knowledge of the most recent scientific or technological developments in a given field.
… [It] confers an ability to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and
apply it to commercial ends. These abilities collectively constitute what we call a firm’s
“absorptive capacity.” (pg. 128)
Optimal absorptive capacity requires a balance between diverse, specialized knowledge
unique to individuals and generalized knowledge common to all. Failure to invest absorptive
capacity early and continually, say Cohen and Levinthal (1990), can result in “lock-out” from
particular technology, intentional ignorance of “not invented here” new technologies, and selfreinforcing reactive innovation and under-investment in knowledge. It can be nearly impossible
to explore new markets and technologies while exploiting existing ones (March, 1991).
Innovation depends on “a set of institutions that will allocate resources appropriately over
a wide range of circumstances and time” (Nelson & Winter, 1977, pg. 40), and “underlying
technologies, the nature of the demands for the goods and services, and the characteristics of the
organizations supplying them” (pg. 41). Chapter 1 of this dissertation features a review of
literature on learning regions (Florida, 1995), the concept of innovation as interactive learning
(Morgan, 1997; Cooke, 2002), and the triple helix metaphor (Etzkotwitz & Leydesdorff, 1997;
Etzkowitz, 2008). Place is important to innovation because it allows for dense, intense, and
supportive interaction across sectors (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Porter, 2003; Asheim, 2003; Breznitz
& Taylor, 2010).

216

Universities can interpret the innovation imperative in two ways. The most explicit
interpretation is that regions and organizations need higher education to meet this imperative.
Individual firms or small clusters of firms can innovate, but it simply isn’t practical for a region
to support innovation across multiple firms without a university. The second interpretation is that
universities need their regional neighbors in order to innovation. Universities need to learn from
and with other strands of the triple helix at least as others need universities’ resources. Indeed, a
primary driver of universities’ need to innovate is the need of governments and industries (and,
individuals) for innovation support.
Table 4 Approaches to Fostering Innovation

•
•
•

•

Open Innovation
(Chesborough, 2006)
External ideas and means to market
Entrepreneurs and outsourcing
o “Laboratories”
Internal venture capital
o Intellectual capital as well as
financial
Mobility and knowledge markets

•

•
•
•

Strategic Innovation
(Christensen, 1997/2006)
New customers and new
technologies
o Starting at the “bottom” of the
market
Learning and “theory testing”
Internal start-up
Different people, policies, processes,
purposes, etc.

Organizing to innovate. Two complementary approaches to fostering innovation emerged
out of, and explicate, the concepts and issues discussed above (see table 4, above). The first
approach, introduced by Christensen’s The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997/2006), is to explore
disruptive innovations by methodically testing new business models to deliver new value to new
customers in new ways, and is referred to as “strategic innovation” (Govindarajan & Trimble,
2005). The innovator’s dilemma is basically the problem identified by March (1991) of
exploitation and exploration being mutually exclusive. Christensen (1997/2006) details why this
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is true even—especially—for well-managed organizations: exploiting and exploring are different
competencies. Technologies can develop faster than markets, and keeping close to customer can
cause organizations to miss innovation opportunities. Similarly, competence at delivering
incremental innovations can blind organizations to disruptive innovations.
Christensen (1997/2006) maintains that firms are embedded in “value networks” that
parallel market architect—who supplies what components to whom to create value—and
constrain capabilities to develop technologies, tolerate failure, produce goods, and make money.
Disruptive technologies are antithetical to existing value networks, even to the point of
threatening existing power relations. They involve wholly different value networks in providing
simple and inexpensive means of achieving valued outcomes that are difficult and expensive
with existing products. More fundamentally, the information required by firms to make
reasonable decisions about disruptive innovations simply does not exist, particularly in existing
value networks. For these reasons strategic innovation necessarily involves creating a separate,
independent, and fully resourced unit.
Govindarajan and Trimble (2005) discuss “CoreCo” and “NewCo,” with the former being
the existing company and the latter created to explore some disruptive innovation. They suggest
that NewCo must simultaneously “forget” CoreCo’s practices, processes, and even values,
“borrow” CoreCo’s expertise, supply chain, etc., and learn about the new technology/customer
set. This is a difficult proposition, to say the least, but will give NewCo a competitive advantage
over its competitors. CoreCo provides scaffolding for NewCo’s network, providing a base of
prior knowledge to draw on but also the opportunity to develop new knowledge via acquisition,
experience, and observation. Kim and Mauborgne (2005) maintain that the fundamental goal is
creation of new, unique benefits for consumers at a low cost; they call this “value innovation.”
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The key, they maintain is “fair process,” including engaging stakeholders in decision-making,
explaining the situation fully, including financial and operational issues, and being clear about
what stakeholders can expect to result (and actually following through on those expectations).
Such process allows strategic innovation by existing or start-up firms. Govindarajan and Trimble
(2005) suggest “theory-focus planning,” which involves developing hypothetical propositions
about how the new business works then methodically testing those propositions, as the
fundamental practice of strategic innovation. Indeed, the very purpose of NewCo is to provide a
laboratory for conducting such tests. Note that fair process and theory-focused planning are
complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
The second approach to fostering innovation is open innovation. “Open Innovation
means,” Chesbrough (2006, pg. 43) tells us, “that valuable ideas can come from inside or outside
the company and can go to market from inside or outside the company as well” (pg. 43). This
seems so apparent and simple, particularly in light of the literature discussed above, but it is a
remarkable break with previous “closed” practices. The key to achieving open innovation,
according to Chesbourgh (2006), is to practice R&D as knowledge connection rather than
knowledge creation, particularly by learning from customers but also by contributing to erstwhile
competitors. Another aspect of open innovation is fully engaging internal personnel in the
innovation process via intrapreneurship, shop floor innovation, and participative management
(Pinchot, 1986; Nonaka, 1998; Ichniowski, et al., 2000).
Generally, open innovation is enabled by the Internet and related technologies. These
technologies make it nearly costless to involve almost anyone in producing knowledge, to do so
in an ad hoc, highly flexible and responsive manner, and to do so from most anywhere, or
everywhere (Shirky, 2008; Godin, 2008; Friedman, 2005). The organizational model for open
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innovation is not new (see, for examples, Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006), but it can now be done
on a much larger scale (see, for examples, Friedman, 2005, and Tapscott & Williams, 2006).
Tapscott and Williams (2006) suggest that open innovation enabled by the internet is forming the
basis for a new, networked economic structure based on collaboration and cooperation rather
than competition. The hallmark is providing critical data to which anyone might add value—as
they see it—along with a means and rationale for doing so (e.g., software tools and monetary
rewards). Gladwell (2002), Brafman and Beckstrom (2006), and Godin (2008) all discuss the
dynamics of highly open, idea-oriented organizations. Essentially, this involves empowering
others to act together based on a reasonably simple set of practices and principles, and providing
a “court of last option” for resolving disputes.
Universities can capitalize on open innovation and strategic innovation (summarized in
table 1) by evolving from their origins as knowledge warehouses, through functioning as
knowledge factories, to acting as knowledge hubs (Youtie & Shapira, 2008). The literature
reviewed above suggests that universities could foster innovation by building knowledge-based
communities (Lave & Wegner, 1991; Voosen & Conneely, 2005) of individuals and
organizations to flexibly build on unique local ordinary knowledge by connecting it to global
specialized knowledge. Open innovation and strategic innovation provide approaches for
developing such a community-based approach to innovation.
In terms of the B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions)/W7TH (how, that, what, when,
where, who, why, whether, which) framework, higher education is a situation in which the B-CV of students, faculty, and administration are complementary but misaligned. The expressed
vision is scholarship in support of democracy and freedom, but the enacted connections are for
fun, standing, and power. These functions are not particularly valuable outside higher education.
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Thus there are internal and external inconsistencies with higher education, and the underlying
elements are set up to maintain if not increase those inconsistencies. The fundamental issue
seems to be that higher education is simply too closed and inflexible. The risk is that it will
become less useful as an institution and will wither in relevance. The solution—greater openness
and responsiveness—can be seen in open and strategic innovation, but comes from community.
In spite much rhetoric to the contrary, universities are networks and organizations, but not
communities to the extent that each is pursuing her or his own interests but not the collective,
long-term interests of the institution. In other words, higher education has a lot to learn if it is
going to thrive in the 21st century.

Thought Experiment: Linking Broadband and Higher Education
Now I will suggest what might happen in and around the fictitious city of Greenfield,
Georgia, if universities were involved as facilitators of community-learning about broadband.
Imagine that early in this scenario, the scion of the Greenfield Regional Foundation (GRF)
attends a conference on innovation and higher education, and listens to a panel of universities in
the southeast. Three of the six panelists happen to be from major universities in metropolitan
areas about an hour and a half drive from Greenfield. The panelists are discussing knowledge
networks and learning communities as means to foster innovation, and how universities can
capitalize on this. At the end of the discussion, the scion stands up and asks, “We’re building a
regional broadband network. Could your universities create learning communities to help us
make the most of it? How might it help your universities to help us?”
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The Identification Function
The scion’s question illustrates the identification function. The scion recognizes a
potential support mechanism for her region. The panelists, all tenured chairs or directors,
recognize an opportunity. They and their colleagues need to do research, and prefer to teach
small, high-level classes. The value of the opportunity to the panelists depends on how
Greenfield Broadband (GB) aligns with their objectives—tactical, as much as strategic—whether
there is financial support and the universities competitive stances. The panelists envision positive
valence from connection to the scion, and their competitive connections to each other do not
allow them to capitulate. Thus, their behavior is to jointly solicit more information from the
scion.
The Greenfield Regional Foundation (GRF) has just committed the seed funding for the
broadband network, regional institutions and organizations are being enlisted, and GRF is
looking for a private partner—the easiest option seems to be basically just contracting with
Major Telecom to build and run the network. But, the foundation board members realize that
there are various non-traditional ways to deploy broadband. GRF is looking for approaches that
will have maximum impact. Does this connection change the behavior (and vision) of the
universities? It depends on the amounts and types of information and materials that flow from
GRF to the universities, and vice versa. This flow might consist of prestige and research funding
for the individuals. If they see those resources as adequate for their purposes and appropriate to
their institutions, then they have fully identified with GRF and the scion.
The strength of the identification function is seen in how behavior changes, implying
changes in connections and visions. The valence of connections and the clarity and strength of
vision are evident in behavior. For this scenario, imagine that the universities agree to contribute
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a professor for 18 weeks over two years and two part-time student assistants for 24 months. The
foundation agrees to buy out one course per semester for each professor, cover travel costs, and
provide facilities and materials for the collaborators. The universities propose to create inclusive,
open, peer-based learning communities, focused on getting maximum benefits from broadband.
They initially concentrate on sector-based communities of interest, but agree to help with
whatever focus the participants decide on. There are GB-specific (Greenfield Broadband)
learning opportunities with face-to-face discussions about operational and strategic issues, as
well as about broadband technology. The learning communities are supported by a social media
system that allows participants to stay connected and coordinate between meetings. The GRF
(Greenfield Regional Foundation) commits to engage regional players, and to work with the
universities to seek support from state and federal governments, foundations, and corporations,
particularly ICT companies. With these roles identified, the GRF and universities begin
integrating around GB.

The Integration Function
The integration function occurs as agents attend to models and respond to stimuli by
practicing. In this hypothetical scenario, the professors, scion, and GRF board and staff meet,
identify techniques for tapping local ordinary knowledge and connecting it with global expertise,
and develop “best practices” for participants. The scion encourages the universities to look at this
as innovation in higher education, partly because she sees the need this as a need for GB, and
partly because she recognizes the professors’ needs for research and the students’ needs for real
world education. The professors, scion, GRF board members, and others (the GB “partners”)
agree to approach GB development as a regional learning process rather than a regional
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broadband planning process. This means they focus on discovery what can be done with
broadband rather than on building a network or providing internet service. Broadband is
approached as a means to an end, rather than an end in and of itself. The end is to increase
human capabilities, and the goal is to learn.
One of the first learning communities focuses on building a regional broadband network.
Composed of diverse stakeholders, this team looks at numerous other technology projects, not
just broadband projects, as models. It subdivides into teams focused on technical, operational,
and financial aspects of the effort. All the sub-teams come back together in a public session to
present the options. The consensus is to create a cooperatively owned “wholesale” fiber and
wireless (not just wi-fi) network, with entrepreneurial “retailers” selling broadband services. The
universities will get bandwidth and facilities for research projects. Technology companies large
and small will be recruited as partners. The areas (neighborhoods) of the region that demonstrate
the most demand and ability to use broadband will get service first. They decide to organize the
co-op around technical, operational, and financial teams, connected by a strategy team with
members from the other teams. One of GRF’s (Greenfield Regional Foundation) first actions is
to hire persons to lead each of these teams.
The GB (Greenfield Broadband) partners (GRF, GB team leaders, and university
personnel) decide to instigate customer teams for business & industry, government, and nonprofit organizations, and they develop workshops on how to set up neighborhood tech teams.
Each of these teams starts with discussions of participants’ strengths and goals. From this the
partners identify experts and resources aligned with team members’ interests. The partners
encourage the teams to identify problems to solve or projects to undertake using ICTs. So, for
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example, the business & industry team decided to “consult” with one of the members—a
manufacturer—as they choose and implement an enterprise resource-planning (ERP) system.
The neighborhood tech teams are organized via social marketing: People are asked to
host meetings with friends in their homes, churches, bars, etc., to talk about what broadband is
and what it could do for them. What is it that citizens might do with broadband? They say:
searching, shopping, and socializing. People say they wanted to improve their educations, but it
becomes clear that they really want is to increase household income, do meaningful work, and
have plenty of leisure time.
These views cause some concern among the other teams as they realized they do not have
online content and services to meet people’s needs. The other teams realize they need people to
use broadband as citizens, consumers, employees, etc. They also realize that members of the
neighborhood tech teams are associates, friends, relatives, etc. And, as persons, members of the
business & industry, government, and social services teams share the interests of the
neighborhood tech teams’ members. In other words, the sector team members identify with the
neighborhood tech teams members.
Between the input from the neighborhood tech teams and the ideas from expert
connections, the sector teams realize they have to figure out how to create meaningful, useful
content for individuals. The sector teams take their goals to GB partners, with detailed requests
for knowledge. They need to know how to interact with citizens, customers, employees, etc.,
online. They need to know what hardware, software, support, and training their organizations
would need. They need to know how to finance all of this and generate revenue from it, or at
least save some other costs. The sector teams develop shared visions—along with connections
and behaviors—based not so much what they know as what they need to know. In the process
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they become integrated, which is a direct result of identifying with the neighborhood tech team
members.

The Differentiation Function
This is the point at which differentiation hypothetically begins. The actors fall into roles
that allow them to make unique and valuable contributions to the effort. This function, more than
the others, serves innate drives. Differentiation provides maximum capabilities gain.
Identification and integration functions don’t cease. Differentiation is layered on them, and they
are focused and specified. The sector teams, for example, set up formal positions to help team
members and their customers use ICTs. The learning communities begin to formalize around
particular purposes, which align with their formal organizational roles. The GB teams sets up
standardized finance, operations, and tech roles to lead development of GB. Some neighborhood
tech teams get lots of participants pre-subscribed to GB. Others get more motivated and
organized as GB is deployed to the neighborhoods with the strongest teams.
Differentiation doesn’t just serve the needs of the differentiated individuals, as they are
helping or serving others. The citizens of Greenfield, clients, customers, patients, students, etc.,
benefit from differentiation. It improves organizational performance via division of labor,
increases personal fulfillment, and contributes to regional advantage. Differentiation is the
hallmark of strong community. Each community input function results in increased capabilities,
but differentiation is a big leap in drive satisfaction and real freedoms. The individuals that step
into the various roles on each team benefit socially and psychically, if not financially, from their
work, and their work benefits others. They help the region get and use broadband and other
ICTs.
226

Each team is differentiated by its focus and actions. The education-sector team focuses on
success in the classroom, finding curricula, content, and assessment tools. They are also
concerned about engaging parents and getting technology in the hands of all kids. The major
issue for the healthcare sector team is access to and integration of clinical information systems.
Physicians and other professionals are interested in practice management software. They are
aware of the burgeoning and sometimes dubious health information available online, but are
unsure how to deal with this information, let alone capitalize on it. The government team is
primarily focused on geographic information systems (GIS) and fleet management, along with
some interest in citizen services and “digital democracy.” The safety & security team is
concerned with similar issues, but one of their major goals was to get data connections to
ambulances, fire trucks, and police cruisers. They also promote surveillance technologies. The
business & industry team has numerous committees with specific interests—asset management,
computer-aided design, content management, customer relationship management, inventory
management, etc.—and sub-sectors. The cross-cutting interest for all teams is personnel. Where
are they going to find the employees with the capabilities needed to deploy and use these
technologies? And, the teams are all concerned about paying for the technology.
Creation of the teams depends on identification, and collective capacity is precipitated via
integration. Differentiation enables the teams to be successful, as individuals step up and, in their
individual ways, take action toward teams’ purposes. The resources associated with each role
draws in persons and organizations that need the resources. Rules define how to access and
disburse those resources. Identification and integration set the stage for differentiation to emerge
from practice via feedback and reflection. Knowledge about practices, criteria for those
practices, and means for feedback and reflection are implicit in each team’s focus and purpose—
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its whether, which, and why. There is tacit knowledge flowing through the teams about how to
use technology and avoid technological pitfalls, as well as explicit knowledge about the
technology. Each community input function involves explicit knowledge about the teams—who
are the people, what are the purposes, and how do they operate—as well as tacit knowledge
about the teams. Each team has different behaviors, connections, and visions, which are affected
differently by each community input function.

The Impact of Community-Learning on Broadband Adoption and Use
So what are adoption and use of GB (Greenfield Broadband) like in this scenario?
Quantitatively, adoption is similar to scenario one, but it is qualitatively different. The rate of
adoption, for instance, is really the rate of deployment because in this scenario GB is deployed in
response to clear demand. By the time GB construction begins, over half of the residents have
signed up through their neighborhood tech teams. The measured deployment rate was a cost
containment and quality assurance tactic by GB rather than a response to growing demand. The
approach was adopted based on researching successful ICT (information and communication
technology) projects, and because the partners approached GB as a learning process rather than
just a network deployment project.
Use is also qualitatively different. More time online is spent with others in this scenario
than in the first because the teams worked together to create social learning opportunities. The
GB strategic team wanted customer insights and early subscriptions. The sector teams wanted to
make sure Greenfielders are engaged as customers, employees, etc. And, the neighborhood tech
teams wanted Greenfielders to connect via GB because they get a variety of rewards for drawing
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in subscribers. So, numerous stakeholders are aligned—have similar behaviors, connections, and
visions—around Greenfielders getting and benefiting from GB.
The differences between the first scenario and the second are largest at the organizational
level. With the support of the university personnel, organizations around the Greenfield region
invested aggressively in ICTs (information and communication technology) because they learned
what ICTs could do for them. Through the learning process, organizational leaders saw the need
to proactively deploy online content and services, and to develop their organizations’
technological capabilities. The teams offered a wide range of opportunities to gain hands-on
experience with or learn the details of a solution, system, technology, etc. They provided a
highly supportive environment in which different organizations learned together about common
applications. Possibly most important, the teams developed a way to finance ICT investment,
including software, training, web sites, etc. All of this happened as and before GB was deployed,
with assistance from the university partners and technology companies. So, by the time GB was
available, many companies were already digitizing their processes and developing online
systems for interacting with customers, employees, and suppliers. Some of this work was sectorfocused, such as using GB to improve communications for emergency personnel. Other efforts,
such as “Business Basics” training for any person who might use computers at work, were broadbased. The teams spun up groups for techies and for executives to sharpen relevant abilities.
Over one thousand organizations signed up for GB in its first month. On average, within
a month (after or before) signing up, commercial subscribers increased ICT spending by $2,000,
and more than half of that was spent with local companies, representing a $1 million dollar boost
for the local tech economy. Over the 18 months of the initial GB period, this number trended
upward. Organizations were spending an average $4,500 per month. Over $2,000 of this was
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local. The number of organizations subscribed to GB increased quickly, and they increased ICT
spending after subscribing. Organizations reported that ICT enabled them to cut costs, increase
revenue, and launch new products and services, resulting in an average increase of $8,000 per
month per organization. And, Greenfield’s organizations trained existing employees, and hired
more and better-paid personnel, in order to achieve gains by being more productive with ICTs.
A wide range of organizations also helped promote GB, supported training opportunities,
offered special deals on technology. A non-profit umbrella organization, for example, worked
with a number of technology companies to get a bulk discount on computers and web services
for other non-profits, their employees and clients. In focused discussions jointly convened by the
customer sector and neighborhood teams it was suggested that churches, salons, stores, and
taverns were good places to introduce people to the internet. Another suggestion was to recruit
older community members to be internet ambassadors, by giving them computers with high
speed internet access to share with others. The ambassadors could even earn extra cash by
getting people signed up for GB or renting their computers to others. This tactic effectively
transformed the region’s matrons and patrons into entrepreneurial GB retailers. These ideas
didn’t come from the community, per se; community members “stole” the ideas from other
places they researched ICT projects as part of the community-learning process.
The results of community-learning for broadband were that Greenfield citizens figured
out how to use ICTs across levels more rapidly and effectively than in scenario one. More
individuals went online sooner, and uses were more beneficial to, connected with, and embedded
in Greenfield. The critical difference between scenarios was that organizations invested ahead of,
or at least with, households and individuals. While substantial local dollars and time went out of
Greenfield via GB in scenario two, local organizations also used it to export, offer new and
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profitable products and services, and hold their own with locals. In fact, recognizing that ICTs
can enhance but not replace relationships, some Greenfield organizations built deeper and
stronger local customer relationships. These relationships became the basis for innovative
products and services that fueled additional organizational growth.
At a broader level, in scenario two the regional infrastructure was aligned with its
institutions via the process, so that ICTs become embedded in institutional locations like
classrooms, commission chambers, churches, boardrooms, and bars. Traditional leaders are
effectively required to be conversant in the technology and its socioeconomic implications. And,
they are expected to use ICTs, too. Overall the results were a net gain in capital—financial,
human, social, etc.—flowing into the Greenfield region, and significant increase in efficiency,
productivity, profitability, and household income.
This is not to say that there were no problems. It is reasonable to imagine that in scenario
two a third of all ICT projects by organizations had negative or no clear value. Sometimes the
technology just didn’t work, although such incidents were minimized as the community-learning
process vetted particular products and technologies. In most cases of poor return on ICT
investment, the technology exacerbated underlying issues with the organizations. Digitizing
broken processes didn’t fix them, and sometimes made them worse. Two general and often
coincident problems were, one, ICTs made a task or process more difficult, or, two, ICTs were
used to layer a digital process on an analog, manual process without replacing it. The problems
usually weren’t with the technology; the problems were in the organizations. While
implementing organizational solutions using GB, it became clear that many organizations don’t
consciously know their processes, and processes too often don’t align with purpose.
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The two general, hypothetical responses of Greenfield organizations were to learn from
failures and to do things differently—with ICTs—or to use ICTs as an excuse. Another result
was that the sector teams began exploring non-ICT methods for increasing performance. Many
of the teams conducted pilot projects in which one organization implemented a solution with the
help others, in an open, collaborative manner. These experiences enabled individuals at various
levels within an organization to see ICTs in action in other organizations, and to engage each
other about the other organization. Such practices minimized the need for making technology a
scapegoat for flawed organizations, and undermined the validity of such excuses.
Hypothetically, behaviors-connections-visions (B-C-V) changed much more in scenario
two than in scenario one, as a result of identification, integration, and differentiation.
Organizations connected to share information and materials about and via GB and other ICTs.
They developed common and complementary visions for and with the technology. These
connections and visions built on previous behaviors, existing connections, and current visions, to
change in ways that increase capabilities and real freedoms. All of this knowledge came from
building community around GB and ICTs. Individuals experienced increases in their senses of
belonging, influence, needs fulfillment, and shared commitment via GB and the teams that were
not experienced in the first scenario. In other words, individuals in Greenfield had a much
stronger shared sense of community in the second scenario than in the first. The gain in
capabilities and knowledge were much greater, too.
The personal, organizational, and regional prior knowledge, intentions, and motivations
were initially the same in both scenarios. The community input functions—particularly
identification, which fed into subsequent functions—were much stronger in the second. In the
first scenario, individuals were identifying assets and interests outside the region via broadband,
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whereas organizations simply weren’t identifying GB as something for them, nor were they
identifying via the internet. In the second scenario, identification by the scion and the university
personnel was just the start of the community-building process. It led to integration,
differentiation, and cascaded into additional iterations of community functions. As a result the
gains in personal fulfillment, organizational performance, regional advantage, and real freedoms
were greater in the second scenario. Not only that, in the second scenario, these factors become
complementary, feeding and supporting each other, rather than mutually exclusive as in the first
scenario. In the next section, I’ll consider in more detail how this occurred, applying and
illustrating the models I proposed in Chapter 4 in the process.

Applying Community-learning Models to Broadband
The general theory I propose is that community yields learning or, simply, community
makes people smarter. Not only that, I suggest that this theory—or, rather, community—links
personal, organizational, and regional learning. Learning—the phenomenon and process of
acquiring knowledge and increasing capabilities—manifests differently at each level. The
cognitive constructor, loops of learning, and triple helix are metaphors for individual,
organizational, and regional learning, which help us learn how learning operates across levels,
connecting the metaphors. Individuals construct reality to better meet innate drives and to be
personally fulfilled. Organizations engage groups in cyclic actions to improve collective
performance on a particular purpose. Regions afford interactions between business, government,
and university that increase advantages associated with place. Community is necessary,
hypothetically, for all of these things to occur. Community is the independent variable.
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Capabilities are the dependent variable. This is where my theoretical framework makes a
break with many economic and sociological approaches. For community-learning there is an
ultimate good, a fundamental value, and that is human capabilities. As I discussed in chapters 1
and 2, capabilities are evident in our real freedoms, in our liberty, prosperity, and wellness. Real
freedoms are reasonably easy to operationalize, to define in such a way as to be validly
measurable. Perceptions or actions, for example, can tell whether people feel free to associate
with whomever they please or to speak their minds. Data for assessing real freedoms can be
generated by interview, observation, survey, etc., and are both qualitative and quantitative.
The dependent variable is somewhat more challenging. I suggest that community—or, at
least, shared sense of community—arises from three general socio-econo-cognitive functions:
identification, integration, and differentiation. The more people identify, integrate, and
differentiate with others, the stronger community is. And, the stronger community is, the smarter
and more capable people are. The factors of learning are important, but it is the power of these
functions that determines capabilities. The functions are things that people do—actions—that can
be observed. Similarities between individuals and whether they recognize those similarities can
be observed. Individuals adopting, coordinating, and repeating common practices are observable,
as are differentiation activities and results. Indeed, the community input functions are more
amenable to conjecture and testing than the factors (prior knowledge, intention and motivation,
models and stimuli, practice, feedback, and reflection). Now I will apply each of my proposed
models to the thought experiment.
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GB Multilevel Learning Logic Models
In the learning logic model prior knowledge and intentions and motivation are antecedent
factors in the learning process. The value of these factors is determined by the identification
function—the extent to which learners consciously share an interest. Let’s consider a specific
situation in Greenfield, illustrated in figure 10. Various organizations around the region have
capabilities for and interest in geographic topics: assessing taxes, building roads, delivering
materials, handling emergencies, identifying customers, providing water, routing school buses,
etc. In the first scenario, in which Greenfield gets broadband but not community, these interests
are never identified. In the second scenario, actions by the GRF (Greenfield Regional
Foundation) and university partners clearly identify these interests and they identify the common
interests in geographic data, asset management, and improving responsiveness while minimizing

Impacts
7.a. Lauds for
GIS techs and
managers
7.b. Better
management of
resources and
processes
7.c. More reliable
utilities,
increased public
safety, etc.

Figure 10 A Learning Logic Model for the Greenfield Geo-Tech Team

The input factors are the availability of models and stimuli, and practice. The value of
these inputs hypothetically depends on the power of the integration function, the extent to which
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individuals establish common B-C-V (behaviors-connections-visions). The GB (Greenfield
Broadband) partners identify a range of broadband applications for geographic purposes, share
them with the interested individuals, ask them to study them and share the results. They also
work with these individuals to identify what defines performance and drives improvement for
their organizations, particularly as it relates to geographic issues. These discussions require time
and other resources. Even more resources are needed to try things out. For example, a local
utility is deploying a mapping application for making work assignments, managing electrical
infrastructure, and routing trucks. The utilities’ managers ask others to help them evaluate
alternatives and implement a solution. Together with other organizations the utility reduces the
time, money, and risk involved in deploying the mapping application. And, everyone gains
understanding of how to evaluate and implement such applications. All involved also see the
benefits of information and communication technologies (ICTs) more clearly, and learn how to
avoid excess costs of ICTs. All participants do and see these things together, and they come to
have common technologies for addressing their shared interests. They become better integrated
in order to get greater benefits and better control costs.
The outputs of the learning logic model are feedback and reflection, which are essentially
information from others and from self about integration, based on identities. The value of these
outputs are determined by the extent to which individuals can differentiate themselves in the—
what can now be called—community. The Greenfield Geo-Tech Team, as they have come to call
themselves, members are recognized by the sources of their models and stimuli. In other words,
their bosses and trade journals recognize and reward their efforts. The Geo-Tech Team members
feel that they really belong and contribute to something that is important and benefits them and
others.
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Throughout this process, and the learning logic model, the factors and functions have
applied differently at different levels. As persons those involved were responding to their drives,
seeking fulfillment, based on their personal knowledge and capabilities. In the organizational
context, individuals act for organizations’ performance based on organizational purposes,
availability of capital, and division of labor. In the process, individuals are building regional
infrastructure and institutions to construct advantage for everyone in the region. For Greenfield,
this case results in more efficient and effective movement of goods and people. They save time
and money with technology, that they can use for more valued things. They create community,
find fulfillment, and gain real freedoms. Broadband provides a means for these outcomes, but it
was community-building instigated by the GB (Greenfield Broadband) partners—intentionally
conducting community input functions—that cause the gain in capabilities.

GB Multilevel Learning Causal Models
In the causal model, knowledge gain at one level can be independent of, or negatively or
positively correlated to knowledge gain at other levels. My theory suggests that this is because
community can exist—or not—at all levels. (It is this variance in the relationship between levels,
along with different metaphors, that defines them as distinct levels.) But, the greatest levels of
real freedoms arise following increases in community. So, for example, members of the GeoTech Team got promotions and raises (increases in prosperity) and less stress (increases in
wellness) without having to move (increases in liberty) as a result of identifying, integrating
with, and differentiating via their learning community. Incremental gains in capabilities result
from information acquisition, but innovation results from collaboratively processing information
into valuable knowledge. In the following example, I show how such activities redefine the
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relationship between healthcare patients and their providers, as well as making healthcare
practices more efficient.
Consider healthcare in Greenfield. In the first scenario healthcare providers make
incremental investments in ICTs (information and communication technology); doing pretty
much what they’ve always done. The people of Greenfield (patients), at least those who
subscribed to GB, had a new, easy way to find information, specifically health and medical
information. A specific behavior—patients coming to their doctors with information on their
condition printed from the internet—is evidence of new capabilities. This behavioral change is
changes in connections and visions, too. (In my conceptual framework behaviors, connections,
and visions are parts of a system, and therefore have the same information content.) The patient
(person) begins getting information from a different source other than her or his healthcare
providers, and discovers new possibilities for disease as well as diet and exercise.
Now consider the second scenario. In that scenario, healthcare providers are identified via
facilitated learning process. Other than the obvious, these people shared some interest in
cardiovascular disease. It was partly the chance expertise of some doctors, but it was partly due
to Greenfield having high incidence of heart disease and stroke. Desire to understand the causes
of these diseases provides the seed for collecting data on vascular disease and—since its needed
to understand causes—comprehensive patient information. From this, stakeholders identify
needs for more health information technology (HIT).
The doctors interested in this issue work at a clinic and realize they need data from the
hospitals, too. So they begin lobbying the hospitals to collect the data, which means investing in
HIT and implementing electronic medical records. The doctors are clearly identified during
sector team discussions on healthcare. They are not at early meetings, but others in the team
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meetings mention them. The partners seek them out, have the address the team, and identify
specific tasks to promote HIT. Together, they review how HIT is being implemented in other
places, by leading healthcare enterprises. And, together, they realize that if healthcare providers
are going to go digital, someone will have to go first for the providers to follow. Supported by
GB (Greenfield Broadband) partners and their learning community, the doctors decide to take
their clinic online.
This involves a lot of experimentation and careful improvements in the clinic’s operation,
but has benefits within GB’s first 18 months. Specifically, doctors are able to respond to patients
with information printed from the internet: It becomes a point of dialog because the doctors can
look it up, along with the patients record and authoritative with the patient to decide what it
means and how to address the issue. Indeed, the doctors encourage patients to research their
conditions and even suggest online resources for the patients’ benefit. This not only benefits the
patients and providers—increasing wellness and reducing costs—it allows the clinic, doctors
(and other healthcare providers and patients), and Greenfield to be recognized as innovators. The
doctors get more business, the hospitals are pressured—guided—to go electronic, too, and
medical technology companies and health agencies begin thinking Greenfield might be a place to
invest.
The interaction between the doctor and patient is a place to measure the impact of
community-learning on the impact of broadband. The identification of interested doctors—who
needed data, not technology per se—led to their integration around electronic health records, by
which they differentiated themselves. Hypothetically, the strength of these functions determines
whether and how the “information printed off the internet” discuss occurs and where it leads.
Community results in a better and less costly response by the doctor for the patient. Both,
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especially the patient, become more capable. (The doctor becomes more competent with
technology, which hypothetically heralds greater capabilities.) Their liberty, prosperity, and
wellness are enhanced much more by broadband than in the first scenario.
Table 5 Variables and Metrics for the Multilevel Learning Causal Model
a1
a2
a3
b1
b2
b3
c1
c2
c3
x1
x2
x3
y1
y2
y3
z1
z2
z3

Independent variables and metrics (community input functions)
Identification: Of
Recall and recognize objects/people
Identification: As and by
Strength and clarity of identity
Identification: With
Inclusion in activities and assets
Integration: Experience
Shared activities or experiences
Integration: Language
Shared expressions, terms, etc.
Integration: Purpose
Shared set of goals and objectives
Differentiation: Power
Distribution of resources
Differentiation: Reason
Ideas and rules
Differentiation: Skill
Carrying out tasks or roles
Dependent variables and metrics (outcome capabilities as real freedoms)
Liberty: Association
Number and strength/type of group interactions
Liberty: Expression
Subjective willingness to disagree or object
Liberty: Transaction and transit Mobility and spending
Prosperity: Earnings
Household earnings by demographics
Prosperity: Opportunities
Number and type/value of job openings
Prosperity: Property
Car, home, other major assets
Wellness: Conviviality
Time with associates, family, friends
Wellness: Health
Diet, exercise, and illness
Wellness: Safety
Number and types of risk behaviors

The gain in independent variables was low in the first scenario, and high in the second.
Here it becomes apparent that identification, integration, and differentiation are really latent
variables. Table 5 contains variables and metrics for the causal model. Each of the metrics is a
version of the variable construct. Multiple metrics for each construct affords greater validity and
veracity. The metrics can be used alone, together, or with other metrics. In the HIT case the
variables might be measured by survey or interview, or observation, using psychological scales,
or with diaries or field notes. My putative theory predicts that identification will be observed
first, followed by integration, and then differentiation. Further, liberty, prosperity, and wellness
metrics will increase following and in proportion to the community input functions. In cases with
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very strong community input functions, when learning aligns across levels of socioeconomic
aggregation, the real freedoms become mutually supportive. That is, there will be gains in
capabilities above those gains explainable by community. These relationships are illustrated in
figure 10.

Figure 11 The Learning Causal Model

The conceptual framework of this dissertation includes parallel factors at each level—
regional advantage from infrastructure and institutions, organizational performance from capitallabor and technology, and personal fulfillment from capacity and ability—that provide a basis for
operationalizing variables at each level. The specific metrics in the case of Greenfield’s
healthcare sector are (1) personnel rating the importance of technology, (2) number of, attendees
at, and outputs of meetings, and (3) press mentions of doctors, organizations, or Greenfield
region (in conjunction with ICTs (information and communication technologies)). The measures
of the dependent variables, which are also essentially latent, are number of sources of health and

241

medical information, earnings (number of patients and amount of fees for doctors, additional or
not lost productive time for patients), and, of course, incidence and severity of disease. The
measure of wellness for doctors might be job satisfaction or job-related stress.

GB Multilevel Learning Mathematical Models
The mathematical model of learning that I propose describes the theorized relationship
between learning at different levels. The unit of analysis, to review, is individual human beings,
who are analyzed on the personal, organizational, and regional level. So, the question becomes
what are total capabilities of the individual, and how do personal, organizational, and regional
capabilities contribute to that total. The factors and variables in this model are drawn directly
from the literature, then are related to community input functions and capabilities as real
freedoms. What does this mean in practical terms? It means that indicators and metrics, while
derived from the literature, must be defined in context. This is helpful because, as discussed in
Chapter 4, the ability and capacity constructs can be difficult to define as variables.
The simplest way to think about operationalizing the variables in the mathematical model
is that they are resources associated with each level that the individual knows of and uses.
Objectively, this reduces ability and capacity to dollar amounts. So, capacity would simply be
the replacement costs of equipment, facilities, infrastructure, etc., and amount of money spent on
labor or personnel, divided by number of persons, members, or residents. Ability would be the
revenue generated and costs avoided by these expenditures, divided by time on tasks associated
with that revenue or avoided cost. The unit of analysis is the individual, so the approach would
be to identify the roles played by individuals as persons (in households), as members of
organizations, and as residents of a region, calculate the objectively defined capacity and ability
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at each level. In order to avoid the danger of circularity (the dependent and independent variables
being measures of the same thing), the dependent variables in this approach would need to be
subjective ratings of regional advantage, organizational performance, and personal fulfillment.
For example, organizational performance might be operationalized as customer satisfaction.
The subjective approach to operationalizing the independent variables would be to
develop scales for individuals to rate ability and capacity at each level. So, for example,
individuals would rate the availability of infrastructure and resources in their region, and the
efficacy of regional institutions. In order to make these measures valid, researchers should have
individuals rate themselves, their organizations, and their regions; have others rate them; and,
have independent experts assess and rate them. With subjectively defined independent variables,
it would be best to have objectively defined dependent variables such as economic growth of
regions, organizations, and persons.
With either approach, the dependent and independent variables might be validated and
verified by correlating them to measures of community input functions and capability output
functions. What are individuals’ perceptions of identification with, integration into, and
differentiation within their households, organizations, and regions? Or, what is the evidence of
these functions in personal, organizational, and regional contexts? Similar questions can be asked
about liberty, prosperity, and wellness. Hypothetically, there should be a significant positive
relationship between dependent variables and community input functions, and between
independent variables and capability output functions, because they are essentially indicators of
the same underlying phenomena. A hybrid approach would be to replace the dependent variables
with measures of community input functions, or replace independent variables with measures of
capability output functions. Such an approach moves beyond the mathematical model’s purpose
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of describing relationships between levels because the input and output functions operate at all
levels. Regardless of approach, it should be clear that applying the mathematical model could be
rather difficult and expensive.
For GB (Greenfield Broadband), personal capabilities might be measured in terms of how
individuals spend their money and time. The money represents their capacity, and allocation of
that money represents their ability. For organizations, ability equates to division of labor,
including automation, and capacity is essentially their capital and labor. Infrastructure represents
capacity at the regional level, and institutions represent ability. Regardless of the metaphors, I
hypothesize that certain arrangements at each level lead to major increases in value. (Value can
be defined as a gain in capabilities but also as improvements in connections and/or visions.)
Using capabilities in certain ways increases capabilities. Those certain ways are community,
specifically identification, integration, and differentiation. The use of capabilities to carry out
these functions explains a significant amount of the variation in how people spend their money
and how much money they have to spend.
In the first GB scenario, without the university partners, although there was investment in
regional infrastructure, (a) adoption and use were relatively small compared to other types of
infrastructure, and (b) adoption and use did not impact regional institutions, the ways in which
churches, schools, government, etc., worked. Nor were there notable changes in organizations’
capital base, labor pool, or processes. At the individual level, GB users were very different from
other Greenfield citizens, and from themselves prior to GB. The community input functions did
not occur at the organizational and regional levels, but they did occur at the personal level.
Individuals used GB to extend and restructure their communities. For many of those individuals,
the result was both beneficial and desirable, increasing their information and materials. GB
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helped them to be more liberated, prosperous, and well, generally speaking, with some
exceptions. But, while individual capabilities benefited from personal use, there was little if any
contribution from organizational and regional factors.
The second scenario featured much higher levels of identification, integration, and
differentiation. Essentially, what the mathematical model says is that variation in individuals
capabilities are largely explained by community input functions at all levels. The actions of the
GB partners—the GRF (Greenfield Regional Foundation) staff and board, and the university
professors and assistants—catalyze identification, integration, and differentiation. The partners
work through the learning factors at each level, and conscientiously link them across levels.
Regional institutions are transformed by learning from experts and interaction. Organizations,
similarly, restructure their processes and division of labor. These are done in conjunction with
individuals’ ability improvements via and with internet technologies. Thus individuals’
competencies are better aligned with organizational performance imperatives, based on regional
advantage.
Around Greenfield, in the tractor industry, ICTs (information and communication
technology) are at first ignored then rapidly adopted and enthusiastically used. The adoption
curve was so steep for the industry because multiple firms, through their executives and
managers, studied the value of digitization from the automotive industry. With the support of the
GRF (Greenfield Regional Foundation) and university experts, the tractor industry developed
standards, demonstrated business value, and invested the necessary resources. This enabled
tractor companies and companies in allied industries to restructure their process—increasing
capital in ICTs and skilled labor, while decreasing capital in facilities and inventory—and boost
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their profitability (performance). Individuals saw increases in household earnings as the tractor
industry hired more skilled workers and trained existing workers to do more technical tasks.
The GRF and the university partners provided the institutional counterpart to GB’s
infrastructure. That change explains a significant amount of the variation in organizational
performance with ICTs, both between scenarios and within the second scenario. Communitylearning catalyzed by GB, facilitated by the university partners, and supported by the GRF is the
difference. The difference from community-learning was especially great because regional,
organizational, and individual learning about ICTs was aligned in the tractor industry: Cognitive
constructors were linked in loops of learning embedded in a triple helix of interactive learning.
The mathematical model of my proposed theory should allow it to be tested with
empirical data. Both the relationships between levels can be explored, as can the impact of
community on capabilities at each level. An interesting issue that is beyond the scope of this
dissertation is the shape of the curves. I provide linear, multivariate regression. For particular
technologies the community functions translate into the three portions of the learning curve. But
are there more complex relationships between capabilities and community between or within
levels? This issue is intellectually interesting and has practical, strategic implications.

Integrating the Models
As noted above, the tractor industry has a strong presence in and around Greenfield. By
the time the scion began contemplating the possibility of bringing broadband to the region, the
industry was beginning a slow decline due to the combination of changing consumer preferences
and foreign competition. Micro, meso, and macro level B-C-Vs (behaviors-connections-visions)
related to tractor production were not changing as fast as the market realities. Those in the region
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could not know that trend would accelerate and would interact with the “Great Recession” in
2009 to decimate their industry. At least, that’s what would happen in scenario one, in which the
industry did not adopt and use GB (Greenfield Broadband).
In scenario two, the prior knowledge of tractor production was connected at the micro,
meso, and macro levels to non-local expertise, facilitated by the university partners. This
identification function resulted in tractor industry leaders seeing models and stimuli to change
their practices. The executives and top managers of tractor manufacturers, their suppliers, and
even local customers came together and began working together to understand the value of
broadband and other ICTs. Those who participated in this process were most able to capitalize on
GB, as discussed in the previous sub-section on the mathematical model. They were also able
differentiate themselves in terms of the technology use, growth, and overall organizational
performance. And, when the “Great Recession” came they not only weathered the storm, they
were able to sustain their growth via innovation.
The community-learning process resulted new connections that were critical to the
industry. One connection was to the Geo-Tech Team, another was to healthcare. The Geo-Tech
Team became something of a new institution for the region by acquiring explicit knowledge
about geographic information systems (GIS), building tacit knowledge about collaboration and
culture, and combining these into implicit knowledge. B-C-V at the micro, meso, and macro
levels changed. Families took up geo-caching (a past time that involves searching for hidden
caches based on geographic clues). Geography became a touchstone topic in education, and was
used across the curricula in math, reading, and science. And, the Greenfield tractor industry led
the industry in using GPS (geographic positioning system) to automate tractors. An industry

247

consortium literally set the standards for this, and a local startup became a global sensation when
it began selling a robotic lawn mower based on the technology.
Connections to the healthcare industry arose from the tractor industry’s need to boost
worker productivity. The university partners noted early on that healthcare costs, absenteeism,
and injuries were major impediments to organizational performance in the industry. So they
identified individuals in each sector whose personal, organizational, and regional prior
knowledge and intentions/motivations were complementary. The partners brought these
individuals together to review models for collaboration between healthcare providers and
manufacturers, and engaged insurance and government officials to offer targeted wellness
incentives as stimulus. Together all of these groups created a wellness “dashboard.” They
identified employees of participating tractor industry companies and their families. The
healthcare providers worked with technologists, sponsored by government agencies and private
companies, to aggregate these persons’ health data in a way that protected their privacy. The
dashboard allowed individuals to create a wellness plan, track their progress, compare their
wellness with others, and mutually support each other. Then everyone employees, employers,
health professionals, etc., came together for “Fun & Fit Together,” a weekend long program to
set wellness goals and come up with ways to meet those goals. Everyone participated as a peer,
since the best expert on any person’s health is that person. The overall vision they established
was “America’s healthiest community by working together for each other’s wellness.”
Fun & Fit Together significantly reduced disease incidents among participants, decreased
absenteeism, increased productivity and earnings (for organizations and individuals), and created
a situation in which persons were able and willing to share their ideas for increasing wellness. It
made liberty, prosperity, and wellness complementary. Not only that, it created other
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improvements and innovations. A small innovation was the tractor industry creating a network of
in-house wellness centers where employees could consult with doctors, nurses, occupational
therapists, and personal trainers. A big innovation was a robotic surgery startup that was
conceived when an engineer turned surgeon and a tractor industry robotics expert met during Fun
& Fit Together.
In these examples—collaboration between the tractor industry and the Geo-Tech Team,
and with healthcare providers—we can see how the community-learning process results in
micro, meso, and macro level capabilities gains. We can also see the cascading feedback/feedforward of community input functions: how identification can lead to additional identification as
well as integration, how integration leads to more identification and integration as well as
differentiation, and how differentiation feeds into all the community input functions. We can see
these things through the lens of the three models I suggest. The mathematical model enables us
to explain variation in capabilities between and within levels as a function of community. We
can examine the ways in which the community input functions lead to increased capabilities and
real freedoms with the causal model. And, the ways in which the factors of learning fit into a
process that results in micro, meso, and macro level impacts is evident with the learning logic
model. The usefulness of these models for strategy, planning, and evaluation is implied by the
examples. We might even stretch the thought experiment by saying that the university partners
had these models at their disposal and used them as a practical and theoretical basis for their
work. While this may stretch the reader’s credulity a bit too far, it does suggest the implications
of this dissertation for research and practice.
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Paradoxes and imperatives
The internet paradox and the productivity paradox can both be seen as artifacts of
learning, at the macro and meso as well as micro levels. Social isolation from use of a nominally
social technology result from families and regions, as well as individuals, learning how to
connect via the internet. The learning involves fundamental changes in the structure and function
of institutions (like the family). These changes take time, resources, and effort. During that time
the individuals and institutions involved inevitably perform at lower levels. The same can be said
for organizations as they work to adopt (and adapt) and use ICTs (information and
communication technology). As they re-organize to capitalize on ICTs, organizational
performance necessarily declines temporarily. Hypothetically, capabilities not only rebound, they
are greatly increased—at macro, meso, and micro levels—as a result of learning to use the
technology.
The Greenfield broadband thought experiment illustrates how the process of communitybuilding, in which identification, integration, and differentiation feed into and reinforce each
other, can greatly increase capability gains. As discussed above, economic pressures are driving
profound change at all levels. Deploying broadband does not alleviate these pressures, or lessen
innate human drives. Innovation does, but it can be very costly and risky. Community reduces
these costs and risks, and boosts the autonomy, belonging, competency, etc. So, community
hypothetically enables innovation, which makes sense if we think of innovation as a general
form of increased capabilities, involving new knowledge and leading to gains in real freedoms.
These points are illustrated by what happened for the university partners in the thought
experiment. In the first scenario, not only did the universities not realize any gain in capabilities,
they were totally disengaged, not even in the picture. In the second scenario, the university
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partners acted as learning facilitators, but they also learned a great deal in the process. The
universities learned to engage organizations and regions, as well as individuals, as learners. The
universities learned to capitalize on a new technology, and it wasn’t broadband. It was
community-learning. The way in which the universities accomplished this was a essentially a
combination of open innovation and strategic innovation, drawing in knowledge from customers
and peers, and creating a functionally different, new unit in Greenfield to do so.
The need and opportunity to step out of the “sage on the stage” role allowed the
university partners to improve their outcomes by collaborating as co-learners. The learning that
resulted in the second scenario had unprecedented scope, extending across multiple organizations
that the universities would have been unlikely to reach otherwise. The universities were able to
achieve these learning outcomes with relatively few personnel because they simply (so to speak,
for this type of learning would be no simple matter) initiated and supported the community input
functions. One the most profound transformation in this thought experiment occurred for the
universities as they built a highly innovative and impactful partnership, linked to place, among
their institutions through their work with Greenfield Broadband.

Researching Scenario Two
The research approach implicit in scenario two is nearly as much of an innovation as the
universities’ educational practice. It involves the university personnel learning along with their
“subjects.” Rather than the universities “doing studies,” everyone studies together. The
university personnel don’t act as teachers or traditional researchers. Instead, they provide
structure—“scaffolding”—for the learning along with others, gathering data together in the
process. The process was essentially loops of learning, as discussed by organizational thinkers
251

(Argyris & Schön, 1978; Deming, 1986; Liker, 2004; and Senge, 2006), and was akin to action
learning (Revans, 1998; Kramer, 2008), appreciative inquiry (Cooperrider & Whitney, 2005),
and Peters’ (2009) DATA-DATA. Within these processes the university personnel and other
participants were socio-cognitively constructing their worlds. And, the processes were embedded
in triple helices of interactive learning with firms and government agencies. The research
methodology that incorporates such multilevel processes is similar to intervention research as
discussed by Rothman and Thomas (1994) and their contributors and to Jarvis’s (1999)
practitioner-researcher, but in the context of community.
The fundamental issue for this research is how the researchers recognize that community
and, more importantly, the input functions of community and how they result in increased
capabilities. They subjectively experience community and recognize functions when pointed out
to them. It is possible that, coming from various disciplines, the university personnel would
dialog about their scholarly perspectives on learning. It is even possible that they would bring
these together to consider learning at different levels. But it is rather less likely that, living inside
their respective paradigms, they would develop a conceptual framework and theory of
composition that would result in a comprehensive explanation such as “community results in
learning.” The point being that without such as framework and theory in place the university
personnel would likely have looked at GB, as researchers, in terms of the adoption and impacts.
They would have started from the internet paradox and productivity paradox, possibly drawing
on social constructionism, to prove that such lagging or poor effects are temporary artifacts of
learning. But, in the end, they would have used a research approach much like described in
conjunction with scenario one.
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If, in contrast, the university personnel started from the fundamental proposition of this
dissertation, that community makes people (and organizations and regions) smarter, they may
would take a different approach. A different research approach is even more likely if they
accepted that the ultimate good is real freedoms, and recognized that it is immoral and
impractical to treat individuals as means to an end (such as producing objective research results).
This approach basically involves engaging others in creating and testing hypotheses about the
relationship between community input functions and real freedoms.
The general hypothesis—which would have been developed with as part of the
community-building process among university partners and Greenfield Regional Foundation
(GRF) members—would be that community-building will result in the greatest capability gains
from Greenfield Broadband (GB) at the least cost for individuals as persons, members of
organizations, and residents of the region. For each individual the specific hypothesis is a bit
different, as are the community input functions. This is because each individual’s interests at
each level are different. While they all reside in the region, they interact in unique ways with the
infrastructure and institutions. Some share organizational affiliations, but play a unique role as
labor and with capital. And, each individual has unique personal ability and capacity. The
process for creating and testing these hypotheses is the same—the community-building process
of identification, integration, and differentiation—though these functions manifest somewhat
differently for each individual.
Because the process has the same structure for each individual (as persons, organization
members, and region citizens), the set of methods and tools used to support the process are the
same. These methods and tools are developed and managed by the university partners. As they
use the tools to identify, integrate, and differentiate, individuals generate data. The data are
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primarily used to test practical hypotheses about the value of GB. For example, neighborhood
teams use simple survey forms to gather information about interests, goals, concerns, etc., of
their neighbors. They use data from these forms to organize house parties on various topics.
Additional data are generated by participation in the parties, and that data is used to identify
specific opportunities for individuals to realize benefits from or with GB. Individuals generate
data about impacts as they act on these opportunities.
Each of these activities represents steps of community-building, increasing capabilities,
and data generation for research. The university partners analyze the data to answers question
such as, “Do those individuals who go through the most community-input functions realize the
greatest gains in real freedoms?” The data gathered during GB activities are associated with
demographic data, so the researchers can control for confounding factors, identify intermediate
outputs (i.e., competencies), and isolate mediating influences. The data are used to specify the
models, test the hypotheses, and validate and verify (falsify) the theory. The methods and tools
for gathering data become part of the university personnel’s practice, as well as means for GB
stakeholders to work through the community-building process. Thus, the methods and tools
allow for feedback to and reflection by the university partners regarding their roles for evaluation
and learning purposes.

Conclusion
What is the relationship between learning by individuals, organizations, and regions? It
depends on how one defines learning. A central element of this theory is the definition of
learning as a gain in capabilities, which equate to knowledge and real freedoms—liberty,
prosperity, and wellness. In common language, capabilities are what one does, has, and says. The
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relationship between micro, meso, and macro level learning is most strongly positive when
community links the levels. And, learning is structurally the same—involving changes in visions
and connections as well as behaviors at all levels—even though the learning takes a different
form (persons, organizations, regions) and has different functions (fulfillment, performance,
advantage).
The foundation of my proposed theory is that, while capabilities can be attributed to
persons, organizations, and regions, morally we must only consider individuals as ends in and of
themselves, and practically capabilities are only evident in individual behavior. Thus the unit of
analysis is the individual human being, which can be analyzed at the personal, organizational,
and regional levels. But each of these is a component of individual capabilities: Individual
capabilities are a function of personal, organizational, and regional capabilities.
One way to understand the relationship between learning at different levels is to consider
the metaphors that emerge from the literature: individual cognitive constructors (micro level)
engaged with others in organizational loops of learning (meso level) embedded together in
regional triple helices (macro level). This may be evocative, but it is not useful for explaining or
predicting learning, why some persons, organizations, and regions learn better or faster than
others.
But, before we can explain or predict or critique or improve, we must describe and
measure capabilities in ways that valid and verifiable. The ordinary concept of capabilities as
evident in what one does, has, and sees provides a starting point. In this dissertation I have
provided a conceptual framework that I believe is a philosophically and scientifically sound
version of such common wisdom. Behaviors, connections, and visions (B-C-V) are what we do,
have, and say. B-C-V includes the intersubjective, objective, and subjective aspects of agents—
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collective and individual—which provide the basis for valid description and measurement. B-CV can be verified in terms of coherence, consistence, and correspondence. Behaviors are evident.
They provide means for validly measuring the information and materials acquired via
connections, and for verifiably describing the “sides” of visions (what is perceived as objectively
beneficial and possible; subjectively desirable and practical; drivers and limiters; past and
future).
Further, B-C-V can be described and measured as knoels (knowledge elements) linked in
webs of meaning that appear as explicit, implicit, and tacit knowledge at each level. Each person,
organization, and region has a unique B-C-V—the differences in B-C-V essential define the
boundaries and characteristics of each level—and each individual’s capabilities are the product
of associated B-C-V at all levels. Practically, B-C-V manifest as liberty, prosperity, and
wellness, which are the product(s) of an individual’s personal, organizational, and regional
capabilities.
In this dissertation I propose that learning can be explained and predicted by community.
I propose that the input functions of community determine capabilities; that community makes
people smarter. The optimal circumstances are when liberty, prosperity, and wellness are
mutually reinforcing rather than trade offs. Such circumstances result from connecting learning
across levels via community. When implemented in an inclusive yet purposive manner, the
community input functions—identification, integration, and differentiation—set up real freedoms
that feed into and reinforce each other. The community input functions align liberty, prosperity,
and wellness via micro, meso, and macro level interactions. Community operates at micro, meso,
and macro levels determine individual freedoms, and its effect is strongest when those functions
align across levels. Positive actions on the community input functions—more extensive and
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stronger identification, integration, and differentiation—result in great socioeconomic gains for
the regions, organizations, and individual people who undertake those actions.
These concepts are synthesized from various academic disciplines—particularly
philosophy and the behavioral-social sciences—to provide means for describing and measuring
capabilities at various levels. These concepts do not explain the relationship between learning at
each level—how capabilities gain at one level affects capabilities at another—or even explains
differences in capabilities between individuals (within levels). The subjective validity of this
theory comes from my personal and professional experience and from my studies. Greenfield is
an amalgamation of my past clients. My experience is also the source of correspondence: This
dissertation is partly an attempt to explain phenomena that I’ve personally experience.
The objective validity rests in the practical aspects of observing and predicting behavior
(and connections and visions) covered by the theory. I believe this dissertation is a substantial
contribution because it can be consistently applied at multiple levels and in many different
contexts to describe and measure, and to explain and predict, learning. The consistency of my
framework arises from its philosophical foundations, from building on components that appear in
various areas of research and practice, and from integrating qualitative and quantitative
approaches. My concepts and conjectures have a consistency that flows from the need to
describe and measure in meaningful ways regardless of subject or topic. The concepts and
conjectures have intersubjective validity because they are synthesized from multiple, disparate
yet complementary, academic sources. While disciplinarians might take issue with how I
associate and use certain concepts, such objections would overlook obvious gaps and parallels in
the literature. The abutments for the proposed theory were in place but the bridges were missing.
What I have attempted to do is provide a coherent explanation of the relationship between
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learning at different levels, an explanation that can make sense of the diversity of established
thoughts on these matters.
As noted in the introduction of this dissertation, Lakotos (1976, 1978) maintains that
theory must be judged by its consistence with accepted knowledge, it heuristic value, and the
novelty of its predictions. I believe I addressed the first issue via the validity and verifiability of
my conjecture that communities increase capabilities across levels. The theory could provide
heuristic value in practice and research. The practice of GB’s (Greenfield Broadband) university
partners in the second scenario suggests how the concepts in this dissertation might apply in
practice. The discussion of how each model might be applied, above, provides some guidance for
research, and chapter four provides conceptual depth for extending and refining the theory.
Novel predictions, which were Lakotos’s criteria for true science, are more challenging.
The general prediction, that those individuals with stronger community across levels will have
the greatest capabilities, is somewhat novel. Community has been used in various conceptual
forms in learning theory, particular at the organizational and regional levels. But my proposed
theory conceives of community as a phenomenon or process—not a thing—that determines
capabilities. I believe my proposed theory has other novel implications, particularly for the fuzzy
space between paradigms, for how concepts from different disciplines fit together. The
Greenfield thought experiment provides examples. The illustration of GB without communitylearning is far from what would be expected under the “if you build it, they will come”
paradigm. The predications of my proposed theory are somewhat novel simply because the
concept of community-learning is novel. As the models are applied to various circumstances, I
believe it will generate more novel predictions, along with valuable heuristics and intellectual
consistency.
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The Greenfield broadband thought experiment suggests some novel, albeit totally
hypothetical, outcomes. In the first scenario the community input functions were weak,
especially at the organizational and regional levels. Those who adopted Greenfield Broadband
(GB) in scenario one, particularly those who were technology savvy, had negative vision of the
region and its organizations. They did not see adequate resources for personal fulfillment. We
know because of what they did: They used GB to search for things they personally valued—
goods to purchase, educational activities, new jobs—outside the region. In the process, they
shifted their time, money, and attention out of Greenfield. In scenario one, individuals increased
their real freedoms by exiting the region, virtually if not actually. Those who used GB for
organizational purposes ended up working more, shifting time away from personal purposes, and
trading a bit of liberty and wellness for a modicum of prosperity. Individuals in organizational
and regional roles did not adopt GB or capitalize on it to improve their divisions of labor or
institutions.
These imagined results are quite a contrast to the “if you build it, they will come”
presumption; it is more like, “if you build it, they will leave”! Of course, these are little more
than predictions of what would happen in a situation like Greenfield’s, based on the theory that
community yields learning. But, the imagined results of scenario one are consistent with
empirical findings of research into adoption and use of information and communication
technologies. And, the results in scenario one are quite reasonable and follow logically from the
manner in which GB (Greenfield Broadband) was instigated.
Essentially, those who saw the potential value of broadband—those who, in terms of my
conceptual framework, had a strong frontside and outside vision for it—adopted and used GB in
ways that disconnected them from Greenfield. Those who had a strong belief in—vision for and
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of—their organizations and regional institutions did not adopt and use GB. It did not fit their
visions. They did not change how they acquired information and materials for their organizations
or the region, nor did they change what information and materials they had. Specifically, they
didn’t buy more ICTs (information and communication technology), hire more technologists, or
send their employees to ICT-related training. This illustrates how B-C-V (behaviorsconnections-visions) can be used to describe and measure changes and impacts, as well as lack of
learning between and within levels.
In the second scenario of this thought experiment, the Greenfield tractor scion and the
university representatives identified each other during a conference, based on complementary
visions, and integrated through follow-up meetings, changing their B-C-V. This led the
universities to further identify with each other, drawing other university personnel, and integrate
via their work on GB. They then became an identification mechanism to connect organizational
and regional agents with each other and GB. As a result, the organizations shifted their capital
and labor toward ICTs, and ICTs were incorporated into regional institutions. So, by the time GB
was deployed and individuals began to adopt it, activities and assets of interest to them were
available online from local organizations and regional institutions. Individuals in scenario two
shifted fewer connections to non-local sources, or established weaker non-local connections that
were more likely to draw capital into the region. Again, this is fictitious scenario, and the results
are nothing more that predictions of what might happen in this situation if, as I propose,
community-building results in gains in capabilities. While the circumstances push the limits of
credulity, the imagined results are reasonable, do not contradict other theories or the conclusions
of empirical research cited in this study, and can be described by my models and explained by
the theory I suggest.
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Taken together the two imaginary scenarios—summarized in table 6—illustrate the
usefulness of my conceptual framework, and the potential power of my putative theory. The
thought experiment also suggests opportunities for applying the content of this dissertation to
research and practice. The general opportunity is to investigate the effects of the community
input functions on real freedoms, how much variation in and relations between real freedoms can
be explained by variation in community input function. One set of research opportunities involve
validating the concepts I’ve laid out in this dissertation, including operationalizing the variables
and establishing reliable means for describing and measuring them. Another set of opportunities
involves testing the central propositions of this dissertation in various contexts, particularly the
relationships between learning at various levels.

Table 6 A High-Level Comparison of the Greenfield Broadband Thought Experiment Scenarios

Negative
None

Medium
Strong

Medium
Strong

Strong
Strong

Positive
Positive

Micro

None

None

None

Weakly
positive

Medium

Medium

Medium

Positive

Outcomes

Differentiation

Weak
None

Integration

Weak
None

Identification

Medium
None

Integration

Macro
Meso

Identification

Outcomes

Scenario two: broadband deployment with
strong community input functions

Differentiation

Scenario one: broadband deployment
with weak community input functions

The B-C-V and W7TH (how, that, what, when, where, who, why, whether, which)
frameworks and the concepts of capabilities and community provide bases for carrying out these
tasks, but these things need additional development for particular applications. Possibly the most
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fundamental research opportunity is to validate these concepts in the B-C-V and W7TH
frameworks in practice. These are little more than extensions of existing concepts from the
behavioral and social sciences presented in an integrated and simplified manner, so they have
prima facie validity. Further validation would need to come from application.
There are opportunities to examine how the community input functions feed into each
other. Do these functions actually exist apart from factors of learning such as prior knowledge
and practice? Community-learning is conceived to be a complex process with diverse
interactions between its component functions. Can it be validly characterized as a process? I
suggest that innate drives are evinced differently with each community input function. Is this
true? If so, this could show that the functions are real and distinct parts of a process. How are the
functions related to each other? Are they connected in a linear and sequential manner or are the
relationships between functions more complex, and, if so, under what circumstances are they
related in complex or simple ways? So, for example, I suggest that integration is driven by
selfish intentions and motivations, but those motives change with differentiation as personal
drives are fulfilled. At that point individuals will act on behalf of the community and even
sacrifice for it based on the extent to which their role in the group is part of their identity.
There are similar opportunities to better understand real freedoms—liberty, prosperity,
and wellness—and relations between them. Are these valid concepts? Can they be
complementary or are they necessarily mutually exclusive? The strength of interaction effects
between real freedoms could be considered a dependent variable in studies of multilevel
learning, but such research would almost have to be preceded by research that establishes the
constructs and identifies these interaction effects.

262

Of course, the central question of this dissertation is the relationship between individual,
organizational, and regional learning. My proposed answer is that community input functions not
only explain learning at one level but also relations between levels. This is a novel proposition. It
also presents something of a research challenge becomes in requires micro, meso, and macro
level, and of both the community input functions and the capabilities or real freedoms. To make
matters worse, such research might also involve assessing learning factors to control for
confounding factors and assessing competencies to identify short-term results. So, for example,
based on my theoretical propositions, a researcher might hypothesize that the more diverse the
parties involve in identification are, the greater potential and actual knowledge gains will be. Or
it might be hypothesized that community input functions that involve individuals acting in
personal, organizational, and regional roles, so the functions operate at the micro, meso, and
macro levels, will have the greatest outputs. These are both novel predictions, particularly the
latter, and have important practical implications.
The simple way to investigate community-learning is likely to be to study the functions at
one level in a particular context. Such studies could afford consideration of spillover effects to
other levels, especially if the study is designed to accommodate such analysis. Another approach
might be to have multiple, parallel studies of learning at different levels by scholars in different
disciplines coordinating their work to examine cross-level effects. Of course, ideally studies
could focus on relationships between learning at different levels. It would be interesting to
examine how changes in personal abilities, division of labor and technology, and institutions—
micro, meso, and macro level phenomena—interact and relate. The discussion of Greenfield
broadband suggests how this might be practically accomplished by focusing on particular
activities or projects. A multilevel learning research agenda, though, would almost have to start
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with validation of essential concepts, developing methods for describing and measuring them,
and then turn to examining relationships between the constructs.
I suggest that the unit of analysis for learning research must be the individual human
being, for philosophical and practical reasons. But, the most opportunities for further work with
this theory may be in organizational performance. This is simply because regional development
is a larger-scale phenomenon, and less open to new practices, and because individual education
and personal development are too politically charged. Organizations have strong need for greater
capabilities, and scholars in management and social sciences are attuned to factors that impact
organizational performance. That said my proposed multilevel theory of learning could have
novel value in understanding and improving school performance and accelerating economic
development. Innovation and technology are two topics that present abundant opportunities for
further research, as suggested by the discussion, above.
This dissertation has provided a textual analysis of theories of learning and identifying
commonalities and differences across these bodies of literatures. It describes clear gaps between
bodies of literature on individual, organizational, and regional learning. On one hand, the
literature does not provide a conceptual framework for learning that could apply at macro, meso,
and micro levels. On the other hand, there is scant consideration of how learning at these various
levels relates. I have applied theory- and model-building methods to suggest ways to address
these gaps. I have also illustrated how my concepts and models might be applied. It is my sincere
hope that this dissertation provides practical bases for investigating community-learning, and can
contribute to learning practices as well as scholarly endeavors.
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